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Foreword 
The anatomy of anti-Arab racism 
An 'interesting' conspiracy tale circulated in the aftermath of 
September 11. It went like this: Arab Muslims are too dumb to plan 
something like the terrorist attack on the towers; it was really Mossad 
that was behind the attack. 
The story is interesting because it combines two racial 
stereotypes in one: the anti-Semitic stereotype of the conspiratorial 
Jew and the typical colonial stereotype of the dumb, inferior, 'third 
world looking' colonised. The fact that these two racisms are 
combined in trying to come to tenus with an action initiated by 
Arab Muslims is not a coincidence. The latter has always had an 
ambivalent position within the spectrum of European otherness. 
This spectrum is structured by a polarity between what we 
might call 'the other of the will' and 'the other of the body'. The 
other of the will is the cunning other, the competitive other, the 
manipulative other, the conspiratorial other, the other that can thwart 
my plans and undenuine me, the other who, deep down, I fear 
might be superior to me ... at least with regards to intelligence. 
The epitome of this other is of course the anti-Semitic figure of the 
Jew. It is also the product of a racism very specific to it, the racism 
of extenuination. 
The other ofthe body, on the other hand, is an unambiguously 
inferior other, inferior in tenus of intelligence, inferior in tenus 
technical know-how, inferior in terms of capacity to be productive 
(e.g., the category of 'the lazy other'). The epitome of this other 
was the colonial portrayal of the black African. Likewise, it is also 
the product of a very specific type of racism, the racism of exploit-
ation. 
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Paradoxically, it was his or her supposed inferiority and lack 
of intelligence that made the lazy other of colonisation, the other 
that is all body, exploitable. The other of the mind, the cunning 
other, was by definition un-exploitable, for if anything, such an other 
had the potential to himself or herself exploit the European colo-
nisers, manipulate them and use them against their will. By defmition 
such an other could only be exterminated. 
This does not mean, of course, that the other ofthe body was 
never exterminated. The history of colonial extermination in the 
process of territorial and political domination is well established. 
Yet, what is interesting about such processes of extermination is 
that within them the colonised other was much less and on fewer 
occasions essentialised as an object of extermination. The European 
colonisers, like everybody else in this world, try to exterminate what 
they classify as a threat, not what they classify as inferior. And 
once the colonised other are eliminated"as"a tnfeat,once tli~y have 
been reduced in number, once their political will has been eradicated, 
once their capacity for resistance has been squashed, that is, once 
they have been 'killed' politically and socially as a group, then, 
most often than not, begins a period where a substantial number of 
people among the colonisers begin to 'love the socio-politically dead 
other', and yearn to 'preserve' its culture. One can see this, in an 
anthropological spirit, as a kind of 'political necrophilia' specific to 
the evolution of colonial culture. Perhaps it is best exemplified by 
those European settlers or their descendants who, once the natives 
have been politically smashed, but only then, not only express their 
love of 'native cultures' (like the European 'appreciation' of 
Indigenous desert paintings in Australia) but manage to express 
outrage at their 'living conditions', at 'the death rate among them' 
and even courageously celebrate their 'resistance'. All is done for 
as long as it is subliminally well-known that it is a resistance ofthe 
politically dead, doomed to have no effect on the quality of life 
they, as colonisers or descendant of colonisers, have acquired from 
being 'well positioned' in this cumulative process of resource 
appropriation and theft. It is this necrophilic appreciation of the 
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politically dead other that characterises the racism of exploitation. 
Practically, it means that the other has been subjugated, pacified 
and tamed enough to become classified as 'valuable', either 
aesthetically or for labouring purposes. 
This necrophilic dimension is totally absent in the racism of 
extermination. For the Nazis, no matter how many Jews have been 
exterminated, the Jew was still a threat. The capacity of the cunning, 
manipulative other to be a threat is not dependent on numbers as is 
the case with the colonised. One manipulative Jew can do as much 
harm as ten, or a thousand, or a million. One cannot imagine a 
situation where a Nazi says, 'we have this Jewish family in our 
neighbourhood, they have such an interesting culture' while another 
says 'we have too many'. For the Nazi, one Jew is always already 
too many. 
It is from within the field constituted by the polarity between 
the racism of exploitation and the racism of extermination, and 
their imaginary others, that we can appreciate the 'ambiguous 
categorisation' of the Arab by the European colonisers. For the 
Arab is at the same time, a hybrid that is both a 'Jew' and a 'black 
African' and an in-between that is neither. He is an other of the 
will and the body, and neither. She is both cunning, and too dumb to 
be cunning. Even in phenotypical terms, the Arab is neither a 'Jewish 
type' nor a 'black type' but an in-between, or a 'both'. The Arab is 
both an uncivilised other like the black African but also, like the 
Jew, belonging to an early modern civilisation that has shaped 
European civilisation. The Arab is a monotheist like the Jewish 
other but with an 'inferior' religious imagination (e.g., the paradise 
as full of virgins) akin to more primitive religious forms. And while 
the dangerous Jew of the anti -Semitic imagination is categorised 
as a snake, a hyena, or a vermin, and the exploitable black as a 
domesticated animal, the Arab is neither. The Arab seems to be 
for the European coloniser what the pig is for Jewish and Muslim 
cultures, a polluting non-exploitable (i.e., not good for consumption) 
creature, and yet unlike the 'Jewish snake' not so much ofa threat 
that it must be exterminated at all cost. 
IX 
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Today's racialised Arab, the bin Laden-like figure of the 
scheming international terrorist, is a continuation within a global 
context of this racialising dichotomy. For is not the imaginary bin 
Laden an in-between figure, hybridising the two key figures of 
otherness in the era of globalisation: the superior, manipulative, 
scheming (Jewish) international banker and the miserable, inferior, 
exploitable (third world looking) migrant labourer? 
And here again, the post-colonial state is ambivalent about the 
Arab within the metropolis in much the same way as the colonial 
state was ambivalent about him or her in the colony. It continually 
asks itself the same question: Is the Arab a migrant 'black African' 
bodily other, or a 'Jewish' subversive scheming will? 
Like every bodily migrant other, the Arab migrant smells (his 
or her house, kids, clothes, cars and cooking smells and pollutes the 
neighbourhood), his or her way of life and place of worship is an 
eyesore that needs to be contained. Within this 'bodily register', 
one or two Arabs might be tolerable but when there are 'too many' 
it becomes unbearable. 
But, unlike most migrants, the Arab migrant is a subversive 
will. He or she is not only interested in opening a restaurant and 
offering exotic food. He or she (especially, she, the veiled one) 
embodies the will of the other, the one who can subvert the European 
national/patriarchal order by speaking and acting in the name of 
another, Arab Muslim, supranational patriarchal order. They invade 
our shores, take over our neighbourhood and rape our women. 
They are all little bin Ladens and they are everywhere: explicit bin 
Ladens and closet bin Ladens; conscious bin Ladens and un-
conscious bin Ladens; bin Ladens on the beach and bin Ladens in 
the suburbs, as this book is aptly titled. Within this register, the 
Arab, like the Jew of the Nazis, is intolerable as such. Even a 
single Arab is a threat. 
Contain the Arab, or exterminate the Arab? A 'tolerable' 
presence in the suburbs, or caged in a concentration camp? 
Exterminate their political will or remove them physically, in their 
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totality, will and body? The politics of the Western post-colonial 
state is constantly and dangerously oscillating between these two 
tendencies today. It is this dangerous oscillation that is so lucidly 
exposed in this book, a book written by veteran anti-racists as it 
were. 
When I first arrived in Australia in 1976, I was an anti-Muslim 
racist. Born and raised in a staunchly Christian Lebanese 
environment, leaving Lebanon in the midst of a civil war I clearly 
perceived as 'backward Muslims hordes out to destroy civilised 
Europeanised Christians', I embodied and felt most of the racist 
categorisations I am critically reflecting upon today. 
In my frrst year at Macquarie University, I encountered another 
Christian Lebanese who was giving a talk on the Lebanese civil 
war. He spoke against the confessionalist Christian versus Muslim 
conception of Lebanon and I thought he was just a misguided idiot. 
His name was Paul Tabar. I later discovered that he was married 
to a Shi'a Muslim woman, which confirmed to me that he was an 
idiot. But in the end, he was offering a version of human relations 
that was very far from, and I un-hesitantly say ethically and 
practically far superior to my world outlook at the time. As I thought 
things through, which is what a university allows you to do - despite 
what some simplistic anti-university journalists want people to believe 
today -, it did not take me much time before I was won over. 
In the meantime, I was in the company of more and more 
students who had an anti-racist ethical and practical view of what 
human relations ought to be about. A handful of those became long 
term friends and a major influence on me. Among them were Greg 
Noble and Scott Poynting. Together as postgraduate students we 
debated the early writing of Jock Collins on migration and labour 
market segmentation as part of our anti-racist abc. 
So, the reader can imagine how grateful I am to be given the 
opportunity to write the Foreword to a book on anti-Arab racism 
authored by the very four people that contributed to cure my anti-
Arab racism. I like to think that they are the people through whom 
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the Australian society of the seventies made me a better person. 
They represented some of what was best about that society. And 
so, today, as I see Australian society moving towards the very 
'Christian versus Muslim outlook' that it has so successfully rid me 
of, I experience puzzlement, pain, and a sense of dread. On one 
hand, I can see in the new 'Christian versus Muslim' zealots a part 
of me, and as such, I understand how good people can come to 
think in such ugly ways. I have no desire to diabolise racists just as 
I don't diabolise my early self. But on the other, I cannot but feel 
that such people, in the name of being part of an advanced 
civilisation, are taking Australian society backward in the direction 
of the ignorant, arrogant and prejudiced Lebanese culture of the 
1970s promoted by a substantial number of Christian chauvinists at 
the time. And so I have to tell such people, even if part of me 
thinks that it is useless to preach, I have to tell them: You never go 
forward by thinking of yourself as protecting Western Christian 
civilisation against Muslim hordes. You only go backward. This 
has been proven historically again and again if you care to learn 
and listen. 
xii 
Ghassan Hage 
Anthropology, University of Sydney 
Introduction 
'TERROR AUSTRALIS: Bin Laden groups in our suburbs', shrilled 
the front-page tabloid headline in October 2001 (Miranda 12110/ 
01 b: 1). The Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security Intel-
ligence Organisation (ASIO) and 'other agencies' had allegedly 
'found sham charities linked directly to terrorist work'. The Daily 
Telegraph editorial of the same day asserted that such 'intelligence 
... has identified up to 100 operatives in Sydney suspected of this 
activity', and urged that 'immediate action' be taken (Daily 
Telegraph 12110/01:20). 
In fact, the 'immediate action' had already begun. In September 
2001, ASIO, along with the Federal police, was raiding at gun-
point the homes of Muslim, mainly Arabic-speaking immigrant 
citizens, amid paper-talk of Al Qaeda 'sleeper cells' in Australia's 
suburbia. A year later, the papers had the terror in our 'backyard' 
or on our 'doorstep' in Bali, and 'we' were not sure whether it had 
a Middle Eastern appearance or a defiant, evil South-East Asian 
smile. ASIO then raided Indonesian immigrants. No suspects-
Arab, Indonesian or other - were charged with terrorist-related 
offences, after either security swoop. Yet in the panic which ensued, 
sheikhs of any sort became suspect, turbans of any type were 
terrifying, and mosques menacing. Numerous letters to the editor 
and radio talkers-back echoed these concerns, which in many cases 
vilified people of Arabic-speaking background and in some instances 
gave rise to acts of racial violence against them. 
How could such hysteria be so commonly shared in con-
temporary Australia? What was in the cultural background that 
made an alarmist headline like 'Bin Laden groups in our suburbs' 
resonate with readers? This book looks for answers to these 
questions: answers - or at least the search for them - that might 
tell us something about ourselves. 
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This monograph is not about 'ethnic crime' in the manner of 
our earlier effort, Kebabs, Kids, Cops and Crime (Collins, Noble, 
Poynting & Tabar 2000). This present work is rather about what 
public worrying over 'ethnic crime' tells us about Australian society 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Why is it, for example, 
that culpability for several horrific gang rapes in Sydney in 2000 
can be attributed so widely to whole ethnic communities? And under 
what conditions does, say, a minor incident such as a 'good news 
story' on the operation of a halal hamburger shop become an 
occasion for a moral panic about the failures of multiculturalism? 
How is it that the arrival off Christmas Island in August 2001 of a 
foundering boatload of emaciated people seeking asylum, mostly 
from despotic regimes in 'the Middle East', can be manipulated to 
characterise complete cohorts of applicants for refuge - and their 
immigrant countryfolk - as dangerous, dishonest, criminally inclined 
and inhuman? All this, recall, was before 11 September 2001. How 
did the terrorist attacks of that day in the USA exacerbate existing 
tendencies in Australia to stereotype Arabs and Muslims as 
backward, inassimilable, without respect for Western laws and 
values, and sympathetic to, or complicit with, barbarism and 
terrorism? 
Moral panics usually entail diagnoses of a society's ills, and 
prescriptions for remedy from both the pundits and the punters. 
What makes the diagnoses 'ring true' is that they strike a chord 
with people's experiences; those suffering from particular anxieties 
about, say, the direction or extent of social change, can identify 
elements of their worries in the acceleratingly generalised, shared 
sense of a social ailment. 'Explanations' offered by the 'experts' 
take up their inchoate concerns, render them more articulate, 
plausible, and scientific-sounding, and deliver them back to the 
anxious audiences in a feedback loop which works to the extent 
that it reverberates with popular anxieties. 'Folk Devils' serve as 
simple, readily digestible apparent causes of the problem, which is 
invariably presented as straightforward and without complexity, and 
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a range of simplistic 'solutions' are accordingly proposed. Thus, 
the examination of a series of moral panics about the' Arab Other' 
which we undertake in the chapters that follow, is intended to throw 
light on what relevant popular anxieties are arising in contemporary 
Australian society, among whom, how they are taken up, how they 
are elaborated, how they are circulated, by whom, with what effect, 
in (or against) whose interests, how the folk devil is 'assembled', 
even how (some of) the diabolised people themselves (some of the 
time) are drawn into this construction. 
This book addresses some of these questions, and others. It 
argues that in contemporary Australia we are witnessing the 
emergence of the 'Arab Other' as the pre-eminent 'folk devil' of 
our time. This Arab Other functions not only in terms of the specific 
concerns embedded in fear of crime; it also functions in the national 
imaginary to prop up the project of national belonging. We show 
that the concern with 'ethnic crime' and 'Lebanese gangs' meshes 
with national and international politics in forming an image of a 
violent and criminal Arab Other, a process in which community 
leaders often unwittingly participate. This mythic Other has little to 
do with the lived experience of those of Arab or Middle Eastern or 
Muslim origin, and everything to do with a host of social anxieties 
which overlap and feed upon each other in a series of moral panics. 
This is not simply a process of ideological representation by media 
and politicians, but impacts upon policing, the judicial system and 
social policy. This manipulation of the politics of fear ultimately 
undermines rather than produces social cohesion in a culturally 
diverse society like Australia, bringing forth a decisive moment in 
the existence of multiculturalism. 
Consider some 'snapshots' of us. The Mufti of Australia, well-
known religious leader of this country's Islamic community, is 
allegedly seen driving in a Sydney suburb with a piece of plastic (or 
might it be metal?) protruding from the vehicle. Sheikh Al Hilaly is 
pulled over by police, manhandled, body-searched in his religious 
robes. Careful, he might be carrying a firearm! Purported, un-
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confirmed security reports, four years old and unacted upon in the 
meantime, supposedly suggest the Sheikh may have a gun. He 
doesn't; but he does object to the treatment. The car is found to be 
some days out of registration. The Sheikh is arrested, handcuffed 
and charged with assault and resisting arrest, as well as driving an 
unregistered and uninsured vehicle. It is page one news. The 
controversy reverberates for a week in the letters pages and opinion 
columns - not to mention talkback radio. Most are condemnatory. 
His 'chequered history' is listed by the Daily Telegraph, beginning 
with the statement that he doesn't speak English in public after 
twenty years in Australia, although' critics claim he is fluent' (Morris 
& English 7/1/03: 1 ,4). The non-traffic charges are dropped before 
the trial proceeds, some seven months later. Police admit they could 
not sustain the charges, as they had no lawful reasons to subject 
him to the search. 
Here is one more snapshot. A man who 'loves cricket, voted 
for John Howard, admires Liberal Party values, and owns a 
computer hardware company' (Cameron 28111102:2) applies to build 
a Muslim prayer centre in middle-class, semi-rural Annangrove, in 
Sydney's north-western 'Hills' District where the white-thinking 
majority likes its fundamentalism Christian. The local council receives 
thousands of objections and complaints, and the applicant, 
Australian-born Mr Abbas Aly, receives racial vilification in a poster 
campaign, a brick through his office window, arson at his home, 
and eventual smashing of the property in contention, marked with 
obscene graffiti. The Council, despite the recommendations of its 
own planning experts, rejects the development application as out 
of keeping with 'the shared beliefs, customs and values of the local 
community' (Morris 19/12/02:4). This decision was to be eventually 
overturned in the Land and Environment Court. There, according 
to the Sydney Morning Herald, Mrs White, secretary of the 
Annangrove Progress Association, told the court that she was 
'unaware of the origin of those putting forward the centre and did 
not know they were of Australian-Indian background'. She was 
quoted as saying, 'All I can say is that a jihad has been placed on 
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Annangrove ... and that creates some fear' (O'Rourke 14/5/03:9). 
There was fear among the locals of sexual violence, as well as of 
jihad, from the outsiders. Senator George Campbell cited Baulkham 
Hills Mayor, lay preacher John Griffith, as 'suggesting the safety 
of "girls and ladies" is at risk if the mosque is built' (Cameron 28/ 
11102:2). Irene Buckler, of Glenwood, wrote to the Daily Telegraph: 
By surrounding themselves with the trappings of their traditional 
cultures, the newcomers gradually ousted mine. Like many 
traditional Australians living in south-western Sydney, I had 
no choice ... but to move on. The residents of Annangrove 
have a right to protect their patch without being vilified as 
racist rednecks (Buckler, 118/03: 26). 
The next day the Telegraph printed the result of its 'Voteline', 
canvassed on the same day as Buckler's letter. 'A court has over-
turned a council decision that prevented the building of a mosque 
at Annangrove. Was it right to do so?' Some 90% of voting readers 
(616 of them) recorded a 'No' answer; only 10% (or 66) responded 
'Yes'. 
How do we go about investigating the common sense of 'race' , 
nation, fear and criminality? What are the 'data' of our research; 
what are our 'methods' for gathering, recording and analysing 
these? How can we observe and grasp such ideology? Many of 
our sources are media extracts, garnered from an exhausting but 
not exhaustive monitoring of the major print media (and to a minor 
extent, because of costs, the electronic media) in Sydney 
concentrating around November 1998 to early 2000, and August 
2001 to September 2003. There is also some material from national 
media and other (mainly capital) cities, but Sydney is the major 
destination for Arabic-speaking immigrants and has the highest 
population ofthis cultural and linguistic background - especially 
concentrated in certain suburbs which have drawn considerable 
media attention. Nevertheless, the book moves between global, 
national, state, city and local events to show how these levels are 
imbricated in moments of moral panic. 
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The media material is not the only source for our analysis. We 
also try to grasp how people make sense of their everyday lives by 
using open-ended, conversation-like recorded interviews and (to a 
much lesser extent) participant observation. The interviews which 
we draw upon from various projects over the last six years are 
more with people on the less powerful side of 'ethnic relations', 
and we try to incorporate their standpoint(s) in our interpretations. 
Thus, in various chapters of the book, there is a mix of media 
and interview sources. The binding and connecting arguments 
throughout the book unfold as follows. 
Chapter One describes a series of events or issues over the 
last few years which have been the subject of much media coverage 
and public debate - 'ethnic crime gangs', 'race rapes', the 'Tampa 
crisis', the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 Septemb~r 2001 and 
in Bali in October 2002, as well as a series of minor incidents -
that reveal social perceptions of the Arab Other. The links that are 
made between these events and the 'perpetrators' involved, however 
problematic, constitute a homogenised category of those of Arabic-
speaking background, Middle Eastern appearance or Muslim faith. 
They are seen as a 'dangerous other', radically different from an 
implicit Australian norm. The racialised 'frame' at work here 
naturalises cultural explanations of criminal and terrorist activities. 
Chapter Two picks up this argument and shows how military 
metaphors in the representations of these events form a crucial 
link, positing an equivalence between rowdy young men of Middle 
Eastern appearance, criminal gangs, pack rapists, people-smugglers 
and queue-jumpers and terrorists, and casting all their offences as 
a generalised threat. Two narratives employ the metaphor of war 
in describing these events, but both attempt to recuperate a morally 
innocent position of the 'ordinary Australian'. 
Chapter Three critiques the oft-repeated claim that the young 
men who are seen to be at the heart of key social problems are 
'lost between two cultures'. It demonstrates that this discourse is 
ethnocentric, inaccurate and part of the repertoire of social control. 
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The chapter uses interview material to show, rather than a 'loss' 
of culture or a failure to integrate, the complex and 'hybrid' cultural 
resources which second-generation Lebanese immigrant young men 
deploy strategically in their everyday lives. We suggest here that 
even the 'sympathetic' and well-meaning liberal way of framing 
the culture of the 'lost' young men of the second generation of 
immigrants, fails to capture the conscious creativity of their 
everyday life. Moreover, such framing takes for granted the 
culturalist 'explanations' critiqued in Chapters One and Two (and 
later in Chapter Six), and problematically assumes an essential 
conflict between' Australian' and 'Middle Eastern' cultures. 
Chapter Four traces the Western Sydney 'ethnic gang rape' 
moral panic of 200 1-02, showing how this horrendous crime was 
racialised and ideologically associated with the masculinity of Muslim 
culture and the failure to assimilate. (It should not be necessary to 
point out that to sustain this argument is not tantamount to condoning 
the crime or diminishing the suffering of the victims, as some media 
columnists have accused.) Not only did the media and populist 
political representation of these crimes involve racialisation, they 
also became interwoven with the contemporaneous 'othering' of 
Arab and other Middle Eastern immigrants and asylum seekers 
and also Muslim Australians, discussed in Chapter One, as: illegal 
immigrants, people-smugglers, criminal gangs, terrorists, rapists. 
The interconnected threads involve common-sense 'orientalism' 
of the ArablMuslim Other's masculinity as deviant, immoral and 
dangerous: racialised and criminalised. These contradictory racist 
themes include: LebaneselMuslim men's purported disrespect of 
women in general; LebaneselMuslim men being allegedly brought 
up to regard 'White', 'Western', 'Caucasian', women as 'sluts' 
and thus 'fair game'; 'ethnic gang rape' as an expression of anti-
'Aussie', anti-White, anti-Western hatred which is supposedly 
encouraged in Muslim communities at large; Muslim and 'Third-
World' cultures as barbaric, uncivilised, violent and misogynistic in 
their law and their morality; condemnation oflaxity and indulgence 
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in the Australian legal and political system towards 'unAustralian' 
transgressors. The chapter further shows how the justice system 
responded to the moral panic in the context of a political 'law and 
order' auction. 
Chapter Five argues that the construction of the Arab Other 
has facilitated the emergence of' dog-whistle politics' in Australia, 
where politicians and media talk about certain events in nuanced 
or coded ways, which speak to pervasive fears and prejudices of 
the Australian population towards people of Arab background, and 
especially towards those of Muslim faith. These everyday fears 
can be found in discussion of such supposedly mundane and non-
criminal issues such as the opening of a halal Macdonald's, the 
creation of a specific classes for Muslim women at a local 
gymnasium, and the case of the Muslim man threatened with 
dismissal for continuing to pray at work. This form of politics licenses 
appalling acts of racial vilification that have been on the rise during 
the moral panics, and increasingly aggressive forms of state 
repression. 
Chapter Six details the ways in which Arab and Muslim 
community leaders have been drawn into complicity with the 
pathologising and criminalising of those of Arabic-speaking 
background, through accepting a discourse which explains criminal 
behaviour in terms of cultural attributes and through being 
incorporated in a multiculturalism based on an 'ethnic politics' of 
party patronage and beholdenness to the state. 
Chapter Seven returns to the theme of everyday fears in 
Australian national life, and details the underlying aspects of 
Australia's paranoid nationalism. It argues that fear of crime has 
become increasingly meshed with a range of social anxieties in a 
climate of panic; anxieties which are projected onto those of Arab 
or Muslim ancestry and onto multiculturalism generally. These are 
managed by the State and media organisations in such a way as to 
promote rather than diminish fear. 
8 
Introduction 
The conclusion considers the perilous existence of multi-
culturalism in the current climate but construes it as a fateful moment 
full of possibility despite the dominance of 'penal populism' . Rather 
than witnessing the death of multiculturalism, we are faced with an 
opportunity to reflect upon the nature of community, cultural 
diversity and national belonging. 
A comment about referencing is called for here. Because we 
are presenting a considerable amount of media extracts, and be-
cause many are written by the same authors on several different 
days of the same year, the standard author/year referencing method 
will not suffice. We have used author and date (dd/mmlyy) for 
media references and the usual author and year for books and 
scholarly journal articles. Letters to the editor are identified in the 
text, referenced by name of the letter's author, and indicated as 
such in the reference list at the end of the book. Newspaper edito-
rials are referenced by the name of the newspaper, as is conven-
tional, with 'editorial' noted in the reference list; newspaper arti-
cles without by-lines are also referenced by the name ofthe news-
paper. The press sources referred to in this book may be found in 
full in the archive editions of the publications that are referenced in 
the reference list. 
Finally, it remains to record our thanks to those who in various 
ways have contributed to the collective labour of the book. We 
thank Ghassan Hage not only for his kind Foreword, but for 
encouraging us to write the book. To Chris Cunneen and the Institute 
of Criminology, go our thanks for welcoming the idea of the 
monograph and supporting its production. To Tessa Boyd-Caine in 
the early stages, to Jocelyn Luff and especially Nina Ralph in the 
text-editing and production stages, we owe a special thanks. We 
would like to thank Rob White and Trevor Batrouney for their helpful 
comments. 
We are grateful to Bruno di Biase, Yama Farid, Randa Kattan, 
Michael Kennedy, Jillanne Martin, Richard Martino, Helen 
Masterman-Smith, Vicki Mau, Ruth McCausland, Cristina Pebaque, 
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Frances Simmons, Michael Strutt, Keysar Trad, and the many others 
- especially our anonymous interviewees and informants - who 
gave their time, trust, material, ideas and myriad other contributions 
to the book. 
We also thank the Centre for Cultural Research at the Uni-
versity of Western Sydney for helping with the cost of the indexing, 
ably undertaken by Glenda Browne. 
We wish to acknowledge that some chapters and parts of 
chapters of the book have been reworked from previous publications: 
parts of Chapter One appear in Current Issues in Criminal Justice , 
vol 14, no 1, pp 43-64; Chapter Two has appeared in an earlier 
form in Media International Australia: Culture and Politics, no 
106, pp 110-123; a version of Chapter Three appears in Palma 
Journal: An interdisciplinary research publication vol 9, no 1, 
pp 93-114; parts of Chapter Four are published in proceedings of 
the Annual Conference of the Australian Sociological Association, 
University of New England, Armidale, 4-6 December, 2003. Parts 
of Chapter Five appear in Media International Australia: Culture 
and Politics, no 109, pp 41--49. 
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Over the last decade, and intensifying in the late 1990s, there has 
been a series of events which have been subject to much media 
coverage and public debate in Australia - 'ethnic crime gangs', 
'race rapes', 'invasions' of asylum-seeking 'boat people', the 
terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 and the terrorist 
bomb blasts in Bali in October 2002. Because of the perception 
that these events have in common the presence of people from 
what might be broadly identified as a 'Middle Eastern' ancestry, 
these events have formed the basis of a series of cycles of moral 
panic which have centred around those of Arabic-speaking 
background and especially, but not exclusively, those of Muslim 
faith. Such waves of panic have recurred over a much longer time 
span, but we have seen an intensification of these waves since the 
late 1990s. They have been whipped up by the tabloid press, 
talkback radio and opportunist politicians, with a subsequent increase 
in racial attacks in public places across Australia. The second half 
of2001 saw one such crescendo, leading up to the federal election 
in November, during which both the refugee crisis and the 
insecurities caused by international terrorism were exploited by 
the Liberal-National Coalition government in their successful bid 
to return to office, against earlier expectations. 
A 'moral panic', in the now oft-repeated formula of Stanley 
Cohen (1973 :9), is a period during which a particular social threat 
- whether it be a 'condition', a crime or a social group - is 
identified and made subject to public debate and sustained media 
coverage. A number of social actors - including politicians, 
journalists, experts and a range of 'moral entrepreneurs' , articulate 
and evaluate the social threat and its consequences for moral and 
social order, and offer 'solutions' which may form the basis of 
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governmental responses to the condition. Cohen's model described 
the processual nature of panic - the stages of its unfolding and 
the ebb and flow of social concern, and he emphasised the role of 
the media in symbolising and amplifying the problem in shaping it 
as deviance and hence a wider social threat. Hall et al (1978) 
famously extended this model by providing a more nuanced account 
of the role of the media and their interaction with politicians in 
what they termed the' signification spiral' endemic to amplification, 
and the way this was framed in populist rhetoric. They also reshaped 
the focus on social and moral order to show how this related to the 
role of the state in maintaining hegemony amidst a sense of crisis. 
Cohen suggested that central to moments of moral panic was 
the creation of a folk devil, an object of hostility that could bear the 
brunt of social anger and be seen as the wrongdoer or cause of the 
social condition (1973). Critcher has recently suggested that the 
folk devil is not necessary to the existence of a moral panic 
(2003: 177), but it is clear from the analysis of moral panics that the 
creation of a folk devil is a key way of focusing the moral and 
social anxieties embedded in the moment of panic, and providing 
an object of hostility which concretises and focuses those anxieties. 
Critcher has also pointed out that there is little elaboration of the 
moral dimensions of moral panics (2003: 144), so it may be useful 
to give the function of the folk devil more attention than is often 
provided. 
In the last ten years or so, and quickening since 1998 because 
of the concerns over 'ethnic gangs', 'race rapes', the asylum-
seekers and the terrorist attacks, we have seen the emergence of 
a significant folk devil in contemporary Australia. The links that 
are made between these events, the 'perpetrators' involved and 
their perceived communities, however problematic, rest on the 
identification of what we might call 'the Arab Other', a supposedly 
homogenous category which includes those of Arab or Middle 
Eastern or Muslim background. This is not a singular category, of 
course - it includes people from quite diverse ancestries and with 
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quite distinct histories - but it is seen to be a singular category. A 
commonality is found not just in behaviour which is unarguably 
criminal, but also in actions which become perceived as 'deviant' 
- such as seeking asylum - and also in a range of other practices 
whose key feature is their visible and threatening difference -
such as the building of a prayer centre. This chapter will recount 
these events and begin to explore the ways they are seen to feature 
the figure of the Arab Other, homogenising a diverse group of people 
and putting them in opposition to some cultural norm. Certain key 
ideological elements recur in the formation of this figure - images 
of violence, barbarism and animality, the contravention of social 
rules and the exhibition of 'offensive' behaviour. This chapter will 
draw on detailed discussions of media commentary and political 
debate to explore the formation of this folk devil. 
It is important to stress, of course, that 'the media' are not a 
single entity that promotes a single ideological version of the world; 
nor, therefore, are they in any simple sense 'racist', as Hartley and 
McKee (2000:6,242) point out. The media, they argue, are 'dialogic', 
providing a variety of stories, often from conflicting perspectives. 
Yet these stories, especially in news production, function according 
to certain techniques and values - narratives of battlers and 
leaders, conflict and sensation, structures of opposition, attraction 
to the anomalous - which shape the ways stories are told. These 
individual stories produce what Hartley and McKee call, following 
Attwood, 'narrative accrual', ongoing myths or histories that shape 
our perceptions of the world (2000:275,76). They constitute what 
other scholars refer to as 'discourse frames', which, rather than 
predetermining single messages, set the terms in which conflicting 
perspectives can be communicated. Thus it is not simply the case 
that sensationalist media coverage delivers simple ideological 
messages (Tulloch 1999), but that media narratives, and particularly 
the 'moral tales' through which the 'drama of crime' is played out, 
make sense to us because these frames give order to our perceptions 
of social reality (Sparks 1992). The media is also a set of 
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organisations functioning amidst a broader array of ~nstitution~ (~han 
1995) but, as both a network of powerful if competmg orgamsatlons 
with vested interests in connecting with and shaping social values, 
and as a network of conduits through which conflicting perspectives 
get played out, the media remain a primary cultural device for 
defming social order and deviance (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1989). 
The media, in ordering our perceptions of the social world, are 
central in reproducing dominant cultural frames, connecting the 
mundane to the wider world and generating a kind of 'common 
sense' of the world which naturalises that reality and the relations 
of power which structure it (Couldry 2000: 12-15,45). . 
We have seen the emergence in recent years of a hIghly 
racialised framing of current events, around crime and terrorism, 
on a local, national and international level. 'Racialisation' here is 
understood as the ways in which complex social phenomena are 
refracted through and become explained primarily in terms of ethnic 
and racial categories of social perception (Miles 1982). This framing 
works to marginalise certain groups because crime images are 
typically structured via oppositions of us and them, gO?~ and b~d, 
victim and villain, right and wrong (Young 1996: 1), Opposlt1ons which 
are then Understood in racialised terms. While criminological studies 
have explored in detail the 'demonology' of the criminal in news 
media (Ericson, Baranek & Chan 1991) and the constitution of an 
'unpredictable stranger' upon whom we project our fears and 
anxieties (Lupton 1999a), much less attention has been given to 
examining the racialised dimensions of these discourses. The 
centrality of the Arab Other to our current frames around crime 
and terrorism has the effect of not only' ethnicising' or racialising 
certain criminal practices; it also produced the 'criminalising' of a 
range of cultural practices whose only offence is their perceived 
difference. The effects of this figure are not purely symbolic for, 
as we shall explore later, they license an amplification of racial 
violence and repressive measures across all levels of state 
organisation, cementing a neo-assimilationist ethic of social 
exclusion. 
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'Gangland' 
In Kebabs, Kids, Cops and Crime (Collins, Noble, Poynting & 
Tabar 2000), we dealt in detail with the moral panic around 'ethnic' 
and especially 'Lebanese' gangs that escalated after the stabbing 
of Edward Lee and the shooting up of the Lakemba police station 
in south-western Sydney in late 1998. We don't want to go over 
that ground again in detail, especially since we will revisit the 
representations of gangs in Chapter Two, but we do want to reiterate 
the salient points for this study. We showed in Kebabs that the 
spiralling moral panic around ethnic gangs involved a number of 
social assumptions about the links between criminal behaviour and 
young men of certain non-English speaking backgrounds in Australia 
- particularly those of Middle Eastern ancestry. After de-
mythologising some of those assumptions, we argued that what 
this moral panic engendered was a racialisation of criminal and 
especially gang activity, whereby the causes of crime and social 
incivility were seen to be related pathologically to the culture and 
ethnicity of those involved. Not only did this ignore the complex 
relations between ethnicity, peer group formation and criminal and 
'anti-social' practices, it had consequences for policing methods, 
government policies and Australian multiculturalism as a whole, as 
well as shifting blame for these events onto whole communities. 
Since the publication of Kebabs, the theme of a rampant' crime 
wave' - especially in Sydney - continues to feature in the media 
and in the rhetoric of politicians (Devine & Skelsey 10/7/03: 1). 
There is regular coverage of the availability of illegal firearms (the 
'handgun epidemic') and knives, car 'rebirthing rackets', drugs and 
violence in schools, drive-by shootings, and so on. Young men of 
Arabic-speaking backgrounds seem to feature frequently in this 
coverage. The anxieties unleashed by the ethnic gangs panic have 
by no means diminished; indeed, they have been exacerbated by 
various events involving young men of 'Middle Eastern appearance' 
in Sydney. Apart from the 'ethnic gang rapes', to which we will 
tum in due course, during the last two years we have seen concerns 
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expressed over: 'teenage drug "hot spots'" operating around railway 
stations and schools on Sydney's north shore, which the Daily 
Telegraph editorialised as 'Community fighting for our children' 
(Daily Telegraph 6/11100:20); triad extortion rackets targeting high 
school students, again on Sydney's north shore (Kidman 7/12/00:3); 
a shooting in Kathleen St, Lakemba, (Kennedy & O'Malley 25/11/ 
00:9); forty 'gangs' battling for control of 'our streets' in wars 
over drugs, extortion and prostitution (Miranda 8/1/01 :4); a 'crisis 
of violence among Lebanese Australian youths' (Sutton 25/2/01: 10), 
requiring new initiatives to target 'Arab gangs' (Kerr 11/7/01:4); 
the exploits of criminal Michael Kanaan and the death of 'drug 
lord' Danny Karam (Knowles 16/4/02: 11); and the stabbing of an 
Asian 'family man' by men of 'Middle Eastern appearance' in a 
'road rage' incident in Hurstville (Lawrence 22/4/02:4). 
The themes we identified in Kebabs - the racialisation of 
crime and the criminalisation of Arabic-speaking youth - can be 
retraced here, but the most significant point to emerge out of the 
more recent coverage is the perception that Sydney's south-west 
was not just a dangerous area, but central to the creation of what 
the media dubbed 'Gangland'. Gangland was a place ruled by 
'organised ethnic gangs' (of Arab, Asian and other backgrounds) 
who had 'secret signs such as sucking on coloured straws or 
wearing red necklaces - signatures of the new criminal fraternity' 
which was increasingly occupying territory across Sydney, even 
infiltrating parts of the prestigious north shore (McDougall et al. 6/ 
8/01: 1,4-5). This imagining ofa place called Gangland provided a 
tangible entity on to which we could project our anxieties, giving 
them a concrete, spatial character as a place to avoid. This 
spatialisation of our anxieties helps produce 'landscapes of fear': 
landscapes which are constituted largely by media representations 
rather than personal experience of crime (Tulloch 1992:55). These 
landscapes are now being 'mapped' by police, identifying the 
'meanest streets in town' (Lewis 18/8/03:5). The identification of 
Gangland also provided a set of descriptions of people who might 
harm us and a 'six-point checklist' for spotting them - much more 
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than a simple ethnic profile. The Daily Telegraph gave us suburb 
by suburb details of the gangs' locations, their ethnic affiliations, 
the secret symbols that identified them, their methods of recruitment, 
and so on, construing their existence as an 'ethnic problem' and 
hence blaming' Sydney's community leaders' for being 'too timid 
to confront' their problem (McDougall et al. 6/8/01: 1,4-5). 
Of course there have been and continue to be parallel concerns 
about' Asian gangs' . As well as the focus on men of Middle Eastern 
appearance, there has also been wider and ongoing coverage of 
'ethnic crime' and gangs: concern that 'crime and fear still rule' 
the streets of Cabramatta, a key centre of Sydney's Asian 
populations (Sofios & Skelsey 18/2/03: 1 0). In April, 2003, the 
Telegraph repeated its 2002 catalogue of ethnic gangs, announcing 
that the 'Boys are back in town: 10 gangs spreading fear and 
violence' (Miranda 28/4/03 :5). While this list contains young people 
of Asian, Islander and Aboriginal background, and even 'North 
Shore schoolboys', the emphasis has shifted over the last decade 
towards young men of Arabic-speaking background as a major 
threat to public safety. The 'Middle Eastern appearance' of such 
young men is usually still identified even when, as in the case of a 
'Lebanese-born youth from Merrylands' apprehended for sexual 
assault, this information is not needed for help from the public in 
identifying suspects (Kidman 18/5/03:34). 
We will return to some aspects of the ethnic gangs panic and 
the creation of 'Gangland' in the following chapter, but we want to 
shift the focus to specific events which have been most significant 
in constituting the Arab Other in recent years; events which augment 
the processes of racialisation and criminalisation we outlined in 
Kebabs. 
'Ethnic gang rapes' 
From August 2000 to August 200 I, there were eight serious group 
sexual assaults in the Bankstown area of south-west Sydney, 
according to the Bankstown Police Local Area Commander (cited 
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by Bankstown City Council 2001; Bankstown-Canterbury Torch 
22/8/01: 1). This is an area with one of the highest concentrations 
of Arabic-speaking background immigrants in Australia, and the 
centre of the virulent moral panic over 'ethnic crime gangs' in 
previous years. Police informants fed the story to the tabloid press 
that there was a racial motivation involved in these instances: 
Almost one year ago, when the youths were first charged with 
this crime, a Daily Telegraph court reporter was telephoned by 
police contacts and told of their upcoming court appearance. 
She was told that the rapes were being perpetrated on Australian 
women and the victims were asked if they had Arabic blood or 
Arabic boyfriends and that this was part of an increasing trend 
(Wockner 25/8/01 :4). 
The ethnic dimension changed these brutal attacks into something 
with much wider, and more dire consequences, producing a spiral 
of hysteria and hyperbole in which the number of alleged assaults 
rapidly escalated. The Sun-Herald warned about this 'new race 
crime': '70 girls attacked by rape gangs' (29/7/01: 1). 'Caucasian' 
women and girls were being 'lured' by 'race gangs' into meeting 
them, it was claimed, and then brutally assaulted (Kidman 29/7/ 
01:4~5). Commercial radio compere Philip Clark mentioned an 
alleged 30 such offences, and broadcast an interview with the 
purported father of a victim, who asserted that his daughter was 
raped by a refugee (Clark 30/9/01). The Daily Telegraph em-
blazoned its front page for August 15 with a large, menacing image 
of a man of 'Middle Eastern appearance' and described it as the 
'Face ofa rapist' (Birch 15/8/01:1). As the investigations, arrests 
and trials for these offences ensued, there were increasing reports 
that 'racially motivated attacks could be spreading throughout 
Sydney' (Downie 29/8/01:3). Amidst the ensuing panic, intense 
debates took place regarding the use of ethnic descriptors by the 
police, over whose culture was to blame for the incidents of sexual 
assault, and over 'soft' sentencing. 
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The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOC-
SAR) issued a press release to counter this panic, informing that: 
... the recorded rate of sexual assault in Bankstown has remained 
stable since 1995, mostly remaining under 10 offences per month. 
The only change to this pattern occurred in the month of June 
1999, when 70 incidents of sexual assault were recorded by 
Bankstown police. 
These offences were not committed by members of a gang. 
Police advise ... that they were mainly committed by a single 
individual (Lesley Ketteringham) who has since been charged, 
convicted and imprisoned for committing a number of willful 
and obscene exposure offences (Weatherburn 2001). 
Bureau Director, Don Weatherburn, pointed out that the rate of 
sexual assault was nearly twice as high in the state's Northern, 
and over twice as high in its North Western, Statistical Division. 
Very few Arab-background or Muslim people live in these areas. 
Weatherburn (2001) also recognised that many sexual assaults are 
not reported to the police, but stated, 'There is no reason to believe 
... that victims of sexual violence are any more reluctant to report 
that violence to police in Bankstown than they are in any other 
area of the State'. Despite these attempts, the reportage and political 
commentary on these incidents made it very clear who was the 
problem. The Daily Telegraph had already reported that police 
were concerned that 'race rape' was 'culturally institutionalised' 
(Kidman 29/7/01 :4). 
We do not dispute that these were brutal assaults, during which 
the perpetrators may have made derogatory comments about the 
victims' 'Aussie' backgrounds. What was problematic in the media 
coverage and the political utterances that ensued was the 
assumption that Sydney was experiencing an epidemic of 'race 
rape' and that these incidents were endemic to Lebanese or Arab 
or Muslim culture. 
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Pauline Hanson, then leader of the anti-immigration party, One 
Nation, opted to 'wade into the ethnic crime debate' with a call for 
rapists to be flogged (Doherty & Jacobsen 23/8/01 :7): 
You can't have gangs going around and committing these of-
fences. And especially what's happening of raping of women 
- white women on the streets - because, in their opinion, 
white women are worth absolutely nothing to them, to their 
race, their cultural background (Insight 23/8/0 1). 
She 'blamed the problem on a lack of respect for Australian 
culture', according to the Sydney Morning Herald, which quoted 
her as saying, 'A lot of these people are Muslims, and they have no 
respect for the Christian way oflife that this country's based on'. 
Hanson boasted: 'Before I came on the scene, this was all politically 
incorrect'. She called for stricter sentences by judges (Doherty & 
Jacobsen 23/8/01:7). The Daily Telegraph and Sun-Herald and 
many of their opinion-writers subsequently campaigned for such 
changes, and NSW Labor Premier Bob Carr made significant 
concessions to these demands (Wainwright 3118/01: 9; Daily 
Telegraph 3118/02:6; Daily Telegraph 1/9/01:22; Australian 20/ 
9/01:8, Express 13/9/02:19; Ackland 8/9/01:8). 'True justice', 
trumpeted the front page of the Sunday Telegraph, celebrating 
that 'The NSW Government has bowed to public pressure by 
increasing the maximum sentence for gang rape to life' (Vass 26/ 
8/01:1). Its editorial on the same day, headed 'Our community 
demands justice' , referred to 'community concerns' including 'the 
vexed question ofthe relationship between crime and ethnicity; the 
terrifying stories of gangs of youth pack-raping Sydney teenagers; 
and lenient sentences being dished out for a range of serious crimes' 
(Sunday Telegraph 26/8/01:87). 
A clear opposition between 'our community' and the 'ethnic' 
criminal underlay these statements. Journalist Paul Sheehan, well 
known as a critic of multiculturalism, claimed that ethnic gang rape 
emanates from Muslim and Arab culture and showed that it was a 
global phenomenon, because it had been perpetrated earlier in the 
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year in France by 'urban immigrant poor' from these backgrounds 
(Sheehan 29/8/01:20). The Australian made clear where the 
problem came from in its front-page headline, 'Rape menace from 
the melting pot': NSW Police Commissioner Peter Ryan stated 
that' a particularly defined cultural group of attackers' was attacking 
'a very clearly defined cultural group of victims'. Premier Bob 
Carr was adamant in rejecting any 'paroxysm of political cor-
rectness' which objected to such definition (Chulov 18-19/8/01: 1). 
Yet such clear ethnic identification of victims and perpetrators, 
and public apportionment of blame by political leaders, police 
spokespeople and media opinion-makers did not apply to 
'retributive' attacks on Muslim and Arab immigrants, including 
reported sexual assaults. Muslim community leaders reported that 
'after Mr Carr had blamed Lebanese gangs for a series of rapes 
there had been an increasing number of attacks on Muslim women' 
including the rape of an 18-year-old Muslim girl (Walker 26/8/0 1: 10). 
Numerous other reports followed, but none referred to the ethnicity 
of the attackers. 
The degree of public anxiety was maintained throughout 2002 
as the Daily Telegraph, for example, gave detailed and lengthy 
accounts of the trials of the men arrested for the rapes, in a specially 
presented section on almost a daily basis, written by Cindy Wockner. 
The panic became so great that Judge Finnane had to remind jurors 
in one trial that: 
You have to put aside any view that you might have ... about 
Muslims, either favourable or unfavourable because this court 
is not concerned with a political trial. 
We are not trying a class of persons or a race (quoted in Wockner 
4/6/02:11). 
The judge's caution is contradicted only two months later in his 
assertion, echoed by the Telegraph, that 'the rapists had injected 
racism into the crimes' (Wockner 16/8/02:4). This claim shifts the 
blame for any prejudiced take on these events to the youths 
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themselves and ignores the already racialised context in which these 
events and their reportage occur. Politicians and journalists echoed 
the judge's claim by asserting that the 'Culprits made race an issue' 
(Wockner 14/3/03:2), but these comments fail to register any 
connection between the emphasis on the ethnicity of a specific 
group of rapists and the purported ethnicity of their victims, and the 
claims that these incidents are typical of a particular ethnic back-
ground or faith, as several examples above suggest. Since the rapes, 
new incidents of sexual assault, and especially gang rape, have 
become key news items, and are often framed by reference to the 
'ethnic gang rapes' . One article stressed, somewhat unnecessarily, 
that: 'Police officially say it is too early to establish any link between 
the attack and a spate of rapes by Lebanese youths who prowled 
the western suburbs in 2000' (Daily Telegraph 7/5/03:5), thereby 
implying that it could be related, and thereby reinforcing the idea 
that rape is typically perpetrated by Arabic-speaking youths. 
Despite his earlier caution, the judge in the gang rape trials 
sentenced the ringleader of these rapes to 55 years, one of the 
heaviest sentences ever handed down in NSW (Wockner 16/8/ 
02:4). It is hard not to see this sentence as being partly the result of 
a context of intersecting and escalating panics - about increasing 
crime and soft sentencing, cultural diversity and immigration, moral 
decay, the failure of political authority, the loss of social order and 
cohesion, and so on. We will return to these below, but it's important 
to stress here that moral panics such as the ones we are describing 
here are complex, layered social phenomena whose explanation is 
not immediately apparent. Over the last few years, the 'panic' is 
not simply about' Arabs' or Muslims per se, but about a whole raft 
of issues and concerns which largely emanate from within 
Australian society but which are projected onto 'external' or 
marginal groups. This was also the case in the anxieties expressed 
towards refugees and terrorists during the months following the 
'Gangland' and 'race rapes' panics. 
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The 'boat people' 
Throughout 2000 and up to August 2001, the media presented stories 
of a seemingly endless and unstoppable flow of refugees and asylum 
seekers invariably described as 'Middle-Eastern' arriving on 
Australian territory off the coast of Western Australia. In fact, the 
numbers were well within Australia's planned immigration provision 
for refugee intake of 12,000 per annum; the moral outrage was 
supposedly directed at their purported 'queue jumping' and at the 
predatory industry of 'people smuggling'. Thus: 
December 16,2000: Boat carrying 117 people, including 32 
children, found off the Ashmore Islands. Second boat had 115 
people. Refugees mainly Iranians, Syrians and Palestinians. 
January 16,2001: 151 people of Middle Eastern origin aboard 
Indonesian inter-island ferry near the Ashmore Islands. 
June 6, 2001: 235 Iraqi men, women and children land in the 
Ashmore Islands, 800 Ian west of Darwin. 
June 14,2001: Boat lands at Christmas Island with 200 asylum 
seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan (Daily Telegraph 17/8/01 :8). 
Journalist Nadya Stani pointed out as early as 2000 that in reporting 
on the 'boat people' the media were depending on and accepting 
information supplied by government ministers and officials, and that 
this was engendering a panic about refugees (Stani 27/1/00). Stani 
demonstrates how the media fixed on the means by which the 
asylum seekers came to Australian territory instead of reporting 
what they were fleeing from. Her analysis shows that stories 
invariably originated from 'the information given to the media by 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, and its 
Minister, Philip Ruddock, in numerous press releases and inter-
views': 
The stories concentrated on people smugglers, mafia-type 
operations, queue jumping, assaults on our shores, the national 
emergency, and the middle-class status of the refugees '" It 
was also the language of fear, and, say refugee advocates, it 
undermined the possibility of any public sympathy (Stani 27/ 
lIOO). 
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Stani enumerates that, out of 16 main articles and editorials 
published over October to December 1999 in the broadsheet 
Sydney Morning Herald, a mere four presented the situation of 
the asylum seekers with any sympathy. The remainder were 
couched in the language of 'illegal immigrants', 'human cargo', 
'people smugglers', 'queue jumpers', and 'invasion' (Stani 27/1/ 
00). This pattern was even more pronounced in the tabloids and on 
talkback radio. The following year, Christine Jackman in the Daily 
Telegraph, seriously attempting to be even-handed, attempted to 
'kickstart the debate' thus: 'the so-called humanitarians screeching 
"racist" at anyone who questioned the right of the 438 on the Tampa 
to automatic entry, should explain what is so humanitarian about 
indulging people-smuggling' . She went on to use the term 'people-
smuggler' twice more in the piece, as well as 'human cargo' 
(Jackman 4/9/01: 17). 
On 26 August 2001, the KM Palapa, a somewhat dilapidated 
ferry carrying over 430 asylum seekers, mainly from Afghanistan, 
began to sink in the Indian Ocean. Those on board were rescued 
by the MV Tampa, a Norwegian freighter, about 75 nautical miles 
from Australia's Christmas Island and almost four times that far 
from the Indonesian port ofMerak (Marr & Wilkinson 20-21/10/ 
01; Burnside 2311/02; Senate Select Committee on a Certain 
Maritime Incident 2002). The Captain, Arne Rinnan, decided to 
head for Christmas Island, as many of the asylum seekers were ill 
and in poor condition; he radioed Australia for medical assistance, 
but none was provided. Having entered Australian territorial waters, 
Captain Rinnan was abruptly threatened by an officer of the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs with the 
punishment meted out to people smugglers under the Migration 
Act - including the possibility of huge fines and confiscation of 
the vessel- ifhe did not turn around and head towards Indonesia 
(Marr & Wilkinson 20-2111 % 1; Burnside 23/1102). With a federal 
election fast approaching, the government had apparently resolved 
to stop these asylum seekers from reaching Australian land. As 
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Julian Burnside QC puts it, 'This odd decision has never been 
explained, except with the rhetoric of "sending a clear message to 
people smugglers and queue jumpers that Australia is not a soft 
touch"'. Burnside, who argued the case for the asylum seekers' 
challenge to the Government's actions in the Federal Court, infers 
that the Prime Minister was calculating that: 
a show of toughness against helpless refugees would be 
electorally popular amongst the large number of Australians 
who had responded positively to aspects of Pauline Hanson's 
unattractive [anti-immigration] platform (Burnside 23/1/02). 
The ship was stopped four miles from Christmas Island. It was 
boarded and taken over by Australian SAS forces, and com-
munications were strictly limited by the Australian military. Rinnan 
and others later characterised this as an act of piracy. Eventually 
after more than a week of stand-off, the asylum seekers were 
transferred to an Australian naval vessel, for eventual transportation 
to the impoverished Pacific island of Nauru, with which a multi-
million dollar deal had been done that they be detained and processed 
there, allowing the Prime Minister to keep his promise that the 
asylum seekers aboard the Tampa would not set foot on Australian 
soil. This populist venture immediately registered in the opinion polls, 
and election campaign articles began to talk about Howard's 
'Tampa-led recovery' and his political exploitation of the plight of 
the boat people (Manne 6/10/01:16). 
Two key stories - one short-lived, the other sustained and 
leading to an inquiry - buttressed the growing support for this' get 
tough' stance. The first linked the asylum-seekers to the deepening 
concern regarding terrorist activity, arising at the same time as the 
refugee crisis: the Daily Telegraph in its editorial column claimed 
that, 'While on board, SAS members were able to place under 
surveillance a suspected agent of the Osama bin Laden terrorist 
network' (Daily Telegraph 1,3110/01:24). As there was never a 
subsequent report about the suspected Al Qaeda terrorist being 
arrested or tried, we can only assume that the suspicions or the 
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report were unfounded. Nevertheless, beliefs that terrorist cells 
are infiltrating Australia have escalated over the last two years, 
and these have been linked in the minds of Australians with the 
threat of increasing boatloads of refugees. 
The other story was the now infamous 'children overboard 
affair' . On October 6, another unseaworthy vessel, a fishing trawler 
laden with 223 Middle Eastern asylum seekers, was intercepted by 
the Australian naval frigate, HMAS Adelaide, in Australian waters 
off the west coast. Shots were fired across its bows and it was 
boarded. Over the following day, navy personnel tried in vain to 
prevent the vessel from sinking, so that it could be towed out of 
Australian waters. As the boat finally did sink, asylum seekers, 
including children, had to be rescued from the water. A video was 
taken by navy personnel. That very day, a Canberra bureaucrat 
told the People Smuggling Task Force that asylum seekers had 
thrown their children overboard in an attempt to prevent the 
Adelaide turning their vessel back (Wilkinson 16-17/2/02:23; 
Ramsay 16-17/2/02:35). The assertion was repeated publicly many 
times by the Defence Minister, the Prime Minister, and those 
campaigning for them, and it was echoed in tabloids and talkback 
and taverns and tearooms across the continent. A Senate enquiry 
has since concluded that it was false. It has, moreover, been 
demonstrated that images from the video depicting children in the 
water, shown on national television by the Defence Minister during 
the election campaign, were cut down so as to exclude the view of 
the boat sinking in the background, and were misrepresented as 
being of the previous day when the incident of tossing the kids into 
the sea was supposed to have taken place. It has also been amply 
proven that the Prime Minister's office and that of the Defence 
Minister were warned soon afterwards by navy personnel conveying 
firsthand knowledge, of the falsehood of the story they were 
presenting, which they nevertheless continued to defend as true 
until well after the election (Senate Select Committee on a Certain 
Maritime Incident 2002). 
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As with the link to terrorism, the imputation that the asylum 
seekers were bad parents only served to strengthen the popular 
opinion that refugees would not be good and decent Australians. 
Prime Minister Howard repeated, 'I don't want, in Australia, people 
who would throw their own children into the sea' (Four Corners 
15/4/02). He told Alan Jones's commercial radio audience on 
Sydney's highest-rating talkback program on 8 October, 'I don't 
want in this country people who are prepared, if those reports are 
true, to throw their own children overboard' (Wilkinson 16-17/2/ 
02:28). This intensely moral view of the refugee situation became 
interwoven with an appeal to national sovereignty and self-
determination. One of the oft-repeated and obviously successful 
slogans of the Liberals' election campaign became, 'We will decide 
who can come to this country'. Column-writers such as Piers 
Akerman repeated the Government's line: 
As for those who threw their children into the sea on Sunday 
and the malcontents who trashed the Manoora - it must be 
made absolutely clear that not only is such behaviour totally 
unacceptable but will in fact mitigate (sic) against any future 
consideration for admission into Australia (Akerman 9/1 010 1: 16). 
The Senate reports show that the Government misled the public on 
the various aspects of the 'maritime incidents' during 2001. 
Commentator Hugh Mackay observed that, 'the "children 
overboard" incident ... show[ s] us just how vulnerable Australians 
have become to political spin'. He argues that 'we wanted to believe 
the kids had been thrown overboard, because we had already been 
worked over by a slick propaganda machine that had created a 
"refugee crisis" out of a couple of hundred people rescued by the 
Tampa' (Mackay 16-17/2/02:31). Manipulating this vulnerability, 
the Government 'encouraged Australians to see all those using the 
services of people smugglers to be as undesirable as the criminals 
exploiting their desperate endeavours to get to Australia' (Kitney 
24/10/02:4). In equating the smugglers with the refugees, the 
Government affirmed the pervasive idea that people from the Middle 
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East, understood broadly, were immoral, dangerous and violent 
criminals, a view that paralleled the increasing alarm at terrorist 
activity. 
'Bin Laden groups in our suburbs' 
A number of terrorist actions over recent years - most notably 
the airborne attacks in the US in September 2001 and the Bali 
bombings in October 2002, but including a number of other incidents 
- have cemented an ideological connection between Islamic 
fundamentalism, extremist organisations and the incidents we have 
already described. 
On 11 September 2001, two hijacked aeroplanes were flown 
into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, a 
third hit the Pentagon in Washington, and a fourth plane, surmised 
to be intended for the White House, crashed outside Pittsburgh. 
Initial reports had the death toll at 10,000, and the event was 
immediately pronounced 'world terror' with Osama bin Laden a , 
Saudi billionaire and leader of the militant organisation Al Qaeda, 
quickly identified as the main suspect (Daily Telegraph 12/9/ 
01:1,2,7). The details of the attacks, the aftermath in New York 
the investigation and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, have no~ 
been frequently told. Our primary concern here is not this story but 
rather the way these events amplified an already pervasive fear of 
the Arab Other through the concern with Islamic fundamentalism. 
US President George Bush Jnr stated that, 'The enemy of America 
is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends', 
yet his rhetoric quickly followed an 'us versus them' structure: 
'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists'; 'freedom 
and fear are at war' (Johnston 21/9/01:1). This polarity left little 
room for the complexities of cultural, social and national difference. 
As the 'war on terror' widened, it became clear to at least some 
commentators that the objective was not simply to target suspected 
terrorists, but all 'enemies of the US' (Fisk 29-30/9/01 :35). 
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This identification of terrorism with Islam was echoed in 
Australia. The us/them binary meant that, while this was ostensibly 
an overseas event, the threat was experienced by many Australians 
as a local one. Just as during the Gulf War, opinion-leaders in the 
media raised the spectre of the 'divided loyalties' of Australia's 
immigrant population, and called upon Arab and Muslim Australians 
to demonstrate their loyalty to this country: 'Australian Muslims 
will have to decide whether they are Australians first ... '. (Akerman 
16/12/01: 109). Fictitious stories circulated on talkback radio that 
after the September 11 attacks, there were celebrations on th~ 
streets of Lake mba, and a number ofthreats and attacks on Muslims 
and mosques followed. The vehemence was indiscriminate: racial 
slurs were scrawled on a Russian Orthodox church in Lidcombe in 
Sydney's west; graffiti on a Brisbane wall announced 'We will kill , 
all Arabs ... Scum will die' and a school bus full of Muslim children 
in Queensland was pelted with bottles (Burke 15-16/9/01:4). 
Among a number of more violent attacks, a mosque in Brisbane 
was torched - but the ethnicity of the arsonists was not mentioned 
in the media reports (Roberts & Glendinning 24/9/01 :9). 
Very quickly, moreover, stories began circulating that there 
were terrorist cells in Australia; a story which was linked in the 
public mind with the stream of asylum seekers. On 12 October, 
2001, the Telegraph front-page headline screamed, 'TERROR 
AUSTRALIS: Bin Laden groups in our suburbs' and the article 
detailed raids on homes of Arab and Muslim immigrants in Western 
Sydney by the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). It reported that 'More than a 
dozen men from Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia currently applying for 
refugee status, have been identified as having connections or 
membership with radical Al-gama Islamiya, AI-Maqdesi, AI-Dawa 
and AI-Nahda groups' (Miranda 12110/01b:l,4). The editorial of 
that day headlined 'Entry is a privilege not a right', and warned of 
'up to a hundred operatives in Sydney' suspected of raising funds 
for 'bogus charities that have been found to have links to terrorist 
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networks'. It urged 'firm and immediate action', and cautioned 
that 'the existence of these groups should sound a warning over 
the standards required to gain entry to Australia (Daily Telegraph 
1211 010 1 :20). There has still not been a report of any charges, ~et 
alone a trial, for any terrorist activity, but new stories of terronst 
activity in Australia have burgeoned since the bombing in Bali and 
the subsequent trials in Indonesia. 
The naturalisation of the links between terrorism and Islam 
were cemented by the endorsement of Huntington's 'clash of 
civilisations' thesis by politicians and journalists (see, for example, 
Crittenden 19-20/7/03:4-5). Huntington's argument was that 
'culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are 
civilisation identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, 
disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold War world' (1997:.2?). 
Culture and civilisation are understood primarily in tenus of ethmcity 
and religion, and become central to Huntington's version of the 
'decline of the west' and the rise of Asia and Islam. Although he 
initially rejects a simple uslthem opposition, he nevertheless uses 
this opposition to portray Islam (and Asia) as a re.lativ~ly coherent 
entity that has become a major source of conflIct, ViOlence a~d 
destabilisation, while the reassertion of western culture and ~ts 
democratic values is seen as the solution to global conflIct 
(1997:33,36,28). These claims, at an international level, ech~ and 
confirm the concerns about conflict between cultures at natiOnal 
and local levels in Australia; a link which is seemingly reinforced 
by the terrorist attacks on the island of Bali in Indonesia. 
On October 12, 2002, two bombs were detonated in or near 
the Sari nightclub and Paddy's Irish Pub, in Kuta, in Bali. The venues 
were frequented by many western, and especially Australian, 
tourists, and speculation immediately arose as to whether the attack 
was the work ofIslamic fundamentalists with links to Al Qaeda. In 
November several suspects were identified and some arrested; 
Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims who belonged to the radical 
Islamic group Jemaah Islamiah. Some of these have since been 
tried and found guilty. 
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What was terrifying about Bali for Australians was that Bali 
was seen to be, as John Howard said, 'on our doorstep': the bomb 
blast 'stamping terrorism's bloody fingerprint on Australia's door'. 
A key theme became 'Terrorism Strikes Home' (Moore & Riley 
1411 0102: 1), confirming much more than the asylum seeker crisis 
and the attacks in America that the threat was immediate and' local', 
and that Australians were a target. Bali, in fact, becomes our 
'watering hole', and the blasts are seen to 'wreck [the] symbolic 
centre of Australian holiday culture' (Holland 15/10/02:6-7). The 
terrorists' presence in Australia became an ongoing concern, with 
reports that Abu Bakar Bashir, leader of Jemaah Islamiah, had 
been to Australia on several occasions and had written for the 
local Islamic Youth Movement magazine (Saunders 16/10/02:7). 
There really did seem to be terrorists 'in our suburbs'. 
Another round of high-profile 'visits' by ASIO, Australia's 
security organisation, accompanied by heavily armed Australian 
Federal Police, targeted the homes of Muslim, this time mainly 
Indonesian, communities in Australia's capital cities, including 
Sydney, Melbourne and Perth (Karvelas & Chulov 30/10102: 1 ,8). 
As with the previous year's raids on Arab-Australian Muslims after 
11 September, there were no arrests for any terrorist offences, 
though a few were charged with visa breaches. Those raided were 
labelled as suspected of having links with Jemaah Islamiah, and 
the raids were justified afterwards by the Prime Minister who 
warned that' sleeper' terrorist cells could exist in Australia (English 
2/11102:4). 
It is not surprising then that the Muslim community became a 
target of blame. Daily Telegraph columnist Piers Akerman (151 
10102:20) complained that, just a few days after the Bali blasts, 
Muslim community radio in Sydney aired a lecture calling for 'one 
vast international Muslim nation', with no mention of the Bali attack, 
'no mention of love, compassion or forgiveness'. 'The Muslim 
community', he demanded, 'has a duty to stop this relentless 
propaganda'. The letters to the editor echoed this extrapolation 
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from a small number of extremists to Islam per se: Nigel Freitas of 
Roseville argued that these events showed that Islam was not 'a 
religion of peace , (15/10/02:22); and John Mayberry of Glenbrook 
claimed that passages from the Koran 'incite believers to violent 
acts against non-believers', as 'their religious duty': 'the problem 
of world terrorism today lies firmly rooted in Islam' (15/10/02:23). 
Many (non-Muslim) Australians responded to this call to arms: 
within days forty local attacks on Muslims were recorded (Lipari 
28/10/02:6). Letters echoed the binarism of us and them: John 
Dawson of McKinnon claimed that the aim of Islamic terrorists 
was to destroy 'our values', 'the Western values of life, liberty, 
prosperity, and the pursuit of happiness' , and that Westerners had 
been 'butchered on every continent' to fulfil this aim (15/10/02:22). 
To achieve the metonymic leap, where specific political acts 
taking place in particular national contexts come to stand for a 
whole religion or culture and its pathological tendency for evil, 
terrorism has to be seen simply as a crime, and essentially as a 
gross moral error. In constantly framing the terrorist attacks as a 
'crime', as Howard did (Hewett 19-20/10/02:3), the specific political 
and economic dimensions of the attacks in America, in Indonesia 
and elsewhere are refused. This capitalised on the way, since Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the international banking scandal 
involving businessmen of Muslim background, Islam had been placed 
in a context of 'criminal culture' (Ahmed 1992:2). Similarly, in 
foregrounding the immoral nature of terrorist acts, and again ignoring 
the political contexts, they are seen primarily in terms of good and 
evil. Akerman sees the various (,left wing') interpretations of the 
origins ofIslamic extremism as 'Sympathy for the devil in disguise', 
rejecting any attempt to effectively explain the terrorist actions. 
He instead reduces it to one factor: 'The extremists attack the 
West because it offers something Islam cannot - freedom of 
thought' (17/10/02:34). In other words, the totalitarian tendency of 
the Islamic faith is the underlying fault. This error - of faith and 
morality - can thus be seen to be shared by an entire community, 
and manifest in actions other than rape and terrorism. 
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Rapists, terrorists and queue-jumpers: assembling the Arab 
As we have seen, media commentators and politicians talk about 
the disparate events of the last few years as though there is a 
natural link in that they share what is perceived as a common 
ancestry. Many of the terms used to describe this background -
Middle Eastern, Muslim and Arab - are deeply problematic terms. 
The 'Middle East', for example, is not a singular entity, and is shaped 
more by the geopolitics of Western colonialism than the political, 
ethnic and religious realities of the region it supposedly designates. 
It includes people of Arabic-speaking background and those not of 
this background; it includes Muslims and Christians; and it includes 
countries whose cultures and political systems are quite diverse 
and distinct (while also including some countries whose status as 
Middle Eastern is arguable - such as Afghanistan - and seems 
to exclude one country - Israel- which is located in the Middle 
East). It also includes great internal differences of class and of the 
urban/rural divide. When 'Middle Eastern' is used to describe 
residents of Australia, it is even more questionable: it includes those 
born overseas and those born in Australia (including some whose 
parents were born in Australia). With the apparent global reach of 
Islamic fundamentalism, this Other is now seen to include Muslims 
of Indonesian or other South-East Asian citizenship and their 
involvement in what Huntington sees as an 'Islamic civilisation'. 
Nevertheless, some essential Arab-ness or Middle Eastern-ness 
or Islamic-ness is seen to be central to this group of people, to 
weave them into a single entity. This link is repeated again and 
again in media items and public statements. 
The point of this chapter is not to apologise for crimes 
committed by Arabic-speaking Australians or Muslim terrorists, 
but to show how, via chains of association, Arab-ness and Islam 
and Middle-Eastern-ness are seen to be the same thing, and are 
seen to be essentially and pathologically evil, inhuman, violent and 
criminal. As a result of the signification spiral, in which discrete 
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events are ideologically associated and linked to wider discourses 
of national experience, whole communities are made to share the 
burden of blame and carry responsibility for social cohesion, or its 
absence (Hall et al. 1978). This is a key issue in the formation of a 
folk devil: a moral panic occurs when the 'problem' is seen as too 
horrible and too threatening to be merely 'cultural boundary setting' 
- that is, it is not just a question of defining a symbolic Other. For 
the horror to be this great, we need 'true victims' with real suffering, 
as well as true perpetrators. This way the panic can essentialise 
the.offender, whose actions are not the product of fashion or situation 
but express the essence of the person they are (Cohen, cited in 
Scraton 2002). The assembling of a homogenised Other is intrinsic 
to this process of essentialisation, and useful in elaborating the 
construction of the folk devil. When Bilal Skaf, who 'terrorised' 
young women, reportedly sent an envelope containing white powder 
to a prison manager, echoing the anthrax scares in the US and 
elsewhere, this simply confirmed a perceived link between 
Lebanese rapists and Muslim terrorists (Lawrence 2113/03 :27). 
Furthermore, when 'Middle Eastern males' 'created havoc' at an 
anti-war rally in Sydney in March, 2003, the protest was described 
as being 'HIJACKED BY HATRED', echoing the hijacking of 
planes on September 11, 2001. This confirmed the idea that violence 
was endemic in Arab or Muslim culture - this item provided a 
visual illustration of the clash of civilisations, as white police 
(protecting social order) were pictured in 'clashes' with 'Middle 
Eastern males' (violent, inciting trouble) (Clifton & Lawrence 271 
3103:1-2). 
The concept of the 'Other' has become a key term in social 
and cultural analysis to explain the ways dominant groups 
characterise subordinate groups as problematically different. The 
most significant and well-known expression of this argument in 
relation to the Middle East is in the work of Edward Said (1978). 
Said analyses what he calls 'Orientalism': the discourses and 
practices emerging from the colonial occupation of the Arab world 
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by Western powers. He argues that the coloniser generates distinct 
forms of knowledge about the colonised - academic, imaginative 
and bureaucratic knowledge - which construct an imagined, 
coherent entity named the Oriental with a distinct' character' , and 
which posit a fundamental opposition between the Occident and 
the Orient, the East and the West. These knowledges aided in the 
administration of the Orient and the subjugation of the colonised 
(1978:2-3). This Other is an object onto which the West projects 
its fears, anxieties and desires, but its construction is naturalised as 
a scientific truth that hides its racialised assumptions. 
Said draws on several centuries of Western representations 
to show that the imagined Oriental is marked by recurring traits 
which are conflated into an 'unchallenged coherence' which is 
then seen as objectively true. The Oriental is seen as degenerate, 
primitive or backward, uncivilised, unreliable and sexually rapacious, 
with an 'aberrant mentality' and a tendency to despotism. Orientals 
are rarely seen as people, but as problems to be solved or confined 
- and there is a particular fear ofthe Oriental male (1978:205-7). 
Said's discussion of the early modem period draws primarily on 
academic and literary texts, but he shows that in the twentieth 
century these representations are exacerbated in contemporary 
popular culture. Film images emphasise the Arab Oriental as 
dishonest and menacing, physically violent and an 'oversexed 
degenerate' (1978:285-7). 
Said does not develop this point in relation to Arabic-speaking 
groups within Western nations. It is clear, however, that othering 
occurs in contemporary societies towards minorities, particularly 
in the light of mass immigrations. The Other functions in two key 
ways: it constitutes something against which one's own identity 
can be defined, either explicitly or implicitly; and it constitutes 
something against which one's social practices, conventions and 
customs, values and beliefs can be contrasted. This comparison 
can be either positive or negative, but the historical tendency is to 
posit an Other that naturalises one's own identity and practices. 
This complex argument doesn't need to be rehearsed in its entirety 
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here; what is important for us is that this othering tends to produce 
a fiction of a homogeneous, deviant Other; a fiction which sustains 
the idea that the Other is always less than ourselves -less capable, 
less moral, less human. 
In contemporary Australia, the assumption of an 'Arab Other' 
can often be found in an array of social discourses and institutions. 
It conflates quite distinct groups of people with various experiences 
and origins, and reduces them as people to a singular entity, 
emphasising their difference to us as radical, deviant and dangerous. 
As Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1991 :261-2) argue, the news media 
are rarely interested in explanations, and when they do offer them 
they are inseparable from political processes of the laying of blame. 
Explanations that address issues of social power are largely erased. 
In this section we want to show how, across the incidents 
described above, there is an assumption that they are linked because 
they commonly involve the Arab Other, defined by supposedly 
shared ethnicity, cultural traits and faith. We want to demonstrate 
how this Other is construed negatively, as potentially inhuman and 
evil, and to show that this radical difference posits a link between 
criminal offences and other practices that are deemed unacceptable 
or socially threatening. 
Miranda Devine, for example, quoted approvingly an opinion 
pollster, David Chalke, as saying: 
I would suspect that the recent events in outer Sydney, part-
icularly the gang rapes, the drug problems and the most recent 
bashing of the small boy, will ... deeply offend Australians' 
sense of decency and honesty. In fact, it is our belief that the 
backlash against the Tampa illegal immigrants was founded on 
anger at their breaking the rules (Devine 811 I/O 1 : 14).1 
In one brief comment, the seemingly natural link between gangs, 
rape, drugs, physical violence and the asylum seekers is established, 
together with the clear implication the perpetrators, with their Middle 
Eastern origins, are in opposition to Australians. This link is then 
extended to terrorist activities. In October 2001, as the United States 
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mounted war in Afghanistan, columnist Piers Akerman lauded the 
Australian military 'preparing to go to sea in the service of their 
country'. The enemy in each case was equated: 
Some are going to the Middle East, to provide back-up to the 
civilised world's war against terrorism; others are going to the 
edges of our territorial waters to dissuade people-smugglers 
from bringing their cargoes of illegal immigrants to our shores 
(14/10/01 :95). 
These juxtapositions are more powerful than any claim, easily 
disproved, of real links between terrorists and refugees. They are 
further juxtaposed with other events in an opinion piece by David 
Penberthy, written three days after the September 11 attacks in 
the United States. Penberthy claimed that what he wrote was 
'extending an olive branch to Australian Muslims', though this was 
'contrary to instinct'. It is worth quoting at length because, while it 
presents itself as an exercise of rational tolerance, it appears to 
assume that Australian Muslims need to bear responsibility for all 
of these attacks. It also registers the mood of intolerance and 
irrationality and the blurring of issues sweeping across Australia: 
Whatever tiny shred of goodwill that still existed in this country 
towards Muslim Australians probably disappeared at the same 
time the first hijacked passenger jet smashed into the World 
Trade Centre. 
This galvanising of public opinion is not rational ... 
In the minds of most Australians, all ofthese issues have merged 
into one. 
A series of events has overlapped, the result of which is blanket, 
unprecedented hostility to anyone who would seek to defend 
Islam and its adherence. 
It explains why, as the Lebanese gang rape scandal started to 
unfold, there was such acrimony directed towards Sheik Hilaly, 
over his call for a seat in State Parliament to be found for a 
Muslim, not to mention his absurd suggestion that because 
the gang rapists were Australian born, their criminal actions 
reflected more on their new homeland than on their ancestry ... 
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It explains why, when the Tampa arrived in Australian waters, 
carrying 434 people from Muslim Afghanistan, most Australians 
did not want to hear any stories from those on board. They just 
wanted them to go away (Penberthy 14/9/01:27). 
There it is, in one equation, recognised as irrational and yet endorsed 
as understandable: terrorism, ethnic crime gangs, Islam, misogynist 
violent crime, Muslim ethnic-religious leader, Middle-Eastern asylum 
seekers. This is the same equation made by One Nation in an East 
Hills election pamphlet during the 2003 NSW state election: it was 
simply headed, 'Immigration-Multiculturalism-Terrorism-Crime' 
(One Nation 2003). These aggregations are possible not just because 
the Arab Other coalesces the diverse groups that have been at the 
centre of waves of panic over the last decade, but because of the 
common discursive elements used to identify and equate these 
groups. 
Barbarians, animals and evil incarnate 
In assembling this Arab Other, the key ideological feature is the 
systematic 'dehumanising' of those involved, whether they be 
criminals, terrorists or refugees. The phrase 'human cargo' was 
frequently used in describing the asylum-seekers, for example. This 
was by no means haphazard or accidental: news reports and images 
of the asylum seekers were tightly controlled via the Australian 
military. Julian Burnside QC, who argued the case for the asylum 
seekers' challenge in the Federal Court to the government's actions, 
later wrote: 
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The press were not allowed anywhere near the ship. Despite 
repeated requests from lawyers and others, no Australian was 
allowed to speak to any of the refugees. The physical cir-
cumstances meant that no images of individual refugees were 
available. At best, film footage showed distant images of tiny 
figures under an awning on the deck of the ship. By the same 
technique, the stories of the refugees were suppressed '" 
Although the misery of the refugees' situation was obvious 
enough none ofthem could be seen as human beings (Burnside 
23/1I02). 
The Arab Other 
Burnside's analysis of this, expressed in January 2002, was 
that by prohibiting media contact with the asylum seekers: 
the Government was able to advance its cynical objectives 
with dishonest rhetoric, wholly unimpeded by facts ... Howard's 
crucial aim was achieved: the refugees were not seen publicly 
as individual people for whom Australian citizens could have 
human sympathy (Burnside 23/1/02). 
The accuracy of this judgement may be assessed in the light of the 
revelation on 17 April 2002 at the Senate Select Committee on a 
Certain Maritime Incident (2002), by Brian Humphreys, Director 
General of Communications Strategies in the Government's Public 
Affairs and Corporate Communication: 'Immigration had concerns 
about identifying potential asylum seekers and so we got some 
guidance on ensuring there were no personalising or humanising 
images'. The refugees were not to be allowed to be seen by the 
Australia people as human beings, as individuals with life stories. 
This ideological sleight of hand was extended to all those Arabic 
Others in the public eye, in stark contrast to 'our' own humanity. 
There are several ways in which the opposition between the 
human 'us' and the inhuman 'them' is elaborated; the first is the 
depiction ofthe perpetrators of these various actions as 'uncivilised'. 
Despite the political use of Huntington's thesis about the clash of 
civilisations, Arabs and Muslims are rarely given the status of being 
civilised. Piers Akerman sees this contrast clearly: he refers to 
'the civilised world's war against terrorism' (14/10/01 :95); John 
Howard described the Bali bombings as 'an act of barbarity' (Moore 
& Riley 14110/02: 1). The letters to the editor at the time reflected 
similar concerns. The same letter-writer from Currumbin Waters 
who had fretted from 1000 km away about Sydney's 'ethnic gangs' 
in August now asked, 'What uncivilised barbarism is this? ... placing 
children's lives at risk' (Ford 11110/01:27). Similar themes were 
present during the gang rape trials. One of those convicted for the 
gang rapes was described by Judge Finnane as 'a menace to 
civilised society', echoing comments he had made in earlier 
judgments (Knowles 1111 0/02: 1). 
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Similarly, there was a surprising amount of heated debate 
regarding the trial ofa woman in Nigeria for adultery. The sentence 
- death by stoning - was couched in comparable terms: one 
letter-writer described it as 'a barbaric punishment for being human' 
(Smith 4/9102:26). A significant share ofthe heat - and little light 
- was generated in Akerman's DaiZv Telegraph columns (22/81 
02:28; 119102; 1219102:24). Whether this punishment is acceptable 
or not is not the point here: rather, it is that the way we see this 
event, which got unusually extensive coverage in Australia during 
this period of panic, is framed by the same representations that 
accrue around local issues. A common Western perception ofIslam 
emphasises its despotic nature, its fanaticism and intolerance: a 
perception that is echoed in local responses to the building of 
mosques in Australia for twenty years (Dunn 200 I). The Nigerian 
example cues into this perception. It also cues into the image of 
Islam as patriarchal, and oppressive ofwomen's rights, in contrast 
to the perceived sexual egalitarianism of the West. Apart from 
being a selective evaluation of gender equality in the West, it draws 
on conventional Orientalist tropes regarding the veiled woman 
(Mackie 2002). The day before the September 11 attacks, the 
Herald ran an item called 'The face of fear hidden behind a veil of 
tyranny' , claiming that' Bought and sold, denied basic rights, women 
in Afghanistan are treated only slightly better than farm animals' 
(McGeough 1019101: 10). The timing ofthis article during the initial 
coverage of the gang rapes, like the Nigerian example, gives these 
kinds of claims a further ideological function affIrming the oppressive 
nature of Islam, and the tendency of Muslim men towards sexual 
violence. 
The second way in which the opposition between the human 
and the inhuman is realised is to depict the perpetrators of various 
crimes as animals. The front page of the Daily Telegraph 
pronounced one of those convicted for the gang rapes a 'WILD 
ANIMAL', echoing comments by the trial judge (Knowles 11110/ 
02: 1). The young men convicted in August were described as a 
'pack of youths', and the Telegraph recounted the judge's words: 
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they 'treated her like wild animals treat prey they have just killed' 
(Wockner 16/8/02:4). One of those involved in these 'orgiastic 
attacks' was similarly described as 'a monster' (Clifton 16/8/02:4). 
Akerman described Indonesia as a 'snake pit' because of the 
failure of President Megawati to 'stand up to the young Muslim 
thugs who are protecting Bashir' (29110/02:16). 
The third element is to depict the perpetrators, not their acts, 
as inherently evil, confirming a long-standing focus in crime 
reportage on the 'demonology' of the criminal (Ericson, Baranek 
& Chan 1991), but in this case giving a racialised hue. In September, 
2002, the Daily Telegraph printed images of the police sketches 
ofthree teenagers wanted for a gang rape of a 'Caucasian' girl at 
Birrong, in Sydney's south west. Despite looking like fairly ordinary 
teenagers, but 'of Middle Eastern or Mediterranean appearance', 
the images were tagged 'faces of evil' (Lawrence 20/9/02:21). 
Osama bin Laden is routinely described as evil; but the more 
important point is that both he and the rapists are seen not just to 
have committed evil acts, but to embody the essence of evil. Images 
of two of the' suicide terrorists' walking through the airport in New 
York was headed, 'Evil caught on film' (Beach 2119/01:5). The 
front page of the Telegraph announced, upon the broadcast of a 
video claimed to show bin Laden commenting on the Bali bombings, 
that 'Evil speaks' (Daily Telegraph 14111102:1). John Howard 
described October 12 as 'a day on which evil struck' (Stephens 
19-20/1 0102: 1). An Akerman piece on dealing with terrorism is 
entitled, 'Exorcising the devils that live among us' (29/5/03:23). In 
a perverse aside, stories circulated on the internet that the 'face of 
the devil' could be seen in the billowing smoke coming from the 
twin towers (Williamson 2119/01 :6). More recently, during the war 
in Iraq, (exaggerated) reports that British troops had found a bunker 
full of chemical 'weapons of mass destruction' was headed, 'EVIL 
PROOF' (Wilson 28/3103:1). On its front page, under a coloured 
picture ofthe damage after the Marriott Hotel bomb blast in Jakarta, 
the Telegraph announced that 'EVIL STRIKES AGAIN' 
(Wockner 6/8/03: 1). 
41 
Bin Laden in the suburbs 
The fourth way to depict the inhuman is to emphasise the 
perpetrators' 'inhumanity'. In its most extreme form, this entails 
describing people as less than human: in the days immediately after 
September 11, Muslims (and not just terrorists) were described by 
radio talkback callers as 'scum' and 'garbage' (cited on 7.30 
Report 13/9/01). More commonly, perpetrators of certain crimes 
are perceived as lacking fundamental human characteristics: during 
the rape trials, for example, the youths were described by judge 
and media as 'callous and mean', treating their victims 'with callous 
indifference and considerable cruelty', degrading and humiliating 
them, and never showing contrition or remorse during the trial 
(Wockner 16/8/02:4). Using this common parlance, many Australians 
would agree with these descriptions; however, the cumulative effect 
of such language is to symbolically remove any requirement that 
we act humanely to those that act inhumanely. As we have seen 
with the spurious 'children overboard' claims, the depiction of 
refugees as callous and indifferent to their children was politically 
motivated and buttressed a callous detention policy. Further, the 
associations we've mapped here, between the perpetrators and 
their ancestry, is to locate this inhumanity in Islam or in Arabic-
speaking cultures. In a further bizarre twist, a furore erupted in 
Australia when images of the confessed Bali bomber, Amrozi, 
laughing with Indonesia's police chief General Bachtiar and fellow 
police were published in Australia newspapers. Politicians and 
journalists quickly described the images as ugly and heartless, but 
the implication was that this applied as much to the Indonesian 
authorities as to Amrozi. Comments by the Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, were reported in a highly ambiguous way: 'these 
people are so bloodthirsty. Their sort of ugly, sneering, amused 
attitude at the slaughter of innocent people is just horrific' (Miller 
15111102:9). Letters to the editor regarding this 'obscene picture' 
were more explicit in their outrage at the behaviour of 'Indonesia', 
lumping together the terrorist, the police and the nation, Osama bin 
Laden, Saddam Hussein, Islam, Asia and the Middle East (Sydney 
Morning Herald 15111102: 14). A Daily Telegraph article pointed 
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out that one of those in the picture, Brigadier-General Timbul Silaen, 
was Indonesian police chiefin Dili when militias 'rampaged' through 
East Timor in 'an orgy of ethnic cleansing' (McPhedran 151111 
02:9). Some journalists speculated that perhaps 'it's a cultural thing, 
something our soft Western minds can't comprehend': but behind 
the feigned self-deprecation is the assertion that murderous 
behaviour is common to Indonesian and/or Muslim culture (Lalor 
15111102:9). 
In contrast, the other side of this equation, the victims of the 
various crimes - such as the girls who were raped or those killed 
in the terrorist attacks - are represented in all their humanity. 
Indeed, they become so well known to us they become like family 
and friends themselves. Again, this is a very conscious strategy on 
the part of media organisations in particular - we all know how 
much value personal interest gives to a story. Their humanity is 
expressed in all its fullness: over a month after the Bali bombings, 
newspapers continued to have not just coverage of the ongoing 
investigations, but an ongoing 'honour roll' of the victims, a kind of 
family photo album. A continuing section entitled' As we remember 
them' in the Sydney Morning Herald was devoted to 'portraits' 
of those lost and the 'cherished moments of joy and love' recalled 
by their families (Cameron et al. 11111102:6 - note that this is 
Remembrance Day; again, weaving national significance into these 
events. Also note that these portraits continued well after this date). 
In these items and in the earlier news stories we are given intimate 
details of their lives - their work, their histories, their achievements, 
their characters, their tastes and habits; we become enmeshed in 
their networks of families, friends and lovers; we experience the 
whole gamut of emotions fundamental to human-ness - sorrow, 
pain, love, anger, joy, fear, etc - in relation to their lives and their 
deaths; we learn about their beliefs, their spirituality, and so on. In 
short, we know these people intimately and fondly; we too 
experience their loss. Similarly, the coverage of the rape trials 
emphasised the humanity of the victims - their suffering, their 
bravery, and so on - and the inhumanity of their attackers. 
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The point here is not to ignore the brutality of the rapes and 
the terrorist attacks, nor to detract from the personal and social 
tragedy experienced by many, but simply to show how a stark 
opposition is created in which some people have humanity, and 
some - criminals, terrorists and those who are culturally different 
- are denied this humanity. Similarly, and perhaps what best shows 
this ideological distribution, is the oft-repeated claim that the Bali 
bombings represented the loss of Australia's innocence (Daily 
Telegraph 14/10/02:20; 17110/02:4-5). It is a rhetorical flourish 
that is almost meaningless: it is a trope that has been used countless 
times. As journalist Tony Stephens (19-2011 0/02: 1) pointed out, it 
was said of the Hilton bombing in Sydney in 1978; it was said of 
the various 'massacres' in Melbourne (such as at Hoddle Street in 
1987), Strathfield in Sydney in 1991 and Port Arthur in Tasmania in 
1996; and of course it was said of Gallipoli in 1915. It might have 
been said, he added, of the massacres of Indigenous inhabitants 
over many years (although, of course, it wasn't), but we can't 
keep losing our innocence. Nevertheless, the idea of innocence 
gives to its bearer a human-ness that is morally pure. 
Those who are denied humanity are seen to be essentially 
Middle Eastern or Arabic or Muslim, and their lack of humanity is 
shifted to a whole community. The judge's opinion that the rapists 
had brought this 'slur on their own culture ... they are the ones that 
created this totally false scenario' (Wockner 16/8/02:4), ignores 
the already racialised context in which these events and their 
reportage occur. Ethnicity seems to become a significant factor 
only at selected moments. When over 100 drunken teenagers from 
'the esteemed private school' Waverley College went on a 
vandalistic rampage through Bondi in September, 2002, their ethnicity 
was not an issue. Indeed, the initial item in the Daily Telegraph 
was only brief (less than 250 words), made no mention of the school 
or the suburbs the youths came from, and was buried away on 
page 18 (Yamine 26/9/02: 18). It became front-page news the next 
day, but the key theme then was that the result of the boys' actions 
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was to 'wreck ... their future' (Grant 27/9/02:3). Similarly, these 
events were not described as criminal, in the way that 'rampages' 
by 'ethnic gangs' have been. But what is significant here is not 
simply that these incidents are racialised or not; but the ways they 
are racialised and the techniques used to construct the Arab Other 
as less human, and evil. 
Labelling something or someone evil, or barbaric, however 
reprehensible the act is, reduces what may be complex social, 
political and economic phenomena to a simple moral framework of 
right and wrong, and it essentialises that wrongdoing as pathological. 
It functions, as has been noted in the fear of crime literature, as a 
condensation symbol, simplifYing and making intelligible what might 
otherwise remain unsettling in the social and moral order (Loader, 
Girling & Sparks 2000:66). Yet it produces the 'pathological 
stranger' (Hogg & Brown 1998:50) who inhabits the 'landscapes 
of fear' which seem to increasingly haunt the media and political 
representations of our everyday lives (Sparks 1992). The creation 
of these objects of hostility, as part of a wider frame of ethnic 
difference, has repercussions for the representations of Arabic-
speaking people beyond those convicted of crimes. 
Crimes and misdemeanours: criminalising cultural difference 
It is one bizarre leap of the imagination to assume a link between 
the criminal activity of some Australian citizens of Middle Eastern 
ancestry and the terrorist activities of extreme Islamic fun-
damentalists in different parts of the world; it is another to link this 
to the attempts to seek asylum by refugees; and it is yet another to 
link these actions with the different cultural traditions of Arab and 
especially Muslim Australians, and yet this link is made naturally. 
In this case, a range of behaviours deemed unacceptable or 
offensive, become linked with and tainted by criminal activity. Once 
the criminal behaviour of a minority is pathologised as the tendency 
of a culture, then other acts of difference become imbued with 
criminality. In Huntington's claim about Islamic civilisation being a 
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cause of global conflict and violence, for example, civilisation here 
is defined in terms of culture, ethnicity and religion, forging a spurious 
link between a fictitious Islamic homogeneity and a cultural 
pathology of violence and conflict. This sweeping assumption is 
also played out in other, more localised ways. 
The Daily Telegraph self-righteously proclaimed that Australia 
should not feel guilt 'over our revulsion at those who care so little 
for their own children' (Daily Telegraph 13/10/02:24), for they 
break standard rules of parental love. As we quoted earlier, Devine, 
linking rape, drugs, violence and the refugees, claims 'the backlash 
against the Tampa illegal immigrants was founded on anger at their 
breaking the rules' (Devine 8/11/01). 'Queue-jumping' and 
'breaking the rules' were powerful and recurring themes in reportage 
of the Tampa crisis and ensuing letters to the editors, which linked 
seeking refuge to terrorism and indecent behaviour. These are 
clearly linked in an item by Akerman, who, we have seen, had 
already implied that terrorists were uncivilised. Not only were the 
refugees illegal immigrants, they were also unable to conduct 
themselves in a proper fashion, like us: 'the principally Iraqi and 
Pakistani queue jumpers have shown little civility towards 
representatives of the country where they hope to settle' (Akerman 
4/10/01 :22). 
This is not surprising given the cultural functions ofthe queue 
- especially in English-speaking countries. As ethnomethodologists 
(Livingston 1987) have pointed out, the queue is a crucial practice 
of social order; it is a way we get things done. To disrupt the queue 
is to render apart the basic social fabric - agreed rules and 
practices. This is why the queue is experienced as a moral order; 
it is a proper and fair way of acting. It is also an everyday practice 
in which political values of democracy are embedded. It is not hard 
then to see why 'queue-jumping' outraged so many people: it is 
experienced as a criminal and immoral act that threatens social 
and political order. But this is only possible if we see it primarily as 
an illegal or immoral action rather than one taken by desperate 
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people fleeing political and economic circumstances that we in 
Australia would not deem acceptable. The emphasis on the illegality 
of the asylum-seekers was tantamount to the criminalisation of 
refugees (Weber 2002; Pickering & Lambert 2002.). We can see 
the kinds oflinks being made between what are perceived as uncivil 
behaviours, crime and cultural difference. 
Devine (611 0/02: 15), in an article almost a year after criticising 
refugees for breaking the rules, complained about the 'decline in 
civility' in Australian society. While no mention is made directly 
about migrants or gangs, Devine, who writes regularly on these 
issues and was writing this in the midst of the gang rape trials, 
repeated the claim by researchers for the conservative Centre for 
Independent Studies that this decline manifested itself in, among 
other things, 'road rage', 'queue rage', air rage' and 'increased 
violence', as well as a 'widespread confusion about social rules', 
for which parents are largely to blame. In other words, there is a 
chain of causation from 'bad manners' to criminal activity. In an 
environment where the incivility has repeatedly been linked to 
ethnicity, there is an implication that the presence of migrants has 
done much to disrupt our agreed-upon social mores. 
This process of criminalisation extends to incidents in which 
what is at stake is deviation from the cultural norm. This is not 
altogether recent: an infamous article in the Australian by Des 
Keegan in the 1980s complained about Muslims slaughtering goats 
in the living room facing Mecca (Castles et al. 1988:3). However, 
in the current climate the furore is much greater. On the same day 
that letters to the editor applauded the record sentence for the 
ringleader of the gang rapes, letters also condemned the Anti-
Discrimination Board approval of a gym for Muslim women only. 
This was denounced as heinous, undemocratic discrimination, 
'prevalent Muslim racism' against' Australians'. As Di Wilson from 
Balmain (19/8/02:21) put it: 
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Unfortunately the hard work done by Australians to encourage 
assimilation has been ruined ... 
Why are we the ones who have to change? 
Ifthese cultures want to come and live in our society, they are 
the ones who should adapt to our way of life. 
We discuss some of these apparently unrelated incidents in Chapter 
Five, but it's worth drawing attention to some media and public 
responses to them here because they illustrate the kinds of themes 
we've witnessed in relation to acts of terrorism and crime. Shortly 
after the gym incident, an article about a McDonald's that served 
halal food met with the same condemnation. S Gordon of Fairfield 
thought it was 'a disgrace that Australia is compelled to adapt to 
the culture. of its immigrants' (10/9/02: 16). A month later, an item 
about a Muslim man threatened with the sack for stopping to pray 
at work was the occasion for further claims that adherents ofIslam 
were trying to be 'exceptions to the rule' (Saxby 12/10/02:22). 
Given the context in which it occurs, such rhetoric affirms the 
prevalent idea that Muslims in Australia disrupt the unspoken rules 
of behaviour in national life, and asserts the assimilationism that 
resurfaced during the 1990s. This rule-breaking, like queue-jumping, 
is implicitly seen to share with gang rape and terrorism an essentially 
immoral and criminal pathology endemic to Arabic-speaking 
cultures, the Middle East and Islam. There are deeply embedded 
anxieties within these responses and the conflation of crime, 
terrorism and cultural difference which are yet to be adequately 
unpacked, but these stories offer telling insights into the current 
climate of panic in Australia. 
Conclusion 
The processes of racialisation that we have outlined elsewhere, 
then, are elaborated and extended over time and reach into every 
corner of the social formation. With the construction of the Arab 
Other, the association of criminal and other practices results in the 
criminalisation of cultural difference, which appears to threaten 
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the social and moral order as much as overtly illegal behaviour. 
Racism, then, is not a 'clean' or rational phenomenon. Just as 
unemployment and insecurity can become joined ideologically with 
non-White immigration in the incoherence of the racist imagination, 
so Middle Eastern can become conflated with Arab, Arab with 
Muslim, Muslim with rapist, rapist with gang, gang with terrorist, 
terrorist with 'boat people', 'boat people' with barbaric, and so on 
in interminable permutations. So the logics of racism are profoundly 
difficult to disentangle. Yet this chapter has presented striking 
parallels between ideological constructs of crime-prone Arab 
immigrants, violent Muslim terrorists, Middle-Eastern queue-jumping 
refugees with no respect for civilised rules, and Muslims who are 
seen as failing to integrate. These events, we have suggested, 
constitute an ongoing cycle of moral panic around the Arab Other. 
The notion of a 'moral panic' has entered common parlance, 
but in doing this, it has been watered down to cover almost any 
moment of public outrage, or any form of cultural construction or 
boundary setting. It's easy to dismiss the recourse to the language 
of moral panic in scholarly analysis (Burchell 2003), but this would 
ignore the valuable insights the model offers. We want to retain the 
conceptual category of moral panic because it is a productive and 
critical concept, able to draw attention to the recognisable patterns 
of cultural meaning-making and their relations to social power. Moral 
panic and the construction of folk devils are both much more 
complicated social processes than is typically captured by common 
uses of these terms: they articulate individual events to broader 
national experience and structures of institutional power, legitimising 
and extending forms of state control, solidifying moral values and 
social divisions, and marginalising dissent and deviance (Scraton 
2002). 
This chapter, in exploring the construction of the Arab Other 
in contemporary Australia, has raised several important issues in 
relation to the formation and maintenance of moral panics. What 
are sometimes described as moments of social concern, are, in 
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fact, layered, complex and ongoing phenomena, suturing a series 
of events into shared narratives so that they have cumulative power, 
and so that each discrete event becomes symptomatic of larger 
social, moral and national concerns. These ongoing phenomena 
ebb and flow, depending on particular events and their specific 
contexts, but are woven into wider social discourses - like 
narratives oflaw and order, social cohesion, institutional decay -
which exist beyond these moments of panic but which are given 
life through them. The folk devil that is constructed in these ongoing 
processes, and is central to them, is a similarly complex entity, 
drawing together diverse groups into a homogeneous Other which 
is then naturalised through iteration and association. This Other is 
constructed through an array of ideological resources which affirm 
each other through the cumulative power of the waves of panic. 
This Other embodies a range of social anxieties, operating at a 
number of levels. We'll unpack these later, but we can indicate 
that present within the events we have just described is a set of 
interrelated fears - about increasing crime, cultural diversity, social 
cohesion, moral decay, the failure of political authority and various 
state institutions, globalisation and economic change, and so on. 
This Other functions not only as an object of hostility, therefore, 
but also as a form of ideological explanation of a range of social 
problems, understood as moral problems originating in the cultural 
pathology of the folk devil and providing a simple narrative of us 
and them, good and evil, victim and wrongdoer. 
Having examined how the Arab Other is 'assembled' through 
linking criminality, terrorism, lack of civilisation and lack of humanity 
and equating this with Middle Easternness and Islam, we want to 
develop further an understanding of the fusions which forge this 
Other and the processes which cast it as such a terrifying threat. 
To this end we explore in the following chapter, the crucial role of 
military metaphors in these ideological equations. 
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The reference to the bashing of the small boy in this context 
seems to imply that it was committed by someone of Middle 
Eastern origin. It was one Paul Voss who was eventually 
convicted of the crime (Knowles & Casella 5/10/02:4). 
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Acts of war: 
engaging the terrorist 
'ACT OF WAR' was the headline emblazoned on the front page 
of the Daily Telegraph the day after the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (12/09/0 1: 1). It continued to 
feature as a header for some days thereafter. But' AN ACT OF 
WAR' was also the headline the Telegraph used in November 
1998, after shots had been fired at the Lakemba police station from 
a passing car, two weeks after the fatal stabbing of Edward Lee in 
Punchbowl (Ogg & Casey 2/11198: 1). 
Our intention is not to trivialise the events of September 11 by 
such a comparison; rather, we want to argue that, through the 
political and media alignment of the events we described in Chapter 
One, the previous several years of media reportage of 'Lebanese 
youth gangs' in NSW get their ideological 'pay-out' after the Tampa 
crisis and the terrorist attacks. The discursive arsenal used to explain 
the terrorist attacks bears remarkable similarities to that deployed 
in explaining 'ethnic gangs' -there is a common language of war 
- and there are echoes in the representation of the asylum seekers. 
The 'narrative accrual' of such representations over the previous 
years came to fruition in the coverage of the recent and ongoing 
international events - a process that enormously benefited the 
Liberal-National Party coalition in the 2001 federal election 
campaign. This accumulation of warring images in the reportage 
of gangs, rape and refugees crystallises in the terrorist 'attack on 
America' , naturalising the dangerous Otherness of those of Arabic-
speaking, Middle Eastern or Muslim background. The Arab Other 
becomes not simply an uncivilised, animalistic queue-jumper, but 
an immediate and violent threat whose reach stretches from the 
Middle East to our own backyard and endangers the innocence of 
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the ordinary Australian citizen. This threat is deployed to justify a 
reactive 'war on terror' at the international level, but also a regime 
of aggressive, domestic policing and security. 
There is another narrative about the Arab Other, however, 
which also relies heavily on the metaphor of war. This second 
narrative recognises to some extent the moral duplicity of both 
combatants: it registers the culpability ofthe state as well as that of 
the Other which, we shall later argue, contributes to a culture of 
fear. This chapter explores these two narratives and suggests that 
they both try to recuperate the morally innocent position of 'the 
ordinary Australian', but in doing so they both sustain and erode 
white Australian nationalism. In granting agency and causal power 
to the Other, they create a sense of threat in the suburban heart of 
the imagined Australian national community, which exacerbates 
the sense of vulnerability. 
War, crime and metaphor 
The choice oflanguage and image in dealing with complex social 
events is crucial because it organises the ways we think about and 
respond to them. It is important to stress that these choices are not 
natural or innocent; there is not a self-evident way of characterising 
such complex social phenomena as terrorism, for example, as a 
'war' or a 'crime'. Wars and crimes are quite different things, 
even if there seems to be a lot of overlap between some crimes 
and some acts committed during a war; terrorist acts are not quite 
wars and yet are more (or less) than crimes. Moreover, what counts 
as each can be different. The US assassination in Yemen in 2002 
of an alleged Al Qaeda operative would be an act of terrorism to 
some, but to the US government it is part of the 'war on terror'. 
Certainly the White House would call it a 'crime' and terrorism if 
it were perpetrated on the US. 
The discussion of the Bali bombings, however, moved 
seamlessly between the two registers. The bombings were 
described on the one hand as a 'crime' (Daily Telegraph 15/10/ 
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02:20), in which policemen talked about 'suspects', or people who 
could help 'solve this case' (Heinzmann, Farr & McDougall 15/1 0/ 
02:2). On the other hand, those killed were 'VICTIMS OF WAR' 
(Daily Telegraph 1411 0/02: 1); the event was explained as an 
'atrocity' (Akerman 15/10!O2:20), and loss oflife was compared 
to World War II (Lawrence & McDougall 14110/02:2). As a 
consequence, 'Australia mourns its fallen' (Heinzmann, Farr & 
McDougall 15110/02:2); this movement between war and crime 
does particular kinds of things in the way we understand and react 
to these events. 
As Lakoff (1991) argues in his paper' Metaphor and War', 
widely circulated during the (first) Gulf War, metaphorical thought 
is a commonplace tool for understanding complex situations. The 
metaphor of war is particularly functional in characterising and 
giving shape to events involving conflict. However, metaphors of 
war have a decidedly moral and political character, serving to 
legitimate state action and entrenched interests - and to render 
illegitimate those of an opponent. Crucial to this, Lakoff adds, is 
the equation of war with crime, particularly violent crime - and 
he cites the characterisation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 
the early 1990s as 'rape' as an example - because crime is more 
recognisable in terms of a discourse of morality and justice. This, 
he argues, displaces the political and economic dimensions of war. 
Making war a 'crime' not only reduces it to a simple paradigm of 
the rights and wrongs of adhering to social laws, it makes it 
containable as an event, something we can respond to given our 
limited institutional and symbolic resources. 
The equation of war and crime works the other way as well. 
Military metaphors are common in the reporting of violent crime 
(Young 1996:6-7; Bessant 1995:51-2). As van Dijk shows in his 
discussion of what he calls the 'riot script' in the reporting of ethnic 
issues in the English and Dutch press in the 1980s, not only was 
there an emphasis on the link between ethnicity and crime, but this 
link drew heavily on of the imagery of war (van Dijk 1991:78). 
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This included fears of 'race war' and 'invasion' by refugees, and 
involved images of battles, mobs, attacks, terror, time bombs, 
guerrillas, and so on (1991 :2,55-56,66,93). Images of 'race war' 
have more recently littered the reportage of disturbances in England 
(Harris 3/6/01). Here complex economic and political causes are 
displaced by reference to cultural difference - difference that is 
construed as (cultural and moral) deviance (1991:21). But its key 
effect is to enhance the violence of the threat posed, and to extend 
it to a general, pervasive threat, akin to a warring enemy. Like the 
chains of association we followed in Chapter One, wars and crimes 
become phenomena of the same order, but they also ground the 
suspicions we have that those committing these offences are all of 
a kind. 
'Terror Australis' 
Unsurprisingly, then, the metaphor of war is central to the recent 
representations of 'Lebanese gangs' in Australia - but it is a 
metaphor that is worked and reworked in various ways. The shooting 
at the Lakemba police station, as we suggested, was declared to 
be an 'act of war', with 'Gunshots that broke our peace' (Wyn-
hausen & Safe 8/11/98: 13). A 'battle for Bankstown' featured in 
media and political representations (Harris 26/3/00:91-93) - the 
events in south-western Sydney have been described as 'urban 
warfare' (Martin 1998:26-27), a 'turf war over drugs in Bankstown' 
between 'Lebanese and Vietnamese gangs' (Temple & Trute 
1998: 5) and' criminal warfare' (Miranda 8/1/01 :4). Most recently, 
the theft of thirty pistols from a private security firm was described 
as being linked to 'a new drug war in Sydney's west' (Kamper 4/ 
9/03 :5): this item, which came with a large, dramatic photo ofthirty 
pistols, also included discussion of a number of (largely unrelated) 
shootings, some of which involved men of Arabic-speaking back-
ground. 
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This metaphoric frame was elaborated through a complex array 
of related images which peppered the commentary; and south-
western Sydney was seen to be a region which was 'Under fire' 
(Bearup 7/11/98:33) and in which there was an 'Ethnic time bomb 
with a slow-burning fuse' (Williams & Moore 1-2/9/01:14-15). 
Police Commissioner Ryan wondered where a 'Middle Eastern 
connection organisation' was drawing its 'recruits' from (Wain-
wright 7/8/0 1 :2). Gangs (of varying cultural backgrounds) were 
said to 'occupy territory', in a place the media called Gangland 
(McDougall & Miranda 6/8/01 :4) - a foreign territory within the 
nation's borders - which gave a spatial dimension to this criminal 
activity. Newspapers provided images of 'leaders' facing off - in 
one case Premier Carr and Sheikh Al Hilaly (Casey & Ogg 3111/ 
98:5) - a standard juxtaposition in war reportage. The police 
accordingly responded with a special 'strike force' to deal with 
street crime (Kennedy 22110/98:3) and we were given images of 
organised raids (see Figure 1) which echoed the images of troops 
in the Gulf, and prefigured the images of troops in Afghanistan and 
later Iraq. We were often given maps of areas under attack and 
aerial shots of dangerous places like Telopea Street (the site of 
Edward Lee's killing) which had a decidedly military feel (Sutton 
25/2/01: 10), comparable to the images from the wars in Afghanistan 
(Beach 11110/01:3) and Iraq (Brenchley 24/9/02: 16-19), and the 
investigations in Indonesia (Ratnesar 23/9/02:30-31). 
Even when the issue wasn't about violent conflict, this language 
still framed discussion: articles described how young people were 
caught in 'cultural crossfire' (Stevenson 7/11/98:32-3); they 
complained that the issue of ethnic relations was a 'cultural 
minefield' (Warren 12/9/01 :33); and they dubbed the debate over 
the sentencing of those guilty of so-called ethnic gang rape a 'judicial 
minefield' (Daily Telegraph 24/8/01: 10). 
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Figure 1: The police as military? Photograph by Brendan 
Esposito, Fairfaxphotos. 
The language of war to describe conflicts in Sydney - criminal or 
otherwise - is not new, of course, and it has featured in the debates 
on crime overseas as well (Stenson 2000). What is significant is 
its increasing pervasiveness and the growing use of themes of 
terrorism. It is not just war which is the metaphorical frame, but 
that particularly heinous form of military action which terrorism 
represents, and which brings with it a seemingly clearer moral 
dimension. A Daily Telegraph editorial equated the events of late 
1998 with 'acts of terrorism , (2111/98: 10) - but it wasn't only the 
tabloid press that saw this - journalists from the Daily Telegraph 
and the Australian decided that we now lived in 'terror Australis' 
(Miranda l2110/01b:1; Crawford 211 1198:1) and the ABC's Michael 
Brissenden observed that' Australia is no longer immune from acts 
of urban terror' (cited in Poynting, Noble & Tabar 2001:78). 
57 
Bin Laden in the suburbs 
One politician even evoked the idea of the 'enemy within' 
(Piccoli 23/8/01 :24) before the terrorist attacks in the US made 
this a concern of Western politicians and media organisations, and 
its ethnic resonances echoed the ensuing anxieties around the use 
of mail containing anthrax spores. Since then, talk of the 'traitors 
within' (Goodsir 14/7/03:1) and the 'conspiracy of silence' which 
has turned us into a 'soft target for turncoats' and the 'traitors in 
our midst' (Reed 14/4/03: 15) have become a staple of the news 
media. In the panic around Gangland, a month before September 
11, many of these gangs (including 'Asian gangs') were described 
in terms reminiscent of terrorist cells: they were 'secret societies', 
'obscure' and 'secretive', identifiable by their peculiar tattoos and 
secret hand signals (McDougall & Miranda 6/8/01 :4). Secret hand 
signals recur as a figure of violent and criminal behaviour - much 
was made of the hand signals of the 'Punchbowl boys' (Casey & 
Ogg 3/11/98: 1) - and this is similar to the claims that bin Laden 
had been 'using secret hand signals' in videos to order new attacks 
(Johnston 5/11/01 :9). Thankfully, we were given detailed briefings 
and maps of the various groups (McDougall & Miranda 6/8/01:4); 
much as we have been given similar information about Al Qaeda 
(Time 2001 :30--31). 
Similarly, during the panic around 'race gang rape', the Sun-
Herald described these incidents as 'terror in the suburbs' (Kidman 
29/7/01 :4): the youths were described as having 'terrorised women' 
(Wockner 16/8/02:4). The young female victim's evidence became 
'her only weapon' (Wockner 31/5/02:6). The judge emphasised 
the almost military-style operation of the attacks: the 'considerable 
degree of planning and co-ordination' involved in these attacks, 
which differentiated them from other cases of gang rape (Wockner 
16/8/02:6). He also likened the crime to, in the Telegraph's words, 
'the unforgiveable attacks against women at a time of social 
breakdown caused by war' (Daily Telegraph 16/8/02:22). 
The link between local gangs and overseas terrorists is 
extended with the claims, mentioned in the previous chapter, that 
boatloads of asylum seekers also contained terrorists. Yet the links 
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were more complex than the questionable, literal claims. The 
reportage of the refugees was couched in the same kind oflanguage 
we have witnessed in the recounts of gang activity. The Telegraph 
pointedly headed the section dealing with letters on the refugee 
crisis 'Terrorism on the seas' (Daily Telegraph 11/10/02:27). In 
August 2001 there was a meeting between New South Wales 
Premier Bob Carr and the federal Minister for Immigration Philip 
Ruddock after Carr had demanded the tightening of immigration 
policies to reduce 'ethnic crime' in Sydney (O'Malley, Jacobsen & 
Kennedy 29/7/01 :3; Wainwright 7/8/01 :2). Carr expressed concern 
that 'people with military experience' were allowed to enter 
Australia, and called for a federal-state plan designed to make it 
harder for 'criminals' to get into Australia and easier 'to kick them 
out' (O'Malley, Jacobsen & Kennedy 17/8/01 :3; Morris 17/8/01 :8). 
Boxed in by the Herald article on this was another piece, headed, 
'Authorities brace for more arrivals as ailing asylum seekers end 
horror voyage' (Sydney Morning Herald 17/8/2001:3). The 
Telegraph story on the same day was more strident, and on the 
other side of the page from the military migrants story and another 
one about a new police anti-gang squad (Miranda 17/8/01:8). Its 
headlines read, 'Leaky boat lands 348: Human cargo arrives with 
more on way' and 'The illegal armada keeps coming' (Daily 
Telegraph 17/8/01:8). The literal sense of 'armada' could not but 
reinforce the notion of immigrants armed with weapons - earlier 
in their homelands and later in Australian streets - especially in 
the context of continual reporting about the crime-ridden suburbs 
being a 'war zone' (Clenne1l9/11/98:4). 
This web of connection between gangs, immigration and 
refugees was repeated frequently. Mark Day complained: 'We are 
importing the problem', whether it be in the form of 'immigration 
officials ... welcoming members of the Southern Lebanon Army ... 
with no qualifications other than being trained to use machine guns' , 
or 'Pacific Islanders, who know nothing other than how to wield a 
machete' (Day 8/8/01:27). One Telegraph correspondent from 
close to Pauline Hanson's heartland in Queensland wrote, 'It is a 
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fact that gangs of Asians, Pacific Islanders and Arabs are terrorising 
Sydney' (Daily Telegraph 9/8/01 :30). In this account, not only 
was 'war' being imported, but also 'terror'. All this was before 11 
September. 
Australian politicians, of both major parties as well as One 
Nation, linked asylum seekers with terrorism and crime during and 
after the 2001 election campaign. On 14 September that year, 
Defence Minister Peter Reith warned that Indonesia could serve 
as a 'launching pad' for terrorism against Australia and other 
countries: 'the clamp down on border protection against boat people 
went "hand in hand" with efforts to combat terrorism' (Allard 14/ 
9/01:6; PMI4/9/01; Farr 14/9/01:8). Immigration Minister Ruddock 
warned on 17 September that boat people entering Australia were 
a potential security risk, and that some of them had criminal records 
(AAP 19/9/01). The Prime Minister said much the same in a 
television interview on 60 Minutes the previous evening. Attorney 
General Daryl Williams called for closer surveillance of immigrants, 
and Queensland Liberal MP Peter Slipper asserted 'an undeniable 
linkage between illegars and terrorists'; it was undeniable because 
'many refugees came from Afghanistan' (Phillips 20/9/01). 
Unsurprisingly, the media, after September 11, warned of 'Bin 
Laden groups in Sydney suburbs' (Miranda 12110/01a:5), linking 
the Lakemba-based Islamic Youth Movement and individuals who 
had received 'military training'; and thereby linking - first implicitly 
and then explicitly - 'Lebanese gangs' in south-western Sydney 
with Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, in much the same way 
that refugee boats were claimed to have contained terrorists. This 
connection followed effortlessly from the parallels between rep-
resentations of Lebanese gangs and the terrorist attacks on New 
York; parallels based on the accrual of a shared imagery. Both 
groups engaged in 'acts of war'; both events required military 
responses and tactics (aerial photos and so on); both groups displayed 
obvious signs of 'terrorist behaviour' - violence, secret signals, 
clandestine organisation, extremist association, and so on. Both 
exhibit, indeed, a common origin in a 'culture of violence , . 
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When, after the Bali bombings, claims that Muslim terrorists 
were present in Australia were asserted again by politicians and 
media, this time the claims seemed real and uncontroversial. The 
year before they had seemed bizarre, and even hysterical, but given 
that Bali was 'on our doorstep' the threat had become immediate 
and local. Yet this claim about terrorists in the suburbs,especially 
given the so far fruitless ASIO raids on suspects, is possibly more 
believable only because of the years of casting petty criminals, 
rowdy boys, asylum seekers and migrants as terrorists. The weekly 
reminders that Australia was now a 'prime target' for overseas 
terrorists (Baker 23-24111102: 1) and under 'DIRECT THREAT' 
(Dickins & Farr 20/11102:1), were complemented by claims that 
'sleeper cells' existed in Australia, that Jemaah Islamiah terrorists 
were being trained in the Blue Mountains, just outside Sydney 
(Barrass 30111/02:6), and that 'deadly instruments of terror' -
like a 'suburban rocket launcher' - were found at Lake Macquarie, 
near Newcastle (Cock & Williams 30/11102:5). More recent articles 
have continued to claim the existence of terrorist networks in 
Australia (Goodsir 1417/03: 1; Goodsir 4/9/03: 1). We are not 
suggesting that there is no possibility of a terrorist attack in Australia; 
just that the hysterical nature of the claims about the threat 
accentuates the fear of the Arab Other. 
We shall return to the nature of this fear later, in Chapter 
Seven; the point here is that the Bali reportage sustains this web of 
connection between crime and terror. These parallels are not 
'natural'; nor indeed are they innocent, but work to naturalise 
ideological links and produce substantial effects. A number of 
instances of racial vilification in recent years were reported to have 
connected the terms 'Arab' or 'Muslim' with 'terrorist', and we 
will return to these below. This pattern was observed during the 
1991 Gulf War, long before the 2001 September 11 attacks (HREOC 
1991). These representations have a long history that is crystallised 
at a particular moment, not simply as representations, but as 
rationales for racist attacks. They become so because the military 
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metaphors tum a deviant Arab Other into a pathologically violent 
and direct threat. 
The Other is armed 
Metaphor works through association, reinscribing complex 
phenomena in terms of the familiar, and through processes of 
opposition, reduction and conflation, turning people and events into 
essentialised, contrastable categories. War metaphors, for example, 
involve an apparently morally clear battle between an 'us' and a 
'them'. Lakoff (1991) notes the pervasive use of a 'fairy tale' cast 
of villain, victim and hero - with an accompanying simplistic moral 
structure - in explaining and hence justifying military action and 
demonising the enemy. But these metaphoric framings also invest 
in the villain, the Other, an agency with the capacity for disorder 
and violent destruction. In representations of Lebanese gangs and 
the array of incidents seemingly involving the Arab Other, the enemy 
was not always so clearly defined, but it was understood that this 
enemy was pitted against government, the police, and right-thinking 
Australia, and was deemed a real and present danger, much like 
international terrorism. 
The opposition between good and bad, however, is primarily 
construed as a cultural division. Central to these representations is 
the creation of the problem as an 'ethnic problem'. This involves 
mobilising the racialised Other we have detailed: a 'them' against 
whose 'difference' a dominant national, ethnic 'us' is defined. In 
these images a racialised Other is created to bear the brunt of 
blame - the circumstances are deemed to be an 'ethnic situation', 
the problem identified as an element within the Arabic-speaking 
communities. This thematises (van Dijk 1991: 116-7) a link between 
ethnicity, crime and violence, producing the overwhelming image 
of ethnic difference as a social threat and the source of conflict 
and deviance. This racialised 'them' is set in conflict with an 
unproblematised 'us': the Daily Telegraph is clear on the point 
that 'Sydney battles gang crime' (23/8/01:1, our emphasis). The 
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recurring claim that members of Arabic-speaking communities have 
put up a 'wall of silence' best reflects this divide - 'they' are not 
talking to 'us' (Poynting et al. 2001). The crucial element here is 
that this Other is always seen to be the one who initiates disorder 
and contravenes social rules. In the media coverage of the halal 
hamburgers, the women-only gym and the praying worker (men-
tioned in Chapter One and detailed in Chapter Five), the letters to 
the editor were clear about who had unsettled the peace. Moreover, 
as with the gang rapists, it was stressed repeatedly that 'they' 
were the ones who were racist in insisting on maintaining their 
ways at the expense of 'ours'. The Arab Other is always seen to 
be the aggressive transgressor, someone who brought conflict here. 
As we have already seen with the refugees, a common theme 
in reporting gangs was the way war had been imported, from places 
like Beirut, along with the cultural baggage of migration. These 
'wars', we were reminded, were 'A grim echo of Beirut' (Charlton 
3/11/98: 11). Significantly, Beirut has become a figure of urban and 
social decay, particularly when it is used to describe a place such 
as Bondi that has been the centre of concerns about the disruptive 
presence of Arabic-background youth (Skelsey 2/3/01: 13). 
Comparisons were also drawn between south-western Sydney and 
Israel and Kashmir in one Daily Telegraph editorial (2/11/98: 10). 
Much has been made of the military background of those 
involved in criminal activity and the so-called gangs (McDougall & 
Miranda 6/8/01:5). The Premier referred to the weapons training 
these 'gangsters' have received in military organisations (Wain-
wright 7/8/01 :2) and murdered gang boss Danny Karam's military 
experience was noted, though without emphasis on the fact that it 
was with Lebanese Christian militia (Sutton 25/2/01: 10-11). This 
was often linked to the 'culturally institutionalised' violence of Middle 
Eastern countries: anthropologist Richard Basham from Sydney 
University was quoted as saying 'it's part of their culture', while 
police were reported as suggesting that gang activity was 'part of 
their cultural upbringing' (McDougall & Miranda 6/8/01 :5). Sutton 
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(25/2/01: 10-11) explicitly traced the 'Telopea Street Boys' as-
sociated with the Edward Lee manslaughter to a Sunni Muslim 
village in the Al Dunnieh region of Lebanon, while retiring Federal 
Police Commissioner Palmer claimed that knives and guns were 
more commonly a feature of 'Lebanese culture' (Mercer 12/3/ 
01: 1). No distinction is made here between those of Christian and 
Muslim faith, between those from Lebanon and those from else-
where in the Middle East, and between those born overseas and 
those born in Australia. As in the article expressing a concern about 
bin Laden groups in Sydney, a Daily Telegraph editorial- 'Entry 
is a privilege not a right' -links international terrorism, local Arabic-
speaking communities and problems with lax migrant and refugee 
entry rules (yet denies this is an issue of racism) (12/10/01 :20). 
As we have already argued in Chapter One, the imagining of 
this Other ignores complex distinctions between religions, places 
of birth and country of ancestry, making internal differences 
inconsequential. There is a semantic chain of equivalence that links, 
unproblematically, Australians of Lebanese background, the Middle 
East, Afghanistan, the Taliban, Arabic-speaking groups and Islam, 
as though these are all of the same order. A homogenising clas-
sification is a characteristic feature of racialised knowledge and 
the way it constructs its Other (Goldberg 1993:150). Further, this 
homogenised Other is explained culturally - these categories are 
'ethnicised' and a similarity found in this imputed cultural 
homogeneity. A semantic chain is also established culturally 
between (exotic) masculine bravado, civil disobedience, organised 
crime, violent crime and terrorism, and linked to lack of civilisation, 
misogyny, deviant masculinity, cruelty, irrationality. Analysis offear 
of crime has shown many times over the ways criminal activity is 
explained in terms of individual pathology (Barak 1994:20-1); here 
we are seeing a more cultural explanation of criminal, violent, and 
terrorist activity, shorn of any sustained attempt to contextualise 
such activity, and building on the existing racialisation of youth crime 
(Collins et al. 2000; White 1996). 
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An oft-repeated claim was that the activities in the spotlight 
- drug dealing, crime, gangs, violence, interethnic conflict, uncivil 
youth - were new and intrinsically 'foreign', imported into 
Australia through decades of immigration, especially from countries 
and regions where conflict and war were familiar and ingrained 
aspects of cultural life. Much of what we had witnessed since late 
1998, it was perceived, had to do with 'Arab culture'. In Premier 
Carr's complaint that 'we import gangsters' (Wainwright 7/8/01 :2), 
the emphasis is on the threat that derives from elsewhere, laying 
the blame for 'Lebanese gangs' squarely at the feet of the Arabic-
speaking community leaders (Jackson, Harris & Nason 3/11/98:5). 
This amounted to the criminalisation of (especially young) people 
of Arabic-speaking background. They have become the pre-eminent 
'dangerous Other', the 'unpredictable stranger' in Australian 
cultural life (Lupton 1999a:14) onto which we project our deepest 
fears about social and moral disorder. 
In producing knowledge about this Other, the process of 
racialisation identifies, if only implicitly, a set of characteristics or 
behaviours, even a pathology, used to explain social and cultural 
difference, and to naturalise social exclusions (Goldberg 1993: 151). 
This involves the projection of anxieties about social problems onto 
the Other, which becomes seen as the cause of those problems, 
the source of conflict and disorder. The Other is not only a source 
of conflict, but embodies a lack of moral order. Societies create 
cultural boundaries and oppositions as a way of maintaining order: 
they differentiate between those who belong and those who, owing 
to cultural differences, are seen as out of place (Douglas 1966). In 
order to legitimate these divisions, those who are seen as Other 
are constructed as moral threats. The metaphor of war, and the 
theme of terror, locate moral right on one particular side of the 
divide, legitimising the actions taken by the NSW government and 
its police service. Racialisation, licensed by the metaphor of war, 
proceeds through a double movement: social problems are defined 
as ethnic ones, and ethnic 'villains' are inscribed as morally culpable 
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on the basis of their ethnicity, allowing the 'non-ethnic' heroes to 
remain morally pure. It is not just the characterisation of the Other 
as deviant at issue here, but the imputing of violent agency to the 
Other: the 'puritanism of good feeling' , as Flahault (2003: 75,108) 
puts it, rests on the energy of the villain's agency. This sustains the 
veneer of the moral innocence of Australian society, but at some 
cost, we shall argue. 
The ideological conflation of 'Lebanese gangs' (even though 
this was concentrated on NSW) and Arab terrorism produced a 
windfall for the conservative parties in the 2001 federal election. 
Together with the refugee crisis, these events intensified the 
racialised discourse that pervaded the campaign, even when it was 
not explicit. After both the Tampa crisis and September 11, electoral 
support for the Coalition rose by about 5% on each occasion (Manne 
12/11/01:10). In Sydney, the centre of the ethnic gang panic, the 
swing to the Liberals was greater than in any other capital city -
in some parts of Sydney it was over 8% (Clark et al. 17-18/111 
01 :27). Prime Minister Howard made much of this situation -
evoking our uncertain times and the need for firm action. This 
discourse racialised issues around global inequalities, humanitarian 
policy, cultural difference and so on, but articulated them as issues 
of right and wrong, villain and victim. The increasing incidence of 
harassment and vilification, here as in the US, both official and 
unofficial (Riley 10-11/11/01:18; Jopson 20-21/10/01:18), bears 
testimony to this implicit 'understanding' of the links between 
cultural difference, crime, terrorism and moral and social order. 
In 'arming' the Arab Other, fashioning a folk devil who is 
aggressive and violent as well as deviant, Australian politicians and 
media imbue this figure with an agency that props up the belief in 
the moral purity of the nation and 'demands' an assertive response. 
Howard's election campaign appealed because it reasserted a 
degree of agency in 'defending' the nation; just like state-based 
'get tough' policing policies - but in both cases they exhibit a 
certain hysterical machismo endemic to Australian politics. Overall, 
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these responses serve to feed a deep-seated anxiety about Aust-
ralian social and political life. In an insightful cartoon and poem 
entitled 'The Warlords of Suburbia', Michael Leunig captures 
something of this: an embittered male watches international events 
on his TV, and domestic events inside and outside his own home, 
and vents his own frustration and sense of impotence by wishing 
misfortune upon the world. A classic representation of the passive/ 
aggressive element in Australian suburban life, Leunig's work 
captures our eagerness for the suffering of others and the hypocrisy 
our double standards, while only barely masking deep anxieties 
and disillusionment (24---25/11/01 :2). 
The Gulf War, or the space in between 
This first narrative - innocent 'us' versus aggressive 'them' -
only works up to a point. The coverage of the events around gangs 
- like the events around the refugee and terrorist crises - was, 
however, always more complex than this portrayal suggests. A 
second narrative has emerged in the representation of youth gangs 
which, while it still operates around the metaphor of war and its 
attendant reductions and associations, uses it differently from the 
manner suggested in Lakoff's analysis. During the ethnic gangs 
panic, the distinction between 'us' and 'them' became a little murky. 
Van Dijk (1991:143) suggests that the us/them schema always 
involves complex sub-categories. But something more complicated 
is happening in these representations. On the one hand, there is a 
sense in which 'we' are caught in a battle between warring elements, 
innocent victims of a bloody battle. Here 'we' are the civilians in 
the 'war'. As Charles Miranda suggests, 'gangs battle for control 
of our streets' (8/1 /0 1 :4, our emphasis). This innocence and removal 
from wrongdoing is a common theme in these stories, but there is 
something else here. 
In the earlier narrative, the police were initially cast as the 
defender of good. As well as being seen as avengers, responding 
to aggression with a special 'strike force' to deal with street crime 
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(Kennedy 22/10/98:3), police were also described as the turget of 
'Terror Australis' (Crawford 2/11198: 1). Ogg and Casey (2/11198b: 1) 
likewise describe how police had to 'dig in against gang attacks' 
(which aligns the police with the revered World War One 'diggers'). 
Both victim and defender are morally justified positions because 
they are not seen to initiate unjust aggression. Yet the image of the 
police-as-victim also opens up the problem of a sense of incapacity 
to act and resolve the problem, and eventually leads to a sense of 
police as part of the problem (Warren 16/8/01 :23). Narratives that 
rely on the fairytale genre and metaphors of war work on a particular 
distribution of blame and of agency (or cause and effect). To shift 
blame onto the wrongdoer, they must grant agency to them, leaving 
the hero as reactive. If the required restoration of order does not 
ensue, as is the case with both the NSW 'crime wave' and the 
'war on terror', then this leaves the hero open to charges of 
impotence. Further, the metaphor of war only works if the hero 
can sustain the burden of moral purity. Over the last few years, 
impotence and moral laxity have become marked features of the 
actors - the police and the State - deemed to be the heroes. 
Inept policing has become a common theme. We see not only 
gang warfare, but wars within the ranks - one article talks about 
police wars, wars of ideas regarding how to deal with drugs and 
crime (involving both police and politicians), as well as the turf 
wars between gangs (Lagan 2001). A cartoon lampoons the' gang 
wars at the coppers' club' (Moir 8/3/01:13). War has erupted all 
over the place. Rather than positively representing the police and 
politicians, much media reportage has become much more 
ambivalent - even critical- of their actions and pronouncements: 
a marked difference from 1998 when some news articles restated 
police media releases with little alteration. This does not just revolve 
around incidents in the Bankstown area or those involving the 
Arabic-speaking communities alone, but includes a number of events 
and issues. Alongside this perception of ineffectuality is the long-
standing recognition of police corruption. Over the course of many 
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years, police have increasingly come 'under fire' for corruption, 
drug-taking and violent behaviour as well as bureaucratic in-fighting, 
poor policing policy and strategy, echoing the image of a corrupt 
force pictured by the Wood Royal Commission (Horan 26/12/99: 19; 
Miranda 24/1 0/00:7; Chan 1997). The failure to resolve factionalism 
in the NSW Police Service, of course, was one of the factors in the 
2002 sacking of Commissioner Peter Ryan by the NSW Labor 
government, which had employed him from England to become 
Australia's highest-paid public servant to reform the hitherto 
notoriously corrupt NSW police and to bring (supposedly rampant) 
crime under control. Extravagant promises about the latter, while 
successful image-builders in the talkbacks and tabloids, proved to 
be Mr Ryan's downfall when he was unable to deliver on them and 
the media turned against him, outraged when his publicity machine 
misrepresented failures as successes (Mercer 16-17/2/02:25). 
Here we do not merely see the mitigation of police acts in 
representations of ethnic situations, as van Dijk claims (1991: 198), 
but an ambivalent relationship with the police; sometimes supportive, 
sometimes critical. Often there is a recognition that aggressive (as 
well as corrupt and inept) policing is part of the problem of conflict, 
not the force defending us. The coverage of the police response 
was meant to reassure us that the police were on top of crime, but 
the images of mass police action - often military-style - produce 
the anxiety they are meant to dispel. The columns of police marching 
into Telopea Street with helicopter cover in August, 2000, were 
intended as a conclusive show of strength - 'Police raid tames a 
street of silent fear' - but it represented for some the image of a 
military state (Lawrence 3/8/00:3). This image was circulated on 
the Internet with the ironic caption' community policing?' 
The representation of NSW politicians and the state Labor 
government has been similarly ambivalent. In an item on Bob Carr's 
mid-term report card which focused on his new drug laws, for 
example, the overwhelming emphasis in news coverage was a 
disillusion with political grandstanding which papers over ineptitude 
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and ineffectual policy (Jacobsen 26/3/0 1 :6). These drug laws were 
dubbed 'Nazi-style' (Lagan et al. 29/3/01 :4). On top of these claims, 
in response to the gang rapes there was the recurrent accusation 
that Australia's courts were failing to reflect community concerns 
and were 'soft' on criminals (Devine 30/08/01: 12): another public 
institution failing to protect the citizenry. A One Nation (2003) 
campaign leaflet for East Hills in the NSW election similarly lumped 
together criticisms of multiculturalism and its role in escalating crime 
and terrorism with criticisms of judges, policing, and other public 
institutions. 
Similar themes of the incompetence and corruption of those 
institutions designed to protect Australian citizens has emerged in 
the asylum-seekers crisis and the investigation into the terrorist 
attacks, especially in relation to Bali. As we saw in Chapter One, 
the Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (2002) 
found politically motivated acts of misrepresentation over the 
'children overboard affair' occurring at many levels, from the Prime 
Minister's office through the Defence Ministry and elements of 
the armed services. Similarly, very soon after the Bali bombings, 
questions were being raised about the competence of the in-
vestigation, Australia's intelligence services and the political 
management of public concerns. While an inquiry eventually cleared 
Australian authorities of any failure to notify the Australian public 
about terrorist dangers (Morris & Stewart 11112/02: 10), a common 
response was that there were still 'questions unanswered' about 
Australia's intelligence and security capabilities (Sydney Morning 
Herald 14-15/12/02:32). More recently, evidence that the 
Australian government, like the UK government, exaggerated the 
threat ofIraq and its 'weapons of mass destruction', and ignored 
advice that war would increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks 
on Australia, have undermined the strong and popular position taken 
by the government (Allard & Fray 13-14/9/03: 1). 
Ambivalence towards political life was seen in other ways. 
Australian politicians were, like the police, seen as unprofitably 
divided: Prime Minister Howard and Opposition Leader Simon Crean 
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were seen to be 'at war over terrorism' (Banham 14-15/12/02: 1). 
The ASIO raids of the homes of people with suspected Jemaah 
Islamiah links were, while generally endorsed by the Australian 
public, also the basis of concern over 'heavy handed' responses 
(Sydney Morning Herald 1111102: 1 0). On the other hand, viewers 
of Channel Nine's Today (18/11102) responded by email to a 
question about whether Australian authorities were' doing enough' 
to prepare for a terrorist attack were scathing, describing Australia 
as a 'soft target' . As one viewer argued, 'our intelligence agencies 
are so far behind the times we wouldn't stand a chance'. Janet 
Albrechtsen (4112/02: 15) managed to link terrorism and refugees 
again while shifting the blame for the threat of attack onto the High 
Court who, she argued, were 'inviting terrorists' to Australia. This 
theme had appeared in a Warren cartoon in the Daily Telegraph 
after September 11, showing a bewigged judge sitting in his lounge 
room with four bearded, turban-wearing Taliban-like figures drinking 
cups of tea while saying to his wife, bearing the tea tray, 'I'm sorry 
dear -I told them it was okay to stay' (Warren 12/9/01 :33). 
The initial war narrative cannot contain the populism in 
Australian political life, a deep and abiding ambivalence towards 
political institutions and associated authorities. While Australians 
generally supported a 'tough' stand on terrorism, they also saw the 
Federal Government's anti-terrorism as 'political grandstanding', 
as the Telegraph's tele-poll showed (4/2/03: 16). At stake here is 
not just the negative portrayal of police and politicians, just as the 
images and headlines discussed were not just about those of Arabic-
speaking background - but a distancing from the very institutions 
that are supposed to guarantee the rights and freedoms that define 
Australian society. While in the earlier narrative the attempt to find 
the moral high ground included those institutions, now the need to 
find a morally innocent position works by excluding those institutions. 
In setting up an opposition between interests that are equally 'to 
blame' (see 'Lebanese leaders attack Carr', Daily Telegraph 6/ 
11198:4), the media representations provide us with a position from 
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which to reject all sides, to find a space 'in between', so to speak. 
The metaphor of war here is not of one in which we are fighting, 
nor a war where one side is any longer 'our side' - it is a futile, 
endless war which we view from a distance, or as victims. This is 
how we have come to view conflicts in Northern Ireland and the 
Balkans, yet what is significant here is the way this is mapped onto 
domestic politics. This second narrative, which emerged over the 
last four years, registers a deep if inarticulate ambivalence about 
the very foundations of the Australian polity, even as it hangs on 
grimly to the moral purity that is often seen to be attached to 
Australian society. 
A particular kind of image began to appear in the last few 
years that captured this sense of antagonistic parties and a neutral 
space between them. In this image - see Figure 2 (Kennedy & 
O'Malley 25/11/00:9) - we have a scene from Kathleen St, 
Lakemba in western Sydney, after a shooting that took place there. 
Six police officers, striding down the street passing suburban homes, 
are walking away from us, and are positioned on the far left side of 
the image. A Muslim woman, in traditional garb, and carrying her 
shopping, is positioned on the far right side. It is supposed to reassure 
us that police are on the job, but it resonates rather with a profound 
sense of the gulf between the police and Arabic-speaking 
communities - a gulf expressed not only in the physical distance 
between a group of police and a Muslim woman at either edge of 
the photograph, but also in the fact that backs are turned against 
each other- a sign of both disrespect and an incapacity to engage. 
In this image we are being placed between them and away from 
them: not asked to side with either, but against both. 
There are two things noteworthy here: first, we are removed 
from being protagonists in the conflict, but are caught in it. Second, 
what is in the middle - well, not exactly the white picket fence 
from John Howard's 1988 'Future Directions' campaign, but it is a 
front yard and a gate of an ordinary suburban house - a symbol 
of ordinary Australianness. The battle that is being fought, then, is 
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over the heart of Australian life, and 'ordinary Australians' are 
caught in the middle. This is conveyed in other ways. The headline, 
'Mum gunned down' (Westwood 24/11100:3), focuses not on the 
ethnicity per se of the person killed, but the fact that she was a 
'mum', an ordinary person from an ordinary family (whether she 
was or not is irrelevant). Elsewhere we have other images of in no-
cent and ordinary Australians -like children (Clenne1l91l1l98:4) 
- being caught in the crossfire, not able to believe that this is 
happening in their own back - or front - yards. In these images, 
ethnicity is largely erased from the victim of the crime. This narra-
tive, reworking the representation of distant wars, allows us to rec-
ognise and explain local conflict and yet remove ourselves from it, 
to see ourselves as victims, even as the ethnicity of the real victims 
is largely erased. 
Figure 2: The space between. Photo by Jessica Hromas, 
F airfaxphotos. 
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It is no wonder that the suburban setting of these criminal acts 
and of the ongoing conflict between police and communities is 
constantly stressed - perhaps if they happened at a longstanding 
drug and prostitution hub of the city like Kings Cross we would be 
less shocked. But the 'sleepy suburbia' of ordinary Australia was 
under attack (Wynhausen & Safe 7-8/11/98:13), just as after the 
World Trade Centre attacks the media worried about 'Bin Laden 
groups in Sydney suburbs'. Another image captures the same sense: 
two foreigners in exotic clothes and two police officers, backs 
turned. We do not identify with either of them, but with, in the 
middle of this suburban street, an ordinary looking fellow (Humphries 
& Marsh 3/11/98: 1). On closer inspection, this ordinary fellow could 
be of 'Middle Eastern appearance' too, but his western clothes-
in contrast to the distinctive apparel of those on the right of the 
picture - emphasises his assimilation to Australianness as well as 
his difference from uniformed authority. This article states explicitly 
that this attack 'was un-Australian'. 
Ordinariness is, of course, a key figure in any populism. An 
enormous investment is made in the idea to embody the goodness 
and decency of the populace. A Telegraph editorial (28/1 0/02: 14) 
stressed this ordinariness in arguing that 'ordinary people' were 
increasingly the targets of global terrorists - 'in their sights' -
resulting in the loss of 'innocent lives'. Ordinary and innocent are 
virtually interchangeable here, and contrasted to war and terror; 
and if these latter two are associated with the Arab Other, then 
innocence and ordinariness are also aligned in particular ways. 
War is not just a metaphor, then, but is central in constituting a 
complex frame wherein a range of social problems, which include 
inept policing and political grandstanding as well as the specific 
concerns around' ethnic crime' , are structured by a moral discourse 
which perceives issues in terms of simple right and wrong. It also 
works to construct these problems in terms of an aggressive 'threat' 
to moral innocence: a world populated by villains who threaten 
victims. This frame works, not by telling us what to think in any 
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singular sense, but by drawing a border around what we see, and 
directing us to what is to be seen: it includes some things and 
excludes others, and sets the parameters by which the object is 
perceived and interpreted (McLachlan & Reid 1994). Yet it also 
helps us forget where we are looking from. By focusing in this 
chapter on the metaphoric frame we can move away from the 
content of the images and headlines to the ways we see this content 
and the position from which we see it. 
Note that those shots fired at Lakemba police station were 
'Gunshots that broke our peace' (Wynhausen & Safe 7-8/11/98: 13) 
- our peaceful existence was disrupted from outside. A Herald 
letter-writer warned that' It is Mr and Mrs Average who will wreak 
revenge' for these crimes; but this 'middle Australia' is clearly 
identified as an 'Australian-born underclass' (Murphy 10/3/01 :35). 
This theme of the un-Australian nature of the attack, and by 
implication, of the perceived culture and traditions of the 
perpetrators, is not new, of course. At one level it confirms the us/ 
them schema we have already discussed. But the 'us' sometimes 
may contain moral duplicity. Recognising how the frame of war 
hides the position from which we view these incidents, we can see 
that the problem will always be seen to be someone else, coming 
from somewhere else - whether it be Arabic-speaking people, 
police, politicians, or whatever - and 'we' are removed from it. 
But who is this unseen ordinary Australian that is at risk? 
Who is the 'we' that is understood in this discourse? The 'Let's 
look out for Australia' anti-terrorist campaign (Commonwealth 
Government 2003) emphasised the need to protect 'our way of 
life' - despite the fact that in contemporary Australia such a 
concept is almost meaningless - and it did so by contrasting this 
with suspicious activity that is 'out of the ordinary', a 'lifestyle that 
doesn't add up', and even people with 'false or multiple identities': 
remembering that we have been reminded that many refugees had 
false identities, and multiculturalism is predicated on a recognition 
of multiple identities. This position of ordinariness then is not available 
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for all to take up. If one side of the polarisation is the exotic, third-
world-looking migrant - as Hage puts it (1998) - then this hidden 
position 'in between' is necessarily 'white'. This may have class 
inflections too - this was clearly seen when the debate, and the 
anxiety, was upped a notch or two when it was suggested that 
criminals from 'other areas' were invading Sydney's north shore 
(Gilmore 6/11/00:5) - the heart of the white, Anglo middle-class 
Australia. The editorial of that issue of the Daily Telegraph (6/11/ 
00:20), entitled 'Community fighting for our children' - note the 
'our' again - spells this out: 'In communities which, by and large, 
typify our ideal of a safe, suburban environment, such a scenario 
seems all the more disturbing'. National belongings always have 
these inflexions of race and class and gender, and this is no exception. 
Perhaps the more important aspect here is that safety, civility, 
decency and order are always on our side, and this side is white 
- an implication also evident in the terrorist coverage. 
Conclusion: for a war on ordinariness 
We have seen two narratives used in the representation of 
Lebanese gangs, as well as Muslim terrorists, both of which revolve 
around the metaphor of war, both of which involve processes of 
racialisation and both of which seek to preserve a morally innocent 
position of ordinary Australianness. The frame of war not only 
embroiders the representation of crime and ethnicity, it is an 
emotionally charged force which shapes the ways we understand 
social relations as moral relations. As Bauman (1993:183) has 
argued, responsibility is fundamental to the structure of SUbjectivity. 
These two narratives provide ways of dealing with responsibility 
and morality. One puts us into battle against a racialised Other in a 
classic war of good versus evil which resonates with contemporary 
representations of terrorism; it casts the Other as aggressor and as 
evil and posits us on the side of good as both victim and avenger; 
the second acknowledges that the two warring sides are not quite 
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so easily separable but finds not only a safe haven between them, 
but a space where we can recuperate moral good. Either way, it is 
always someone else's fault, and either way the moral positions 
are highly racialised. The value of the second narrative is that it 
allows us to abrogate responsibility when our institutions are at 
fault. These two narratives, then, also provide a kind of ideological 
space - a repertoire of positions and representations which 
politicians, media commentators and audiences draw upon in 
attempting to make sense of social relations and in particular the 
concerns and tensions related to cultural diversity, crime and social 
policy. The different narratives can be mobilised according to the 
situation and speaker, giving the dominant culture a kind of 
hegemonic flexibility. At their heart both narratives attempt to retain 
a morally 'pure' position which is attributable to some core ordinary 
Australianness that retains the possibility of a pure national 
community, relegating to an ethnic Other the tendency towards 
criminality. 
Nation-states and elements within their social formations have 
always promoted strategies of 'purification' , aiming to create senses 
of national and local space from which impurities - of race and 
ethnicity, for example, or criminality and deviance - can be 
excluded, such as in restrictive immigration laws or in white, middle-
class gated communities (Morley 2000:141-144). However, 
purification can also refer to the specifically moral nature of national 
identification, creating a sense in which the ordinary citizen is freed 
ofthe impurity of ethnic conflict, crime or institutional corruption. 
The identification of Gangland is one way in which moral impurities 
can be located and externalised; the identification of a pathologically 
violent Other that imports crime and terror similarly sustains this 
purity. 
Ironically, however, these strategies also serve to problematise 
the very foundations of national identification. On the one hand the 
shift in narratives demonstrates that impurity is increasingly hard 
to conceive as external; it is becoming increasingly internal to 
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Australian society, not because multiculturalism allows us to 'import' 
conflict, crime and disorder, but because Australian institutions 
themselves are increasingly seen as corrupt and disordered. On 
the other, the association of innocence and victimhood produces a 
'weak' nationalism. In investing in the criminal Other the capacity 
for aggression and disorder, these representations invest in 'us' the 
capacity to be harmed, a passivity which guarantees the moral 
status of victimhood but which robs 'us' of agency. This is like the 
tendencies of crime surveys generally, which construct simple 
categories, founded in opposition between victims and offender, 
but which exacerbate the sense of risk and of the likelihood of 
victimisation (Stanko 2000: 13). We will return to the consequences 
of this for an emerging 'paranoid nationalism' (Hage 2002), a culture 
of anxiety around our national attachments; suffice it to say here 
that the theme of fragmentation (Seccombe 17/2/01 :25,30-31) has 
been common to those ongoing debates about Australian national 
identity and multiculturalism for many years. 
The identification of a pure Australian ordinariness underlies 
the strong association of crime and ethnicity, and, as we have seen, 
it licenses the 'criminalisation' of cultural difference. We need, 
therefore, to problematise the ordinariness we often take for granted 
in national life. We need to question the apparent innocence at the 
heart of Australian identity and reveal the 'warlord of suburbia' 
that lies within, and to deconstruct the essentialised understandings 
of ethnicity underpinning our everyday assumptions about cultural 
difference and national community. 
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The lost boys: 
caught between cultures or resisting racism? 
War is not the only metaphor in terms of which the' Arab Other' is 
conceived. In this chapter we examine the image of being lost, 
caught or trapped between two cultures, that sets the horizons of 
intelligibility for much influential discussion and practice in relation 
to young second-generation Arabic-speaking background im-
migrants in Australia. Of particular interest and focus here are the 
young working-class men who are encountered by the State as a 
problem to be resolved or dealt with: not least during the widening 
gyres of moral panic. In both versions of the metaphor of war 
analysed in Chapter Two, the Arab Other tended to be presented 
as the enemy of those hegemonic 'us' who were constructing this 
message and of those of 'us' with whom this message was intended 
to communicate. 'We' are sometimes the innocent victims of an 
enemy within, a cultural or actual fifth column from which we must 
be protected by the police and, if necessary, security forces and 
other repressive arms of the State. 'We' are sometimes the innocent, 
put-upon hosts of ungrateful, bad-mannered and downright immoral 
guests within our home, who cannot or will not learn to do as the 
Romans when they are in Rome. 
In the first version of the war metaphor, the police and security 
forces are on 'our' side, and the enemy is to be defeated, put, 
down, repressed. This corresponds in part to the 'zero tolerance' 
approach towards second-generation young men in public spaces, 
which has been analysed in Poynting (1999) and Collins et al (2000) 
and is not the major focus of our attention here. The second version 
of the war metaphor, as we have seen, leaves the 'us' in the space 
in between the Other and the heavy-handed or bumbling police. 
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This second version of the metaphor of war places the immigrant 
in an either/or position: either become 'one of us', or remain (at 
best) on the outside as the Other or even (at worst as in the 1991 
Gulf War, the 'War on Terror' from 2001, or the ensuing second 
Gulf War) on the side of the enemy, a traitor. 
Young, second-generation immigrants are positioned especially 
invidiously and unrealistically within this framework, as we shall 
see in this chapter. In addition to the ethnic profiling and 'zero 
tolerance' approach, the State has a gentler way of dealing with 
them within its repertoire, more apparently consensual and less 
coercive. Well-meaning liberals, worried ethnic leaders and 
community workers - and even in some contexts concerned 
parents and the marginalised adolescents themselves - can come 
to see this second generation as lost between cultures, and thus 
contrive or support measures to find, rescue or save them. 
This popular notion that second-generation immigrant youth 
of Lebanese background are 'caught between two cultures' is 
widespread both in the dominant culture and among Lebanese-
Australian communities. Indeed, this belief is held in both academic 
and common-sense forms, of second-generation immigrant young 
people generally. It is often put forward to explain a range of social 
problems involving these young people: from education to youth 
culture and the criminal justice system. In the context of the 
criminalisation of young people - especially young men - of Arab 
and Muslim background which is the focus ofthis book, the 'Lost 
between Cultures' thesis offers an ideological 'explanation' of the 
taken-for-granted criminality. 
This chapter demonstrates, firstly, that the thesis does not stand 
up to empirical test. We show that the premise of two neatly bounded 
cultures with second-generation immigrant youth trapped in between 
does not accurately represent the lived reality of the young people 
concerned. Secondly, this calls into question the range of redemptive 
measures that are prescribed by well-meaning and right-thinking 
experts: from reactionary to progressive. These comprise contra-
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dictory and complexly interrelating strategies of assimilation, con-
servative cultural maintenance, and liberal cultural pluralism. We 
argue that these prescriptions are generally futile, for they depend 
on a deepseated ethnocentrism in education and criminal justice 
systems which are part of the problem. We conclude, rather, that 
recognition and provision of social space to develop cultural 
hybridities could be part of the way forward. We also emphasise 
that it is necessary to deal with the realities of class inequality, 
including unequal means and power in the production and valorisation 
ofhybridity. 
There is a difference between being lost and being told to 'get 
lost'. This chapter advances the argument that these distinct 
approaches comprise two complementary hegemonic strategies 
deployed by the State in the social control of young, male, working-
class, second-generation, Arabic-speaking background immigrants. 
Some definitions 
Let us begin by defining some key terms which we will use in the 
analysis presented in this chapter. We are using the concept of 
'hegemony' as developed in the 1920s and 30s by the Italian social 
theorist and revolutionary, Antonio Gramsci (1971). Hegemony is 
a form of class domination through a political-cultural alliance of 
ruling-class fractions, in which the ruling class secures a decisive 
measure of consent by the subaltern classes to their own domination. 
It involves intellectual and moral leadership by the ruling class, 
through its domination of institutions such as schooling or the press, 
and the influence of the intellectuals organic to the ruling class, 
such that the everyday ways of seeing and acting in the world, of 
the masses of ordinary people, become aligned with, or present no 
viable challenge to, the interests of the ruling class. This consent, 
however, is never uncontested and must be continually won by the 
ruling class if it is to maintain its rule; moreover, it is always backed 
up by coercion - the repressive arm of the state - in the army, 
the police, the courts, the gaols. Coercion and consent are always 
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linked: the press and the schools have a coercive function as well 
as an informative and educative one; and the courts and even the 
police also have a pedagogic function. The concept of the State, in 
this theory, takes on an expanded meaning, and incorporates 
privately-owned media, say, as much as publicly owned schools. It 
is 'the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with 
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, 
but manages to win the active consent over those whom it rules' 
(Gramsci 1971 :258). 
A crisis of hegemony 
We conjecture that the moment of Hansonism represents a crisis 
of hegemony in Australia: an instability, pending realignment of the 
dominant class fractions which, in their hegemony, represent the 
people to themselves. Cope and Kalantzis (2000) call it a 'water-
shed'. They compare it in significance to the Federation settlement, 
in which crisis was resolved by a white and male-dominated working-
class movement accepting State limiting of class struggle through 
arbitration, in return for considerable concessions, including 
immigration restrictions: the 'White Australia Policy'. 
So-called 'globalisation' - the increasing and accelerating 
interchange of capital, commodities, information, population - has 
brought economic and cultural insecurities to particular sections of 
the populus in recent decades. It has, for example, advantaged 
those sections of capital which are most mobile and most easily 
bridge or jump national boundaries. Workers employed by these 
capitals have enjoyed better conditions and prospects in recent years: 
jobs for those producing commodities in the information sector, or 
certain service industries, for example, for the world tourist market 
have increased, while employment in manufacturing industry has 
dramatically declined. In the context of this unsettling change, many 
have been susceptible to the ideology that the attendant insecurities 
are caused by immigration, by migrants, by foreigners. This has 
occurred over much the same period in France, Germany, Austria, 
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Spain, the Netherlands and other countries, as in Australia. In such 
a context, 'ethnic crime' can be identified as a source of fears and 
insecurities whose causes are more deep-seated and less under-
stood l . 
White Australian xenophobia marked the previous turn-of-
century in the wake of the 1890s depression, and the Federation 
settlement of that time. One cartoon from the late nineteenth-century 
Bulletin depicted a Chinese octopus with its tentacles inscribed 
with gambling, vice, drugs, disease, corruption (see Figure 3, 
reproduced in Coleman & Tanner 1978: 188). This cartoon is 
uncannily echoed a century later by a Warren cartoon in the Daily 
Telegraph (28110102, see Figure 4), showing an octopus with the 
head of Osama bin Laden entangling much of the globe in its 
tentacles. Most of the evils of immigration which troubled the 
Bulletin at the birth of the White Australia policy have concerned 
the contemporary One Nation Party as the policy was born again. 
So the fear of 'ethnic crime' is not new, but cyclical moral panics 
about it can be manifestations of more deep-rooted anxieties arising 
from real, structural insecurities. Nor is the fear of youth 'gangs' a 
recent phenomenon: also in the late nineteenth century, there was 
a moral panic about working-class youths loitering in public spaces, 
their supposed criminal propensities, and the offence and alarm 
they caused to passing respectable citizens. These were the original 
'larrikins' (Finch 1993; Morgan 1997). 
In the context of economic recession and crisis-level youth 
unemployment of the mid-1980s, the 'Blainey debate' about' Asian 
immigration' instigated by right-wing historian Geoffrey Blainey in 
1984 and endorsed by then Opposition Leader John Howard in 
1988, slated immigration, especially of South-East Asians, for 
increasing unemployment and potential social unrest. There was 
much talkback radio chatter and tabloid troubling about 'ethnic 
ghettoes' like Cabramatta in south-west Sydney being centres of 
crime as well as strange sounds, smells and shop signs. When in 
1994, Cabramatta state MP, John Newman, was shot outside his 
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home, there ensued a media panic about 'Asian gangs' (Walsh 20/ 
9/94:26). This led to a campaign of police harassment of young, 
South-East Asian background people in the Cabramatta area, where 
humiliating public strip-searches and other civil rights violations 
became common (Maher et al. 1997). At the same time, there was 
a proliferation of seemingly sympathetic media stories about young 
orphans and refugees from broken homes and a war-tom back-
ground being 'lost between two cultures': a liberal gloss on the 
social marginalisation, largely of racism, which is a strong causal 
factor in crime. 
So the two modes of State dealing with young, working-class, 
non-English speaking background (NESB) youth - coercion and 
moral rescue - were already well rehearsed by 1998. 
Figure 3: Anti-Chinese cartoon in the Bulletin 1886. 
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1 Figure 4: 'Warren's View' cartoon. Daily Telegraph, 28/10/ 
02. Cartoon reproduced courtesy of Warren Brown 
and the Daily Telegraph 
The hard line 
From 1994, a whole battery of coercive legislation was passed in 
NSW to deal with groups of young people in public places. These 
were conceived as part of a populist strategy of focusing on law 
and order issues in the state election campaign, resulting in an 
'auction' between Labor and the conservative Coalition as to who 
could be tougher and more punitive. In an ideological manoeuvre 
which we shall analyse in Chapter Five as 'Dog-whistling', it was 
never stated explicitly by the bidders in the auction that the targets 
of the 'get tough' approach were especially Indigenous youth and 
youth of non-English speaking immigrant background. Yet the 
message got through to those disaffected voters for whom it was 
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intended. In 1994, the Children (Parental Responsibility) Act was 
passed, though opposed by the NSW Police Association, the 
Federation of Parents and Citizens Associations, the Bar Assoc-
iation, the Law Society and the Council for Civil Liberties (Legal 
Infonnation Access Centre 1997). This law was extended under 
the Carr Government in 1997, with the Children (Protection and 
Parental Responsibility) Act 1997. This allowed police to pick up 
young people under 16 from public places at any time, night or day, 
ifthey are not under the supervision of a responsible adult and the 
police believe they are 'at risk'. Police may use 'reasonable force' 
to do so (Irwin 2000). In the same year, the Crimes Act (Street 
Safety) Amendment Act was announced, allowing police to break 
up groups of three or more in the street if they have 'reasonable 
grounds to believe the group's behaviour is likely to obstruct, harass 
or intimidate' (Humphries 29/3/97: 1). The legal measure oflikely 
intimidation is if a person of 'reasonable finnness' would feel 
intimidated in the circumstances (Sanders 2000). We have argued 
elsewhere that, in practice, the embodiment of this person is likely 
to be Anglo, and more often elderly (Collins, Noble, Poynting & 
Tabar 2000). Despite opposition by some Labor members of the 
Legislative Council (NSW Upper House) and the Council for Civil 
Lib~rties, who said that the law would militate against the young, 
IndIgenous people, and immigrants, the Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Act was passed by the 
NSW Parliament in 1998. Also in 1998, the Police Powers 
(Vehicles) Act, gave NSW police the power to stop and search 
vehicles if they believed they may have been used in the commission 
of a serious offence, and to demand identification of the occupants 
(Legal Infonnation Access Centre 1997; English 1998). As if these 
laws weren't enough - and the Illawarra Legal Centre (Harvey 
2000:2) has argued that they are more than enough - various 
local councils in areas of high unemployment, such as Bankstown 
and Wollongong, have passed anti-loitering laws: without any legal 
definition of what constitutes loitering. 
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(The lost boys' and the 'soothing show of force' 
In November 1998, the Sydney tabloid newspaper, the Daily 
Telegraph had a coloured, front-page banner advertising its lead 
story with the label, 'The lost boys: caught between cultures in 
Lakemba' (Daily Telegraph 3/11/98:1). The six Lebanese-
Australian young men pictured on page one were not lost; they 
were on their way home from a south-west Sydney suburban state 
secondary school, yet they were being mischievously mis-
represented by the tabloid as gun-toting gangsters (Collins et al. 
2000). 
The 'caught between cultures' portrayal was reprised during 
subsequent cycles of moral panic, most notably in the case of the 
'ethnic rape gangs' alluded to in Chapter One and traced in detail 
in Chapter Four. In some ways, it can be seen as an ethnocentric 
misreading, or an exploitative and even racist misrepresentation. It 
is more than that, however, and more shared than that - it is even 
shared to an extent by the communities of the young men concerned, 
including sometimes in certain contexts the' lost boys' themselves. 
For their part, the second-generation bicultural young people 
sometimes see themselves as caught between cultures, while mostly 
they are moving strategically between elements of each culture, 
depending on context, and sometimes they recognise themselves 
as doing this. The 'caught between cultures' positioning can be an 
assimilationist gloss, or a conservative plea for 'traditional' cultural 
maintenance, or yet an elitist deprecation of 'hybrid' cultural fonns. 
Each of these infonns a range of strategies of social control, of 
which we canvass examples in this chapter. We also examine the 
cultural resistances to which these strategies are a response, while 
at the same time interrogating the extent to which these strategies 
of social control in turn elicit cultural resistances. 
We have earlier mentioned how, in a western Sydney suburban 
street the media dubbed 'Murder Street' (Lawrence 27111100:7), 
Korean immigrant schoolboy, Edward Lee was mortally stabbed 
on an October Saturday evening in 1998 after he and his 
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companions, on their way to a local teenage girl's party, became 
involved in a footpath brawl with a group of youths. The moral 
panic which ensued is traced in detail in Kebabs, Kids, Cops and 
Crime (Collins et al. 2000). By way of updating the story, we should 
note here that in 2002, a young man of Lebanese Muslim background 
on trial for Lee's murder and having pleaded 'not guilty', offered to 
plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter. In the context of the 
virulent moral panic raging at this time about lawless Muslim youth, 
and in the wake of public outcries about charge-bargaining and 
lenient sentences in the' ethnic gang rape' cases, the judge, Justice 
Hulme, (in an unexpected and almost unprecedented response) 
refused to accept the plea of guilty to manslaughter (Connolly 101 
10102:2; McNamara 10/10102:21). With an appeal pending against 
this extraordinary refusal, and a retrial due to follow the hearing 
thus aborted, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) then 
dropped the charge of murder and proffered one of manslaughter 
When Moustapha Dib was rearraigned before Justice Barr, who 
accepted the manslaughter plea (Daily Telegraph 10112/02:9; 
Glendinning & Connolly 19112/02: 1). This eventual outcome does 
not allay the reasonable conjecture that the first judgment was called 
forth by the moral panic which had surrounded the Lee killing and 
the media's moral outrage which could be anticipated in the case 
of any sentence that could be portrayed as 'soft'. In the event, 
When the three accomplices of Moustapha Dib pleaded guilty, as 
the result of charge bargaining, to being accessories after the fact 
of malicious wounding, carrying a maximum sentence of 5 years 
instead of the 25-year maximum for accessories after the fact of 
murder, the front page of the Herald bore the headline, 'Light 
sentences fall on a boy's lonely grave' (Glendinning & Connolly 
19112/02: 1). Moustapha Dib himself was sentenced on 12 February 
2003 to a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment, with a minimum of 
five years to be served, which immediately sparked the Labor 
Attorney-General (in election mode) to write to the DPP calling 
for an appeal against this minimum and to reassure the public that 
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manslaughter sentencing provisions were being reviewed by a 
former Supreme Court Justice, and the Liberal Opposition legal 
affairs spokesman (in like mode) to call upon the Attorney to appeal 
against the decision (News Online 12/2/03; Connolly 13/2/03:7; 
Miller 1312103: 17). The Telegraph headline lamented, 'Son's killer 
may go free in three years' (Miller 13/2/03: 17). 
Of issue in this chapter are two things. The first is that the 
media presented the killing at the time as an assassination arising 
from a 'turf war , between competing criminal 'ethnic' gangs. It is 
clear now that it was nothing of the sort: rather, a violent schoolboy 
brawl with tragic consequences - one of a series of such in Sydney, 
Melbourne, Perth and other Australian cities over 1998-2002. 
The second is that, following this portrayal and the moral panic 
of which it formed a part, the State responded in two opposing and 
complementary manners: a tough repressive law and order 
crackdown targeted by ethnic profiling, and an apparently well-
intentioned ideological campaign presenting' at risk' ethnic minority 
youth as lost sheep, in want of pastoral care to find them and set 
them on the right path. Yet the right path according to assim-
iliationists was to abandon the wicked, backward ways of their 
culture of origin, as we shall see. The right path according to 
conservative ethnic leaders was to forsake the corrupting influences 
in western culture and return to traditional values. If the boys of 
this immigrant generation are 'caught in between' anything, it is 
between the contradictory demands ofthese two reactionary politics 
of culture. As we shall see, these boys are not 'lost'; they do not 
accept the invidious either/or. Nor is their supposed forlornness in 
any wayan adequate explanation for crudely observable patterns 
in crime rates. 
'Murder Street' is in fact a tree-lined suburban sidestreet, 
where residents can still live on quarter-acre housing blocks, some 
twenty minutes by train or car from the city centre of Sydney. A 
couple of minutes away by family sedan is the local shopping strip 
where there are signs in Arabic, familiar food in the stores, and 
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familiar faces in the street. It is close to Maronite, Orthodox and 
Melkite churches and the Lakemba mosque, and is the sort of street 
where many immigrant families have aspired since the 1970s to 
make a new life in their new land. It was neither the ghetto nor the 
'no-go zone' which the media would represent it as over the 
subsequent years. 
We have shown in Kebabs Kids, Cops and Crime how from 
the beginning, the killing of Edward Lee was causally linked by 
police and media to ethnicity, the perpetrators were described in 
racial terms, and a moral panic about' ethnic' gangs was generated 
in a feedback loop of police, media and politicians in election 
campaign mode. The first article to appear in a metropolitan 
broadsheet presented the attack in the context of clashes involving 
'Asian' and 'Middle Eastern' gangs. Middle Eastern appearance 
is mentioned three times, 'a group of Lebanese men' once more, 
and 'Asian' gangs are mentioned twice. Television news reports 
the night after the killing were linking it to a 'gang' and circulating 
the police description of racial phenotypes alluding to Lebanese 
immigrants. 
The State's 'get-tough' response was to follow swiftly: an 
intensive police campaign of 'zero tolerance' targeting Lebanese 
immigrant youth in public spaces of the neighbouring suburbs. While 
young men of Arabic-speaking background were the focus of the 
clampdown, older people and teenage girls from their communities 
were not exempt. The campaign of 'stop and search' and 'move 
on' was exclusively directed at people of 'Middle Eastern appear-
ance' (Ogg & Casey 2/11//98:4-5; Poynting 1999; Collins et al. 
2000). 'About 130 police, including mounted and dog squad officers, 
blitzed the Bankstown area in an aggressive and high-profile push 
to reclaim the streets', reported the Telegraph (Rowlands & Ogg 
30110/98:9). The stated objective of this offensive was 'the lookout 
for stolen property, outstanding warrants, truancies from schools, 
anti-social and offensive behaviour' (Rowlands & Ogg 30110/98:9), 
which contributed little towards investigating the slaying of Edward 
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Lee. These resources were not directed at solving the crime, rather 
at clamping down on whole immigrant communities taken to share 
responsibility (Poynting 1999). The Sydney Morning Herald called 
this a 'soothing show of force' (Bearup 2/11198:4): the 
accompanying photograph of an elderly Anglo woman suggested 
the sort of people who might be soothed by all this. 
The moral panic was given further impetus when, on 1 
November, after two weeks of this 'zero tolerance' campaign, 
gunshots were fired from a passing car into Lakemba police station. 
No one was injured. There was general agreement that the attack 
on the police station was in retaliation for the aggressive police 
operation on the streets (Ogg & Casey 2/11/98: 1,4-5). There 
followed an accelerating round of press briefings from police 
spokespeople, comment on talkback radio, statements by 
parliamentarians and other public figures, letters to the editor, press 
editorials (Collins et al. 2000). These were in general of two types: 
right-wing demands to 'clean up the streets', and a liberal rhetoric 
about a younger generation of Lebanese immigrants being 'caught 
between two cultures' . It is the second frame upon which we focus 
here. 
'A growing divide' 
Journalists in the Australian, in a relatively sympathetic background 
piece, expounded: 
Up to 45 per cent of[ the local community] are Arabic-speakers, 
mostly Muslims from Lebanon who came to Australia in the 
1970s and whose children often feel themselves to be outsiders 
who don't really belong to one culture or the other - a sense 
reinforced by the way people react to them. Confronted with 
the sight of a bunch ofthem in Nike caps and Fila jackets, many 
other Australians seem to see an olive-skinned apparition of a 
bunch of homeboys from South-Central Los Angeles 
(Wynhausen & Safe 7-8111198: 13, emphasis added). 
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Its tabloid stablemate, the Daily Telegraph, said much the same 
thing, that the young people being targeted were 'caught between 
two cultures', 'caught in the middle, belonging neither to the world 
oftheirparents nor the world of their peers' (Stevenson 7/11198:32). 
The Sydney Morning Herald painted the same picture: 
In all likelihood the gang members ... are Australian. Born and 
educated here. The sons of hardworking Lebanese immigrants 
who fled the civil war in 1975. Like the Vietnamese kids of 
Cabramatta, they are caught between their parents' culture and 
their new culture, not really fitting into either. The gang becomes 
their culture (Bearup 7/11/98:43). 
The television news of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) reported: 
The weekend attack has shocked local Lebanese as much as 
anyone else. Some say they've lost control of their young 
people and they're causing a growing divide within their local 
community (2/11/98). 
The main informants for these media representations seem to be 
ethnic community workers and ethnic community leaders, rather 
than the young people of Lebanese background themselves. 
The account of' loss' is more typically articulated by the first 
- their parents' - generation of immigrants: 
The biggest problem would be a generation gap, there is a big 
backlash because of the generation gap and secondly you've 
got two cultures: like the parents have a culture and the kids 
have a part of their parents' culture and also taking on the 
Australian. So we've got new cultures coming up. And the 
kids are lost, and the problem is an identity crisis. They don't 
know who they are, are they Lebanese, are they Australian, are 
they Arabs are they Turkish, are they Asians? (community 
worker, male, 33 years, himself a parent ofthree). 
Rob White (1990: 165-188) has pointed out how the youth worker 
performs a function of social control for the State. There is an 
ideology of dysfunction, which legitimates state surveillance and 
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intervention. The corrective intervention can be one of enlightenment 
or forceful containment. Here, the youth worker's argument implies 
the need to educate parents (in the ways of 'whiteness' - the 
dominant culture), or else the children 'end up on the streets', 
necessitating repression: 
There is a big communication breakdown within the home itself. 
The father doesn't see his son much because he is always 
busy and the father doesn't understand his son's culture. He 
wants him brought up the way he was brought up by his uncles, 
so there are always cultural differences at home and a com-
munication breakdown. They don't talk to each other much, 
not like the way they should be talking to each other. If my own 
son has a problem, by right he should approach me and I should 
be there to support him and help hini out. Otherwise he will be 
looking for somebody else to be comfortable with and this is 
why they all end up on the streets (community worker, female, 
36 years, herself a parent offour). 
Spokesperson for the Lebanese Muslim Association, Richard Mitre, 
when interviewed by conservative media personality Alan Jones 
(10111198), said that Lebanese parents worry about their children 
losing the best of their tradition. Jones retorted that parents feel 
that they are not allowed to discipline their children as they see fit. 
Alan Jones was here echoing pronouncements by the Mufti of 
Australia, Taj Al Hilaly, who had been quoted in the Australian 
saying that 'The law doesn't give the power for families to control 
their kids' (Humphries 4/11198:5), and Sheikh Chami, of the 
Lebanese Welfare Centre in Lakemba who had complained to the 
same newspaper that 'the Government doesn't allow parents to 
discipline' (Jackson 3111198:5). 
When young people were actually interviewed, they tended to 
be misheard: the group of young men interviewed by the Telegraph 
spoke of their solidarity against racism and their demands for mutual 
respect; the reporters heard and recounted an argument about a 
'gang' united by 'Lebanese blood' (Casey & Ogg 3111198:4). There 
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were commendable exceptions, of course, such as the documentary 
on Radio National over a year later by Nadya Stani (2001), who 
interviewed some of the very same youths: 
First young man s voice: WaIter here. Walter's never hurt an 
ant in his life; he never hurt anyone in his life but there he's 
referred as a big gang member. 
Second young man s voice: Because my parents have come 
from overseas, my parents might be Lebanese and that, but 
I've lost a lot of my heritage, my parents haven't passed it 
down to me so therefore I've picked up the Australian heritage 
so therefore - but inside, I might not look it, but I am 
Australian ... 
If we take the trouble to listen to the young man, he is not saying 
that he is 'lost', though others may say it of him. He has inherited 
some Lebanese culture, 'lost' some, and 'picked up the Australian 
heritage' (emphasis added). He asserts that he is Australian, while 
conceding that his physical appearance may lead some to think 
otherwise. He indicates awareness of the calls in his ethnic 
community for cultural maintenance, and some sense that he has 
'lost a lot of ... heritage'. There is also a notion that there is 
something already defined as the Australian heritage, which he 
feels that he has 'picked up'. He is constructing his identity then, 
within the contradictory demands for cultural maintenance and for 
assimilation to 'the' dominant culture. There is no lack of confidence 
in his partaking in the 'Australian heritage', only an implied 
resentment that others may call this into question because of how 
he looks. 
This is not an idiosyncratic individual case, but an example of 
a strong pattern which we have encountered again and again among 
this generation in a series of research projects in Western Sydney 
since 1996 (Poynting, Noble & Tabar 1999; Noble, Poynting & 
Tabar 1999; Collins, Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2000). 
A very similar formulation was articulated by Paul, a seven-
teen-year-old student interviewed in a western Sydney high school 
in 1996: 
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SP: How do you identify yourself in terms of ethnicity? 
Paul: I see myself as an Australian from a Lebanese back-
ground. 
SP: What does that mean to you? 
Paul: Well, I respect my parents what they are and they respect 
me for what I am. And I like being Australian because I was 
born in Australia, this is my country and I also respect my 
parents for Lebanon as their country. Them being Australian 
citizens has never really been a problem. 
Paul considers himself to be Australian, which he is by birth and 
citizenship. His parents, who migrated to Australia some twenty 
years ago, are Australian citizens, and Lebanon is seen by him 
(and probably by them) as 'their country'. His father speaks English 
and his mother can understand English but not speak it. Paul speaks 
Arabic with his parents and English with his five brothers and two 
sisters, mixing the two languages sometimes with his siblings and 
never with his parents, he says. Paul is confident in his bilingualism 
and what could be called biculturalism. He speaks highly of the 
multiculturalism now well established in his school, and speaks 
critically about racism where he finds it in his neighbourhood and 
his milieu. Paul is constructing his identity, then, in similar 
circumstances to the young man interviewed by Nadya Stani. He 
moves fluidly and competently between two cultures depending on 
context, but this does not mean that the two are neatly bounded or 
that he is caught between them. His manoeuvres may be impeded 
by racism or directed by pressures for cultural maintenance. 
Paul's father works long hours as a taxi driver; his mother is 
occupied full-time in domestic work for their family of ten. His 
sisters are still very young, four of his elder brothers are working in 
professions and studying. Paul studies hard, and goes regularly to 
the gym, but he contributes of necessity and quite willingly to the 
housework; he undertakes a variety of household tasks voluntarily 
and routinely 'to keep a lot of stress off my mum'. He is mindful of 
neighbours' surprise that he, a young man, does housework, and 
he recognises but does not criticise his father's declining to do so. 
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He has little time for those girls of his age who hold stereotypes 
about Middle Eastern men. Paul is participating in the active 
construction of new forms of masculinity, at the same time as he is 
part of the collective construction of new combinations of ethnicity. 
Both these 'intersecting' sets of social relations are powerfully 
inflected by the class relations in which Paul must make his life 
history. This is shown clearly in his desire to marry a 'hard working 
woman' and not a 'racist snob'. 
Paul and his contemporaries are active: they are not 'caught'. 
They are navigating with pretty serviceable maps of their social 
surroundings: they are not lost. 
Elsewhere we have written of a different type of ethnic mas-
culinity, a 'protest' form which is constructed in opposition to the 
racism which young second-generation immigrants find directed at 
their cohort, their fathers, their 'brothers' (Poynting, Noble & Tabar 
1999). This involves asserting what for them constitutes their 
Lebaneseness in Australia, and doing so with a good deal of male 
aggression, often directed at authority figures from the 'mainstream' 
culture which are implicated in institutional racism (Poynting et al. 
1999; Collins et al. 2000). What the protest masculinity and Paul's 
new form of masculinity have in common is that they are being 
constituted by the young men's experiences of being, and ways of 
being, men of a minority ethnicity in a racist society. Their disposition 
towards their parents' ways of being Lebanese, and the elements 
of these which they adopt, exaggerate, transform, downplay, negate 
or reject, depends largely on the social context in which they find 
themselves and how they move to assert their interests and their 
dignity. 
We have elsewhere called these cultural manoeuvres 
'strategic hybridity' (Noble et al. 1999). This is almost the opposite 
of being trapped between cultures; it involves appropriating elements 
of parents' homeland culture and the' dominant culture' in creative 
and quite fluid ways, shifting according to circumstances. What 
the various hybrid forms share is that they are misread and dep-
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recated both by the traditionalists of their parents' generation and 
those of the dominant culture who feel threatened when (only) 
elements of it are appropriated by 'others', who stubbornly remain 
other by refusing to assimilate unconditionally, and who feel just as 
threatened when other elements of it are rejected, undermining the 
singularity and exclusivity of what they see as 'their' Australian 
cultural heritage: 'one nation'. 
The young Lebanese Australians are operating - we will not 
say 'caught' - within a double contradiction. Their parents want 
them to succeed in the new country. The younger generation knows 
that this necessarily entails a degree of strategic adoption of dominant 
cultural forms: what Ghassan Hage (1998) calls 'accumulating 
whiteness' .2 To the extent that they do this, however, they 
experience a sense of reprooffor abandonment, neglect, disregard, 
or even perhaps betrayal, of their parents' culture and their own 
origins. 3 On the other hand, to the extent that they become fluent in 
the dominant cultural idiom, they are never judged to do so enough 
to attain the equality that they seek. They always do so imperfectly 
from the point of view of the cultural arbiters; they always have a 
cultural 'accent', as it were, which serves as a marker and a pretext 
for discrimination. 
So, while the myth of being caught between cultures does not 
accurately represent how second-generation Lebanese Australian 
youth live their lives, it does contain elements of how they are at 
times made to feel. Like all ideology, it reflects aspects of reality 
which are presented in distorted form as appearances.4 We are 
not suggesting that this myth is simply propagated by liberal 
journalists and community workers and conservative ethnic com-
munity leaders. Rather, it comes to frame the wider perceptions 
and public debates. As Angela McRobbie suggests (1994:214), folk 
devils are often defended by welfare and other progressive interest 
groups in order to contest stereotypes, yet in so doing they frequently 
take for granted, and thus help reproduce, the very frames that are 
problematic. Thus the myth of two separate cultures, with 
conflicting values and demands, producing directionless youth lost 
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between them, accepts the premise of 'culture clash' and leads to 
the conclusion that one or the other culture is the source of the 
problem. We take up this argument in Chapter Six in relation to the 
politics of ethnic communities and ethnic leadership. We would 
also note here, in passing, that it is in many ways the local-scale 
analogue of the 'clash of civilisations' thesis criticised in Chapter 
One. Ideologues can take either side, can champion the one 
civilisation or the other as more 'civilised', humane, moral, and so 
on, while assuming that the clash is inevitable and that one or the 
other of existing contenders must be championed. Fortunately, the 
world of the young people whom we interviewed is not at all like a 
'clash of civilisations' writ small. So, we will suggest, perhaps it is 
through such creativity as can be found in their lively, nuanced, 
struggle-produced culture-in-the-making, that history might be made 
for the better. 
'I am divided up into two' 
George was born in Australia. Both his parents were born in 
Lebanon and migrated to Australia some 'fifteen or twenty' years 
ago, according to George. He was 15 years old and in Year 10 at a 
local Catholic high school in south-west Sydney when he was 
interviewed.5 His father is a labourer and his mother a housewife. 
George says he talks to his parents in 'Lebanese', and to his brothers 
in 'either Lebanese or English'. 'My dad doesn't speak that much 
English; it's not good.' His mother understands English better -
she had somewhat more formal education in Lebanon - but he 
speaks Arabic with both his parents, 'so they can understand better'. 
There are exceptions. Almost all of our second generation inter-
viewees told us that they spoke English to their parents when angry 
and that their parents spoke Arabic when angry. George said, 'IfI 
am angry I would be either shouting or speaking English; the next 
sentence I would change to Lebanese. I'm a bit of a mix there'. 
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George defines his identity as 'Australian-Lebanese': 
It means like inside I'm Lebanese, but I'm Australian-Lebanese 
because I'm living in Australia as a country. So that's what I 
have to follow, but it would be a different story if I was 
Lebanese-Lebanese. In was born in Lebanon, that's what I'd 
describe myself as. 
We were interested to know what the content behind these identity 
labels was for the young people we interviewed. What do they 
mean in practice? 
PT: Can you tell me more about the Australian part of your 
identity? I mean what things do you feel that you do because 
you are Australian-Lebanese? 
George: Well firstly Australian-Lebanese. Australians over 
here, if they feel like it they go for a drive, they just like to show 
off. For example you can go down to a beach here, and just 
keep showing offin your car. In Lebanon I don't know whether 
it's really done or done at all. That's what I follow, and me and 
my friends follow. We go out and hang out and do that. I'm not 
sure whether it's done in Lebanon, but that's what we follow, 
because everyone else does it in Australia. 
Asked about the Lebanese component of his identity, George then 
starts talking about being divided. Curiously, moreover, he reinvents 
the meaning of place of birth in order to assert his Lebanese' half': 
George: I am divided up into, one side of me is Lebanese, and 
one side of me is Australian, because I was born in Lebanon, 
but I am living in Australia. So I want to do a bit of both. 
PT: You weren't born in Lebanon, you were born here, you 
said. 
George: I was born in Lebanon - I've got Lebanese parents, 
plus Lebanese background. I still follow Australian, because I 
am living in Australia. So you can say I am divided up into two. 
Half Lebanese and half Australian. 
We asked all our young interviewees if they thought their parents 
had the same idea as they did about what it means to be Lebanese-
Australian (or whatever identity combination they volunteered): 
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George: Because they were born in Lebanon, and you can say 
they brought the tradition of the Lebanese from Lebanon, and 
they still continue it here. They've got a bit of Lebanese-
Australian, but there's mostly Lebanese-Lebanese. And they 
follow and have never changed tradition. 
George is not lacking in confidence, in either his identity or his 
demeanour. He repeats: 'I am proud of being Lebanese. I am not 
showing and telling people I'm Lebanese. I'm proud of it. Like I'm 
proud of being Lebanese. It doesn't bother me in any way'. 
What does bother George is racist portrayals of Lebanese in 
the media; he feels personally 'put down' by this. He refers to an 
event in 1993, when there was a fracas labelled as a 'riot' between 
police and participants - especially young men - at an Arabic 
Day carnival in an inner-western Sydney park. According to the 
subsequent Ethnic Affairs Commission inquiry (Ethnic Affairs 
Commission ofNSW 1994), male police had allegedly manhandled 
some Lebanese Muslim women, in attempting to intervene in an 
altercation between them, and there arose scuffles with male youths 
which escalated into a large-scale confrontation with the calling of 
many police vehicles with reinforcements and equipment, followed 
by the inevitable arrival of the media. The inquiry identified what 
amounted to institutional racism, and recommended many improve-
ments to police training in cultural diversity and ethnic relations, 
and further suggested that the media should show more responsibility 
in such matters. 
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George says: 
Sometimes when you hear on the news, bad things that 
Lebanese people have done. Like I'm put down - like this 
person is like me ... I remember I think it was about two years 
ago. Every year they have a Lebanese carnival, and it was in 
Tempe. There was a big fight there with police, and on the 
news all you heard was Lebanese doing this, doing that. It 
puts me down, because that's when Lebanese get the bad 
name ... 
The lost boys 
Differently from his parents' generation, George's sense of his 
Lebaneseness, that part of his identity, is constructed from the 
beginning in the environment of 'white Australian' ethnocentrism. 
But being 'put down' is not the same as being' lost'. 
Ali, at twenty-two years old, gives an articulate account of 
the same process. He is Sunni Muslim, born in Australia of 
Lebanese-born parents. He is bilingual, speaking 'mostly Arabic' 
at home. He counts himself as 'an Australian with Lebanese 
background', though in common with most of our interviewees, 
when he uses the word' Australians' without a qualifier he usually 
means Australians of Anglo background: 
They [the media] describe us as troublemakers, as coming from 
a country where there was war and in their minds ... it 
automatically means that they are troublemakers. It's not like 
that; most of us, the youth, have been born here. We are raised 
just as the Australians are, we are taught exactly what they are, 
we are like identical to one another except we have a different 
colour in our skin. We speak the same language but we know a 
different language. Some Lebanese boys don't know Arabic; 
they just speak English6. 
Ali's response to the 'put-down' is to reverse its meaning for him, 
by taking on the label and acting the part: 
I have come to realise I am an Australian but I am not treated 
like an Australian. I do not act like an Australian. I am more 
Lebanese. I am treated like a Lebanese, so I will stick to what I 
am treated like (Collins et al. 2000: 165). 
John, a sixteen year old Maronite Christian attending the same 
Catholic school as George, says that his parents' culture and his 
are 'two different worlds'. John was born in Australia; both his 
parents in Lebanon. At home he speaks 'Half-half: English and 
Lebanese', though with his parents he talks 'mostly Lebanese', 
but when he misses a word, or when he gets angry, he switches to 
English. He speaks English with his sisters and brothers. His par-
ents will change to English ifhe doesn't understand something they 
say in Arabic. 'When they are angry, they say it in Lebanese'. 
This is quite typical of our second-generation interviewees. 
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John describes his identity thus: 'Like first I speak Lebanese. 
J am Lebanese. 1 am half Australian as well, because I was born in 
Australia. And I do live in Australia. So I'm half Australian as 
well'. Unlike Ali, John takes for granted some of the portrayals 
shown in the media, of Lebanese as troublemakers. He says he 
doesn't really like the neighbourhood where he lives in south-
western Sydney, because 'there is a lot of Lebs. Don't get me 
wrong. 1 like socialising with a lot ofLebs, but I like socialising with 
other cultures. And there is a lot of trouble in this area'. He 
'accumulates whiteness' (Hage 1998) by deploying his Christian 
identity to distinguish himself from the troublemakers: 
PT: How do you feel about Muslim Lebanese? 
John: Oh sometimes they are all right. Most of them are 
troublemakers you know. I've had a lot of bad experiences with 
Muslims. 
PT: Like what? 
John: They'll argue. 
PT: Over what do you argue? 
John: They just want to pick a fight. They pick some thing out 
oftheir head like 'what are you looking at me for?' They just 
want to pick a fight. I hate it. I don't like it when they do that. I 
just keep walking. Stuff them! 
PT: Do you think they do it because of religion? 
John: Sometimes they pick a fight, but most of the time it could 
be of religion. 
PT: How could they tell that you are a Christian? 
John: I don't knOw. I have no idea. I know some Muslim guys, 
and they're good. Good friends. 
John is describing what we have identified as an ethnic form of 
protest masculinity constituted in opposition to racism. His 
antagonists are unable to accumulate as much 'whiteness' -
national cultural capital - as he; they are not Christian. These 
moves in the formation of John's identity were taking place at a 
time in Australia where the racist right was beginning to reassert 
the cultural politics of 'white Australia' which had been virtually 
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eradicated from the Australian political landscape for almost thirty 
years. As will be analysed in Chapter Five, the right-wing, assim-
iliationist, anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalist One Nation party 
and its supporters oppose immigration from 'non-Christian lands', 
and express their offence at immigrants who keep their distance, 
retain their cultural differences and form 'ethnic' enclaves. John's 
statement, 'I like socialising with a lot ofLebs, but 1 like socialising 
with other cultures', was made in that context. It is a manoeuvre 
which highlights his own 'whiteness' in contradistinction to others 
such as Lebanese Muslims who are thus positioned as more 
'different', less civilised and inassimilable: a process which we have 
examined in Chapter One. One Nation and their supporters claim 
that immigration produces increases in crime, that many immigrants 
are lawless, and that alien lawbreakers should be deported. John's 
distancing himself from the Lebanese Muslim 'troublemakers' 
should also be seen in that light. 
Asked whether his parents have a similar view to his about 
what it means to be a Lebanese Australian, John replies: 
Oh, a very different view! 'Cause they were born in Lebanon, 
and they came over in their Lebanon tradition, and they did 
everything Lebanese do. I came after, and I saw the Australian 
world. So it's two different worlds. 
John is familiar with 'two different worlds'; he is not lost. But the 
cultural-political landscape in which he has to find his way condi-
tions the way he forms his identity. 
Mohammed is the sixteen-year-old son of Lebanese-born 
parents, who own and work in a small family business. They came 
to Australia about twenty years ago, and Mohammed was born in 
Australia. He attends the local coeducational state secondary school. 
He says that he speaks 'Lebanese' with his parents, and English 
with his two brothers and three sisters. He says that is it very 
important to his father that he speak Arabic, though his father will 
sometimes speak to him in English when he is working on something. 
His father will always speak in Arabic when he is angry and when 
he is talking about behaviour. 
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Mohammed defines his identity primarily by his religion: 'I am 
Muslim, but [an] Australian citizen'. Note the 'but': Mohammed is 
aware of an opposition. It reappears when he is asked to expand 
on what he means: 
My religion is Muslim, but my citizen[ ship] is Australian. I'm 
half Australian and half Muslim. I believe in my religion but I 
am Australian. I've been born here, and I wouldn't say I was 
pure Lebanese. 
He has experienced stereotypes about Lebanese from teachers 
(they're dumb) and from girls his age (they're dishonest). He finds 
that teachers treat 'wogs' - he includes Greeks and Italians with 
the Lebanese here - with lower expectations and give them less 
time. He responds with lack of respect. He finds a commonality 
with the Greek and the Italian girls: 'You can relate to them, you 
can talk to them ... Because they have the same traditions. Their 
parents are strict. Their brothers like to face things' . 
None of this alters the fact that he sees himself as Australian. 
He contrasts himself here with his parents: 
IfI ask my mum and dad which country you would like to live 
in, they would say Lebanon. I would say Australian. They 
would say Lebanon is your homeland. I was born here; I am an 
Australian citizen. Only my religion is Muslim. Everything else 
apart from that is Australian. 
Ghassan is a sixteen year old Australian-born student in a Catholic 
school in south-west Sydney. His father is self-employed in a small 
business; his mother is a full-time housewife. Ghassan cannot 
remember when they migrated to Australia from Lebanon. The 
family speaks mostly English at home. Ghassan says: 
I mostly speak in English with my little brother or my mum, but 
sometimes my dad will speak with me in Arabic. So I just reply 
in Arabic ... Sometimes I can't express what I'm saying in Ara-
bic, so I put it in English. 
His father, for his part, can speak English but there are some things 
he can only say in Arabic. 
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But there are other reasons for his father sometimes speaking 
to his son in his mother tongue: 'Sometimes ... he'll say to me, 
"Speak Arabic". So ifhe just wants to keep the language together 
- so I won't forget. Or just to keep the language and culture 
alive'. And then there's the issue of respect: 
I sometimes switch because, like some people, like my grand-
parents, some people who don't understand English very well. 
I speak with them Lebanese, just through respect. So they 
know what we are saying. 
Like a lot of other teenagers, Ghassan has arguments with his par-
ents over issues such as going out and the amount of study he 
ought to be doing: 
My mum wouldn't let me out without someone like my cousins 
or her like after six, because that's when it gets dark. She's got 
a phobia of the dark I think. Yeah, she wouldn't let me go to 
nightclubs - too young ... Some of my friends would go out 
with girls at this age. Like the girls would actually come to their 
house and say, 'Let's go', or whatever. But my parents, or my 
mother or father or whatever, wouldn't like that. They would 
tell me to concentrate on my studies. 
As with many second-generation immigrant families, however, 
these disagreements appear to both sides as clashes of Australian 
and Lebanese ways: 
PT: Do you think about this matter, your parents are -
Ghassan [interrupts]: Lebanese. Yes, they would say to me, 
'When we were small, we didn't do that'. I have sort of adapted 
to the Australian way; I would say, 'That's nothing.' Some 
people, ice-skating sometimes, under 18s nights for people to 
go to nightclubs sometimes on Fridays. See my mum thinks it's 
all 18s and over like. So you still have to study. Like it was in 
Lebanon, everyone used to study. Well everyone here goes 
out. 
Ghassan sums up this way the values and traditions his parents 
pass on to him: 
Like treat others how you want to be treated ... First study and 
get your future like set, then you can sort of have a good time. 
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You should get married first before any sexual relationships. 
Marry a Lebanese girl, because it is easier for any marriage. 
Traditions basically. They taught me stuff like Lebanese 
traditions. Dancing and stuff. 
Likewise, George saw having to obey his parents over the issue of 
girlfriends as a key part of his identity. Asked about the things 
which comprise the Lebanese component of his Australian-
Lebanese identity, George offered, 'Like I said, if I want to do 
something that I like, and I speak to my parents about it, they might 
not agree. They might not think it's appropriate'. Asked for an 
example, he responded: 
I will never have a relationship. This was, I think, two years 
ago. I will never have a relationship with a girl. My parents 
didn't approve of her, because they thought I was too young, 
and they said when I get older, when I get in my teenage years, 
late teenage years. I should start dating then, but you see that 
was something that I would never do. I chose; my parents 
wouldn't approve. 
Ghassan, while he disagrees with his parents about the issue of 
girlfriends, agrees that there are limits: 'As long as it's nothing too 
serious'. Sexual intercourse before marriage doesn't come into 
the question: 'I'm a Catholic person. So that's beyond - [stops in 
mid-sentence]' . 
This pattern was repeated among the second-generation 
Lebanese teenage boys we interviewed almost as much as the 
girls7. They saw it as constitutive of their identity. And the pattern 
persisted across religious creeds. A seventeen year old male 
Ala'wite Muslim assessed the market with some signs of experience: 
If there is a pretty white girl Australian, she would have to pick 
from Lebanese or Australian. A guy, no matter how good-
looking a Lebanese guy is, she would go for an Australian ... 
Because we're discriminated, that's Why. 
His response is to say that he respects Lebanese girls more than 
'Australian' girls. He says that he finds Anglo girls: 
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You know what I mean? I can't do it, because religion into it. 
Some people don't have their morals. They just do it. With me 
I can't. I have morals. 
He said that he would 'flirt around', but 'when it comes to doing 
the sin, that's when I stop'. He mused: 
A friend said that to me the other day, he said, 'I think I know 
why girls go out with Lebanese guys'. I said, 'Why is that?' He 
goes, 'because youse don't lose your virginity; it's a sin for 
youse, but for us we do it anyway'. 
Another seventeen year old interviewee, whose mother is Lebanese 
and father Syrian, describes himself thus: 
You can say I am Australian. I was born here, so I'm partly 
Australian, and my background is Lebanese. But I don't really 
say that. I mostly say that I'm Muslim, 'cause that's the main 
thing. 
He says he has had girlfriends from Lebanese, Greek, Italian and 
Australian backgrounds. He says that he wouldn't stay more than 
two weeks with a Lebanese girl, because they tend to get too ser-
ious. 'I just stop it'. With Italian and Greek girls, 'Some of them 
have to be home early. It's all family things'. He says many 
'Australian' girls are prejudiced about Lebanese boys and he doesn't 
have much in common with them and doesn't like going out with 
them· he has more in common with Lebanese, Italian and Greek , 
girls. When it comes to the question of sexual relations, he says he 
would not have a 'full relationship' before marriage. 'It's me. It's 
my religion. I wouldn't go all the way with a girl'. 
'Olive-skinned homeboys'? 
Another timeworn point of conflict of the teenagers with parents, 
about which there is nothing peculiar to immigrants or Lebanese 
- is the matter of clothes and dress codes. Ghassan, for example, 
spoke of one such disagreement with his parents: 
I had a bit of a hard time last year or the year before that. When 
I was sort of getting to teenage years, when you start to wear 
fashionable clothes and that. And they were telling me that's 
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not right, or it doesn't look good. I would say that this is what 
everyone else is wearing. To wear baggy jeans, like it took me 
a month to convince my dad, because he was saying it's for the 
gangsters. 
For Ghassan and his friendship group, the dress code was part of 
belonging. It was fashion. To his father it was a fashion redolent of 
North American gangs, and to be avoided. To the Daily Telegraph, 
and to many older Anglo people in the south-western Sydney 
suburbs, according to our police service and community worker 
interviewees, it marked the wearers as a Lebanese gang. 
'Punchbowl Homeboys ... ape the black homeboy gangs in the 
United States - they wear the same baggy jeans, sportswear such 
as Fila and adidas, and listen to rap music' (Casey & Ogg 3/11/98). 
An Arabic-speaking background female Police and Community 
Training Officer interviewed in 1999 described the dress code: 
adidas, track suits with stripes, a beanie or a cap. ' ... when you get 
the average Arabic group who stand on the comer wearing the 
adidas and not doing much, they look threatening', she explained. 
Yet she conceded, 'Most of our teenagers who hang out on the 
street wear that kind of stuff' (Collins et al. 2000: 173). 
There is nothing particularly new in a youth dress code being 
taken as a sign of deviance. What is interesting here is the way 
that it is ethnicised. The young people themselves use the dress 
code to identify as members of a subculture adopted by their peer 
group, not to signal their membership of a criminal gang. Those 
who rely on illicit business for a livelihood rarely seek to identify 
themselves so visibly, and when interviewed those who 'used to' 
do so will disparage those who so draw attention to themselves as 
'wannabes' or 'tryhards'. It is significant, moreover, that the 
'uniform' of the subculture has the cachet of the cultural metropolis, 
the United States, while being identified with minority and 
marginalised groups (Afro-Americans, Latinos) with whom 
Lebanese-Australian youth can feel some commonality. (This 
'appropriation' from subcultures of the Other in another national 
culture means that there are already more than two cultures at 
stake. The notion of fixed cultural borders, between which one can 
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be trapped or lost, is just not applicable here.) In any case, Anglo-
Australian youth tend not to adopt this style; not being marginalised, 
they have no need to reappropriate the symbols of the cultural 
resistance of the marginalised. 
Towards the beginning of this chapter, we quoted the 
Australian as reporting, 'Confronted with the sight of a bunch of 
them in Nike caps and Fila jackets, many other Australians seem 
to see an olive-skinned apparition of a bunch of homeboys from 
South-Central Los Angeles' (Wynhausen & Safe 7-8/11/98: 13). 
We did not there emphasise that this was a statement about how 
many other Australians see the Lebanese-Australian young men 
on the streets. The journalists, of course, mean Anglo Australians. 
Yet parents of the young men sometimes also have reservations 
about their dress code, which they share with the respectable Anglos 
fearful of 'gangs' and with police responding to these. 
An Anglo male police officer in his late twenties, said to one 
of the authors in an interview: 
The major problem is, I think, they are too heavily influenced 
by the American rap culture. They are still running around 
thinking that they are MC Hammer, they are living in East LA 
(Andy 18/7/99 cited in Collins et al. 2000: 178). 
To risk labouring the point: the young men know exactly where 
they are running around. If United States rap music speaks to their 
experiences, then perhaps we should look for the commonalities 
which it expresses. 'Racial profiling' by police is just one experience 
which Lebanese-Australian youth share with Black United States 
youth (Poynting 2001). Institutional racism in schools is one more 
(Poynting, Noble & Tabar 1999). Labour market segmentation is 
another such commonality (Collins et al. 2000). As is lack of 
resources and adequate public space in neighbourhoods. The 
phenomenon of' Lebbo rap' , a hybrid music form emerging among 
this second generation in Australia, shows the creativity of their 
youth culture and the permeability of its ethnic boundaries. Such 
hybridised cultural forms are expressed by the Lebanese Australian 
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singer of the 'young multicultural rap band, South West Syndicate' , 
whose song 'Equal', says: 
I've got a new story but it ain't no throwback 
I ain't got not time for no racism bro 
I'm too busy I got people to see and places to go (excerpted in 
Stani 2000). 
Caught between two policies 
What are the consequences of seeing young Lebanese-background 
men's being caught between cultures as the cause of social 
problems? The first consequence, to blame and to punish these 
young men and their communities for the problems, has been discus-
sed at length elsewhere (Collins et al. 2000). A further consequence 
is that 'solutions' are logically presented in terms of the purported 
cultural divide which is supposed to be experienced by these youth. 
One imagined solution is a return to the mythically untroubled 
past, 'before the war' when young working-class men did not 
intimidate and offend respectable citizens on the street with bad 
language, outlandish clothes, idleness, and a threatening demeanour. 
No such past, of course, existed (Pearson 1983). For those sectors 
of - especially older - working-class or petit-bourgeois Anglos 
who are themselves experiencing feelings of displacement or 
disorientation, and very real economic disadvantage, through the 
effects of globalisation, a convenient apparent cause is presented 
by the new racist politics of One Nation and the like: it is non-
Anglo, non-white and non-Christian immigration. They look back 
fondly to the time when suburbia was marked by neat white picket 
fences and all the shop signs were in English and they were not 
threatened by the ebullience of young people because they were 
young themselves. They demand that immigrants assimilate to what, 
for them, used to be Australian culture, or they want some sort of 
white Australia policy restricting immigration to the right kinds or 
the right numbers. In this way, we would have no cultural divisions, 
because there would be one culture, one nation. According to this 
account, multiculturalism has been the cause of untold social 
110 
The lost boys 
divisions, inequities and tensions. This past is mythical, the culprits 
are imagined and the solution is a fantasy. We shall return to this 
fantasy, in relation to fear, in the final chapters of the book. 
Nevertheless, it is a fantasy that has appeal and effects. Populist 
politicians like Premier Carr, with an eye to this appeal (as will be 
shown in Chapter Five), will make damaging public pronouncements 
about getting tough on 'ethnic gangs' (Poynting 2002), and will 
purge 'ethnic affairs' from the state's policy vocabulary. 
Another equally imaginary and reactionary solution is 
propounded by conservative spokespeople who present themselves 
as the representatives of whole ethnic communities. For example, 
the Mufti of Australia, Taj Al Hilaly, responded to the racism of the 
media outcry about 'ethnic youth' being 'out of control' by blaming 
the laxity of western culture and western laws, as will be detailed 
in Chapter Six. Often in the absence of any evidence as yet 
presented by police and tested in court, he seemed to be accepting 
the police, media and politicians' assertions that the perpetrators of 
the high-profile crimes of 1998, the Lee killing and the Lakemba 
shooting - and the pack rapes two years later - were Lebanese-
Australian youth. He simply downplayed their Lebanese identity 
(or rather Arabic and Muslim identity, which had become blurred 
together in the mainstream media discourse), because it was not 
properly, traditionally, Lebanese (read Arabic and Islamic). The 
young people being talked about were really Australians, he said in 
several instances, as they were born and educated in this country. 
He complained about restrictions by the State on parents' disciplining 
of their children, and urged legislators to 'go back 25 years' and to 
introduce curfews for young people to keep them off the street. 
Similar rhetoric issued from spokespeople from Lebanese Christian 
communities. 
The Mufti was right that the young people being targeted on 
the streets were Australian - by birth, by citizenship, and by 
important elements of their identity. Yet to ascribe their purported 
criminality to some essential Australianness or Westernness which 
111 
Bin Laden in the suburbs 
they have adopted is just as irrational as to blame it on an 
essentialised Lebaneseness which they have inherited. It leads to 
policy prescriptions which are just as ineffectual. Going 'back 25 
years' or imposing curfews is hardly likely to appeal to the young 
people or to work for their parents. Moreover, our interviews with 
the young second-generation Lebanese Australians indicate that 
what they see as being Lebanese is indeed important to their identity, 
and comes into relations with police, teachers,journalists and other 
bearers of institutional racism. As we have shown in our interviews, 
it might not be the same as their parents' or their religious leaders' 
ideas of Lebanese ness, but the young people are not about to adopt 
the latter as a neatly wrapped package, whatever the level of 
complaint or moral pressure. 
In contrast to these reactionary approaches, liberal pluralist 
discourses favour 'Harmony Days' and talk of 'building bridges' 
between cultures. Yet they tend to accept the same assumption 
that there is a rift between cultures; they differ in believing that it is 
bridgeable in and their well-meaning objective of bridging 'it'. Yet 
they too often ignore the reality of the young people from various 
ethnic backgrounds that are building myriad cultural connections in 
their everyday lives. They are unconsciously ethnocentric in 
deprecating hybridity or blendedness of cultures, seeing it as mere 
imitation of something( s) which properly belong to distinct cultures. 
They underestimate its creativity and its potential for struggle and 
change. We have attempted to convey some of these intercultural 
connections, the permeability of cultural boundaries, and the 
creativeness in constantly shifting them, in the lived experience of 
the second-generation youth whom we interviewed. Liberal pluralist 
discourses also pronounce all cultures equal and then assume that 
they are. They thus ignore the reality of the racism that looms so 
large in the lives of the young men we interviewed. In policy terms, 
they are useless in confronting or overcoming racism. 
These prescriptions are futile because the premise of two neatly 
bounded cultures with second-generation immigrant youth trapped 
in between does not accurately represent the lived reality of the 
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young people. Ethnocentrism in education and criminal justice 
systems is part of the problem. These young people need educators 
who do not assume that they are academically uninclined and 
interested only in pursuits such as muscle-building or fashion. They 
also need schools which recognise the language development needs 
of bilingual immigrants with parents who are often illiterate in their 
first language and have little formal education. The second 
generation shift, as they need, between languages, tending to hide 
this need, and leaving the appearance to their teachers of being 
'unacademic' and to their parents of being well developed users of 
school English and thoroughly' Australian'. They are not trapped 
between languages, rather their facility with both hides their educ-
ational needs. 
Furthermore, the 'two cultures' discourse lends itself to 
'welfarist' policy strategies in response to problems which are 
perceived to be inherent in culture. The culture of the disadvantaged 
is thus found to be wanting and in need of remediation, obscuring 
the real, fundamental causes of strife in the discriminatory processes 
of structural racism and class exploitation. The welfarist, soft 
approach is 'armoured', in Gramsci's language (1971 :263), by the 
coercive moment of hegemony. In the policing of second-generation 
immigrant youth - especially young men - it needs to be 
recognised that the culture of resistance in the masculinities of the 
marginalised is only exacerbated by 'zero tolerance' over-policing. 
Teenage friendship groups of immigrants are not 'gangs' just 
because they are immigrants, and their youth subcultures are not a 
sign of being 'lost between cultures' - they would not be labelled 
as such in the case of young people from the cultural backgrounds 
ofthe dominant. 
It is necessary to deal with the realities of class inequality, 
including unequal means and power in the production and valorisation 
ofhybridity. It is vital, then, that social researchers, social policy-
makers, community representatives, journalist representors of 
society to itself, political 'representatives' and others come to see 
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that second-generation Lebanese immigrant young people are not 
'lost'. They are making their lives, constructing their identities and 
finding their way in what is currently an abidingly unequal society. 
This recognition is an important step in the cultural struggle to 
overcome the structural inequalities of race and class. 
In the following chapter, we detail and analyse a moral panic 
which arose in 2001-2, after a series of group sexual assaults in 
Sydney, for which a number of working-class young men of 
Lebanese Muslim background were eventually convicted. Most 
were second generation immigrants. The crimes were highly 
racialised in media and political commentary, presented as 'ethnic' 
gang rape. We shall see here how relations of class and gender 
(masculinity) inflected by racism are given the appearance of race, 
ethnicity orreligion, to which causality of the crimes is ideologically 
ascribed. 
Notes 
For a very good analysis in the case of Germany, see Eckert, 
2002. 
2 The term 'whiteness' here is used by Hage as a metaphor for a 
form of national cultural capital, tied to belongingness and 
ownership of nation. 
3 This is somewhat analogous to the process of abandonment of 
one's class culture in order to appropriate a new class culture 
on the path to upward mobility, which has been well documented, 
especially in the sociology of education. 
4 Ghassan Hage (2002) has some interesting comments to make 
about the pertinence of the camera obscura metaphor and the 
classical Marxist theory of ideology in the current conjuncture. 
5 The interviews with George, John, Mohammed and Ghassan 
(pseudonyms) were conducted in 1996 by Paul Tabar, as part 
of a joint project between him, Greg Noble and Scott Poynting. 
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6 This interview was conducted by Michael Kennedy in 1999, as 
part of a collaboration with the authors. These tracts of the 
interview with 'Ali' have been published in Collins et al. 
(2000: 150-165). 
7 This chapter focuses on the interviews with the boys. For the 
material on the young women, see Poynting, Noble and Tabar 
(2001 ). 
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'You deserve it because you are Australian': 
the moral panic over 'ethnic gang rape' 
Around August 2001 and again in August 2002, there were some 
20 lurid front-page headlines in the Sydney daily and weekend tabloid 
newspapers coinciding with the trials and re-trials of a group of 
young Lebanese-Australian men for several particularly degrading 
and callous group sexual assaults in Western Sydney in the year 
2000. The number was nothing like the 70 alleged by the Sun-
Herald nor the 30 claimed on Radio 2GB, but they were brutal, 
violent and frightening as such crimes always are. They were 
apparently seen as good news copy as well, as such crimes also 
often are, but this time the news was racialised. Hundreds of news 
articles gave saturation coverage to the trials and issues that were 
associated with them, along with scores of opinion columns, 
editorials, letters to the editor, radio talkback discussions, television 
news and current affairs items. The racialisation of these crimes 
has been briefly outlined in Chapter One in connection with the 
'Othering' of Arab and other Middle Eastern immigrants and asylum 
seekers and also Muslim Australians as: illegal immigrants, people-
smugglers, criminal gangs, terrorists, rapists. This chapter will now 
analyse the ideological elements of the 'ethnic gang rape' moral 
panic which centred on Sydney in 200 I and 2002. The inter-
connected threads in this ideology involve common-sense 
'orientalism' of the Arab/Muslim Other's maSCUlinity as deviant, 
immoral and dangerous; it is racialised and criminalised. These 
contradictory racist themes include: Lebanese/Muslim men's 
purported disrespect of women in general; Lebanese/Muslim men 
being allegedly brought up to regard 'White', 'Western', 
'Caucasian', women as 'sluts' and thus' fair game' as distinct from 
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their own women who are respected or at least valued as property; 
'ethnic gang rape' as an expression ofanti-'Aussie', anti-White, 
anti-Western hatred which is supposedly encouraged in Muslim 
communities at large; Muslim and 'Third-World' cultures as barbaric, 
uncivilised, violent and misogynistic in their law and their morality; 
condemnation of laxity and indulgence in the Australian legal and 
political system towards transgressors and calls to mete out 'their 
own medicine'. We also see, a fortiori, the metaphor of war analysed 
in Chapter Two: Australia's race warrior journalists leave us in no 
doubt that this is 'race war' being waged. 
'Caucasian women the targets' 
From the beginning, newspaper reports undoubtedly sourced from 
NSW police (see Wockner 25/8/0 1:4) couched the story in racial 
terms. The Daily Telegraph's crime reporter, Charles Miranda 
(13/9/00: 14), for example, wrote: 'In a chilling racial development, 
some of the victims said they were asked if they were true 
Australians before being attacked by the youths, believed to be of 
Middle-Eastern extraction'. (This 'extraction' was in later public 
discussion to be recast as 'Muslim' and also at times associated 
with refugees, as we shall see below). All the alleged attackers 
came from 'the same ethnic community', wrote Sunday Telegraph 
court reporter Warren Owens (11/3/01: 19), while' all the alleged 
victims come from ethnic groups other than their alleged attackers'. 
(These ethnicities were later to be recast in terms of race as 
'Caucasian' or 'white'). Nationality was also used as a descriptor: 
'Several girls claimed their attackers had boasted of their 
"Lebanese" prowess, while others claimed their attackers had 
questioned them abouttheir ethnic background ' (Owens 1113/01: 19). 
On 29 July 200 I, the Sun-Herald had a front-page story which 
headlined, '70 girls attacked by rape gangs' (a fallacious figure) 
which was sub-headed 'Caucasian women the targets', and in which 
it repeated the phraseology that the alleged perpetrators 'are all of 
Middle Eastern extraction' and remarked that 'their alleged victims 
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have all been Caucasian' (Kidman 29/7/0 I: I). 'Police are concerned 
that the acts may become culturally institutionalised', it recorded. 
The following day, 2GB radio talkback host Philip Clark (30/7/0 I) 
referred to pack rapes by 'Middle Eastern gangs' around Banks-
town, canvassed the belief that the crimes were racially based, 
and suggested that members of the 'Arabic community' could be 
harbouring the criminals. 
We see here the ideological themes which emerged during 
the 'ethnic crime gang' moral panic in 1998 (Collins et al. 2000): 
the observation that the alleged perpetrators share a particular 
appearance or ethnic background; attribution of causation of 
criminality to the supposedly shared culture of the offenders; and 
apportionment of responsibility for the crimes to entire ethnic 
communities. In addition, in these instances it is asserted by police, 
media and then politicians, that the victimisation is on the basis of 
race: 
Police said they were 'keeping an open mind' on possible links 
between Tuesday's attack and similar incidents in which 
teenage girls and women have been targeted by middle eastern 
[sic] men for being Caucasian. 
Insp. Johnson said there were no clear links between the latest 
attack [sic] but said the girl was of Caucasian appearance. The 
three attackers were all said to be of Middle Eastern appearance 
(Gee 9/8/01:1). 
'There are suburbs in which the streets are not safe and young 
Caucasian women are at risk ofrape', editorialised the Telegraph, 
which explained that the crime was associated with a lack of 
assimilation or integration into 'our' Australian society. 'Many of 
the members of these gangs declare they don't regard themselves 
as Australians even though they were born here, and this challenges 
the comfortable image of the society we have built' (Daily 
Telegraph 6/8/0 I :20). On commercial radio station 2GB, Alan Jones 
(26/7/02), following the further trials a year later, also attributed 
the crimes to immigrants' failure to integrate. Refusing to resile 
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from what he reiterated was the truth, that gang rapists were raping 
girls for racial reasons, he continued, as if these claims were logically 
and inextricably linked, that if Lebanese Muslims wanted to live [in 
Australia] solely as Lebanese Muslims, then' Australia is not going 
to take it'. 
An opinion column in the Daily Telegraph remarked on the 
racism raging on radio talkback shows, and observed how the 
untrammelled racial vilification was linking the gang rapes with 
asylum-seekers. From being of Middle Eastern 'extraction' or 
appearance, or being' Lebanese', the gang rapists were now being 
ideologically identified as 'Muslims': 
In this past week I have heard the most outrageous bile and 
venom coming from the mouths of [talkback] listeners, with the 
announcers making no attempt whatsoever to correct or bring 
balance to the diatribe. 'Ya mustn't let those Muslims in ... they 
breed like flies', said one caller, to which the announcer replied: 
'Yes' ... Many callers have made the connection between the 
pack rapes which have received much publicity recently, and 
the MS Tampa boat people. To claim the Tampa unfortunates 
would, if allowed into Australia, rampage and rape through our 
suburbs is an obscene defamation, yet it has been peddled at 
will on some talkback stations through the week (Day 5/9/01 :31). 
Melissa Fyfe, reporting in the broadsheet Melbourne newspaper 
the Age, wrote, 'Like Pauline Hanson revisited, it has been a week 
of racist bile over Sydney's airwaves and in the pages of its tabloid 
press' (Fyfe 25/8/01 :4). NSW Islamic Council Chairman Ali Roude 
concurred: 
Talkback radio had broadcast a stream of abuse and hatred 
over the past few weeks directed at Muslims and people from 
Arabic speaking backgrounds. 'It's like a war, if you listen to 
talkback radio,' he said (Tremain 16/8/0 I: 1). 
Alan Jones (30/7/01, excerpted in Media Watch 9/9/02), referred 
to 'attacks against ordinary Australian girls carried out by out of 
control Lebanese Muslim gangs who hold us and our police service 
in contempt'. He commented, 'Now they are showering their 
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contempt for Australia and our police on these young girls', and 
described this as 'the first signs of an Islamic hatred towards the 
community that welcomed them' (Fickling 2002). 
The Daily Telegraph also underlined the supposed racial 
causation of the crimes, hear-hearing with Premier Bob Carr 
against politically correct qualms about declaring the apparent 
conjunction of empirical factors to be a cause: 
After a series of gang rapes in Southwest Sydney, Mr Carr 
stated the irrefutable fact that groups of Lebanese youths were 
responsible for the attacks. It was important to make this 
distinction because the attacks against the women were racially 
based ... The accused in the rape cases brought to trial were 
Lebanese and the victims were 'Australian' women (Daily 
Telegraph 5/9/01:30). 
The editor of the Daily Telegraph, Campbell Reid, stated the 
newspaper's position on this representation during an interview by 
Nadya Stani on ABC Radio National (27/8/02): 
Why did a group of men attack those women? What was it that 
brought that group of men together? To be involved in that 
pack rape, who did you have to be? And if the answer to those 
questions is that you had to be a young Lebanese Muslim 
man, then that is something our society should discuss and 
that is something I firmly believe and have evidence to support 
that that is indeed what happened. 
Tabloid columnist Miranda Devine weighed in with a breathless 
argument, reprised a year later by Janet Albrechtsen (17/7/02), 
that it was multiculturalism which caused the rapes. 'How many 
girls and young women have been sacrificed because no-one 
wanted to offend ethnic sensibilities?' , she asked rhetorically (Devine 
12/8/01:15). Heaping hyperbole on the rhetoric, she wrote that it 
was no less than war being fought, in: 
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a home-grown form of systematic ethnic cleansing by a group 
of men said to be of' Middle Eastern' extraction ... [T]hey wage 
war on those they feel do belong. And make no mistake. It is a 
war, and one in which our laws are impotent. 
'You deserve it because you are Australian' 
Very similar claims were made in an anonymous, racist 
pamphlet handed out to school students at Bankstown railway station 
and a number of other sites in Sydney around September 2002, and 
bearing the name, postal address and website of the Australia First 
Party. Subheaded, 'Don't Be a Victim of Multiculturalism Gone 
Mad!', the leaflet asserted that misogynist Muslim culture caused 
the sexual assaults. Referring to the rapists (the convicted 'leader' 
of whom is pictured), it asks, 'Why Do They Do It?' , and answers 
(falsely), 'They Quote From The Koran'. There follow three 
purported quotations from the Koran in English, which are 
summarised (again patently falsely) as follows: 
In other words, women can be taken by men as they will; men 
can control and dominate women and use violence against 
them; women who assert their physical beauty could be open 
to punishment. The victims of the gang attacks were so chosen! 
The pamphlet continues with the familiar blaming of multiculturalism 
as a cause of the rapes: 
It is teachers and clergy, politicians and pop-stars, who preach 
the multicultural lie. These people make it possible for some 
girls to get into a situation where rape can follow. On September 
11 [2002], school-kids were supposed to show tolerance to 
Moslems in their schools. Sadly, this tolerance rubbish, leads 
to letting the guard down (anon 2002). 
A similar pamphlet was handed out in Young, in rural NSW. 
Miranda Devine recounted the story of 'Steve', a Lakemba 
father and grandfather who had been a caller-in to John Laws's 
program on radio 2UE during that 'week of bile' on the airwaves, 
saying (among other hair-raising stories) that his attractive blonde 
daughter and her friend had been spat on and called 'fucking skips' 
by 'Lebanese' men in a southern Sydney shopping mall. Steve said 
(and Devine quoted in approbation), 'They just have no respect for 
Caucasian women' (Devine 12/8/01:15). 'Steve' ,who had ident-
ified himself as 'a white working executive from the suburbs', had 
said on 2UE, 'We are not a soft touch, you can't rape our girls', 
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and grimly predicted vigilante reaction, which of course he did not 
sanction (Fyfe 25/8/01:4). The ideological notion of Australia and 
(White) Australians being stood over or taken advantage of as 'a 
soft touch' also circulated during the 'boat people' crisis of2001, 
promoted by conservative politicians including the Prime Minister 
and the Immigration Minister. It touched a chord which continued 
to reverberate. A talk-back caller, 'Stephanie', on Alan Jones's 
Radio 2GB program (19/9/02:8:50am) linked the gang rapes in her 
stream of consciousness with lack of assimilation or assimilability. 
People were not Australian just because they are born here, she 
said. She demanded that the rapists' names be published, and 
condemned Lebanese Muslim Association spokesman, Keysar Trad, 
for arguing against this. She said that she was angry about 'these 
Muslims' who constantly 'push their religion', and that Australia 
had been 'a soft touch' for too long. 
Nor was ABC Radio immune from talk-back attacks on multi-
culturalism and recommendations of vigilantism. One caller to the 
morning program in Wagga Wagga in country NSW said, 'There's 
only one thing you can with these pricks, it's not right treating women 
like this, you just want to get 'em and string 'em up by their nuts 
... ' . Another said: 
It just hasn't been going on for a couple of years. This dates 
back to about 15 years that things have been going on with 
this multi-cultural rubbish up there and I think there has to be 
a minimum sentence, not just a maximum sentence (excerpted 
in The WorldToday27/8/01:12:14pm). 
In the second half of 200 1, the City Star, the local paper ofPenrith 
in the outer west of Sydney was 'besieged by letters from angry, 
white males about "ethnic crime", especially rape'. The editor, Chris 
Hutchins, recounts to Andrew West, 'They would say these rap-
ists were not real men .. , Send them out here and we'll show them 
what a real man does - all that stuff' (West 18111/01). 
The tabloids and talkback demanded tougher sentences and 
Premier Carr (and, of course, the Opposition) promised tougher 
sentences. They reviled judges as soft and out of touch and they 
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called for appeals on the sentencing, and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions indeed appealed against the 'ridiculously lenient 
sentences' (Morris 7/9/01:4). They pilloried 'ethnic leaders' to 
accept the blame on their communities, and, as we shall see in 
Chapter Six, some leading ethnic community figures were in fact 
bullied or manoeuvred into doing so (e.g. Sun-Herald 14/7/02: 1). 
When Police Commissioner Peter Ryan referred to the rapes as 
'racially motivated' (Daily Telegraph 18/8/01: 11) and described 
the situation as 'to some extent a by-product of Sydney's recent 
huge immigration' , Premier Carr headed off criticism with a populist 
swipe at 'political correctness' (Chulov 18-19/8/01: 1). The Daily 
Telegraph noted: 
Mr Carr refused to apologise, saying he would not stop 
speaking out on international linkages with local criminal 
actlvity and was not embarrassed at identifying criminals by 
their ethnicity to help police tackle the problem. 
Mr Carr elaborated, 'These acts are the responsibility of crilninals 
they can't be slated home to Australian society. I won't accept 
that for a moment' (Morris 22/8/01 :4). 
When being interviewed for the Sydney-based Arabic 
newspaper, El Telegraph, by a young. woman journalism student 
questioning the Premier over his government's handling of the gang 
rape matter, Mr Carr became angry. The Sun-Herald reported 
(frOln a transcript) that he said: 
I'm sorry that I'm emotional because I met one of the victims 
yesterday, and I just find an appalling insensitivity in the 
questions you're asking about the plight of these victims ... 
She was held by these men for hours. They said disgusting 
things to her and some of them were out there committing this 
crime against other young women. You're saying that the 
Government is somehow responsible. The cause of the unease 
in the community, and you must face up to it, is what these 
violent rapists said when they committed the crime that 
projected race into this argument (Sun-Herald 1118/02:7). 
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Opposition Leader John Brogden, for his part, promised compulsory 
minimum sentencing should he be elected. He concurred on air 
with Alan Jones (2GB 18/7/02) in his criticism of Lebanese Muslim 
leaders for denying the racial aspects of the gang rapes, and (in 
this context) offered amendments to the Crimes Act for hate and 
racially motivated crimes. 
Nicholas Cowdery, the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions, 
was critical of both the Premier and the Opposition Leader for 
encouraging racism: 
There is an element of racism in the community, and the politi-
cians prey on these mindsets and make statements which are 
sympathetic with the prejudices of the people they wish to 
vote for them (Gerard 10-1118/02:5). 
One Nation MP David Oldfield called for a ban on the immigration 
of Muslims following the gang rape convictions: 
What we have seen with the latest offenders is just the tip of 
the iceberg, these people are not alone. There are others like 
them. Those 14 men did not come to the conclusion that 
Western women are 'sluts' and 'whores' by themselves, they 
were indoctrinated with these beliefs by Islamic leaders ... The 
socially primitive nature of Islamic society is evident ... in the 
way they treat their women and, surely now, in the way they 
treat ours ... such backward practices are not acceptable to 
Australian society (The Torch 2417102). 
Two converse interesting ideological manoeuvres being effected 
here are the 'othering' of the perpetrators and the 'whitening' of 
the victims. The suspected and later convicted rapists were often 
referred to as 'Muslim' in contexts where this identity was con-
trasted with Australiannness. They were repeatedly described as 
'Lebanese', notwithstanding their Australian nationality, residency 
and country of upbringing. By contrast, the seven victims of the 
rapes, invariably described as 'Australian', included two girls of 
Italian and one of Greek background. The victims were often 
collectively designated as 'Caucasian', and sometimes as 'white', 
despite the fact that one was of Aboriginal parentage (Fickling 
2002).1 
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'The rapists mentioned race first' 
There is a grain ~ and only a grain ~ of truth in the widely repeated 
claims that the gang rapes in question appeared to be racially 
motivated. It was reportedly asserted by at least one ofthe victims 
that the perpetrators made racial remarks and insults while the 
young women were held captive and sexually assaulted. These 
allegations, and what the police, media, and politicians made of 
them, will be discussed in the following section. What the judiciary 
made of them is something quite different, and therefore 'lenient' 
and 'out of touch' judges were excoriated for precisely that, at a 
time when a general onslaught of 'penal populism' (Totaro 27/1/ 
03: 1; Roberts, Hough, Stalans & Indermaur 2003) was coming into 
full battle cry, not least in NSW in the approach to yet another 
'Law and Order' driven state election (Totaro 27/1/03: 15). Other, 
later judgments, which fell into line with the 'public expectations' 
thus constructed, were in turn crudely applauded by populist media 
commentary (often presented as 'news'), as were political and 
administrative announcements of 'reform' to the criminal justice 
system, and especially to sentencing. Notwithstanding this, it must 
be recognised that there was also just a kernel of truth in the furore 
about failings of the justice process, as we shall see. 
It should be stressed at the outset of this discussion that the 
mostly untested allegations of a few racist remarks do not remotely 
demonstrate the race-based motivation that was inferred or even 
assumed with such irresponsible abandon. Moreover, given the 
horrific humiliation and damage of the rapes, it is interesting that 
the relatively minor aspect of these comments should be so seized 
upon and emphasised ~ by certain media and populist politicians 
as a major aggravating factor of the crimes, with implications about 
their causality. Likewise, it is noteworthy that procedural short-
comings identified in this particular moral panic both in the processes 
of charge-bargaining and in ignoring victims' impact statements ~ 
processes which had been in place for a considerable time ~ should 
have surfaced and arisen to such prominence in these very 
instances, laden as they were with racial overtones. 
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Neither, furthennore, do the convictions and the backgrounds 
of the offenders demonstrate culpability on the part of communities 
from which they come, and of which they are unfairly held to be 
representative. Still less can they be taken as evidence of endemic 
cultural wrongs and inadequacies of particular ethnicities and/or 
religions which are ideologically taken to be causes of the crimes 
under discussion. All of these ideological elements pervaded the 
moral panic about the 'ethnic' gang rapes. 
In March 2001, the Sunday Telegraph s court reporter wrote, 
'Fourteen youths from a Sydney suburb have been accused of 
raping at least seven teenage girls during a five-week rampage'. 
His sources were police. He continued, 'Several girls claimed their 
attackers had boasted of their "Lebanese" prowess, while others 
claimed their attackers had questioned them about their ethnic 
background' (Owen 11/3/01:19). Neither the 'Lebanese prowess' 
claim, nor that about questioning over ethnic background, is 
particularly surprising. Indeed, research by the present authors on 
masculinity and identity among second-generation Lebanese-
background young men has documented how boasting of the 
supposed attributes of the manhood of their culture of origin is a 
common theme of their conversation, often advanced in the face 
of experienced cultural denigration (Poynting, Noble & Tabar 1998). 
Nor is there anything very culturally specific about that; the theme 
can be observed in boys' talk among any number of ethnicities, 
including Anglo Australian. It occurs in quite mundane, quotidian 
situations. The fact that the same topic then arises in the context of 
a horrific group sexual assault does not therefore imply that this 
sort of talk and attitude is causally related to the crime in any direct 
or ethnically specific sense. (Patriarchy and dominant masculinity 
are, of course, causally related to rape, irrespective of ethnicity). 
The inquiry about the ethnic backgrounds of the girls being targeted 
is hardly astonishing either. Because of the opprobrium it would 
cause (to those of both genders involved) in a close-knit community 
where strong sanctions apply against extra-marital sex, young men 
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of this second-generation background often look for non-marital 
sexual partners outside of their community (Poynting, Noble & 
Tabar 1998). Again, this is the case in legal, everyday sexual 
encounters where no crime is involved. As Andrew Jakubowicz 
(27/09/01) argues: 
There are two questions then about whether these are racial 
rapes ... One is is there something about the general Lebanese 
Muslim culture that drives young men to rape Anglo Australian 
women? The answer to that is quite clearly No, there's nothing 
specifically cultural about it. Is it the case that adolescent thugs, 
looking for easy targets to play out their stuff on would pick 
women from outside their own community? The answer is Yes, 
they clearly would. 
That is to say, there is no necessary causal link between such 
precautions and the rapes to which it becomes ideologically joined. 
The rapists said things claiming cultural superiority and expressing 
cultural put-downs at the same time, but they surely say them at 
other times, too, in common with their entire cohort. Many men 
say them who are not rapists. An empirical conjunction does not 
entail a cause-effect relation. The appearance of causality arises 
in the process of racialisation. 
The issue of motivation goes to the heart of the characterisation 
of the rapes in question by a number of commentators, intent on 
attributing a measure of responsibility to the Lebanese community 
ofthe perpetrators, as racist hate crime. According to Byers (1999, 
cited in White & Perrone 2002:163), a hate crime: 
is a prejudice-based criminal offence motivated by the victim's 
membership within a particular social group. This could include, 
but may not be limited to, crimes motivated by the victim's real 
or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation 
[emphasis added]. 
The evidence that some of the gang rapes in Sydney in 2000 involved 
abusive reference to the ethnicity of the victims, does not demon-
strate such motivation. As columnist PP McGuinness surprisingly 
observes, ' ... gang rape is not the product of religious or ethnic 
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factors'. He compares the recent sexual assaults with an infamous 
case in Sydney in 1886, the 'Mount Rennie Outrage'. Nine youths 
were sentenced to hanging for the offence; all had 'typical Anglo 
and Celtic names'. McGuinness concedes that, 'It is relevant that 
the perpetrators of the recent cases of gang rape had common 
identifiers', and also refers to the alleged race-based insults so 
emphasised in the recent moral panic: 
Any girl who is targeted by a bunch ofthugs of any origin will 
be described by epithets which somehow make her inferior, 
and therefore fair game unlike their own women, who are pro-
tected by tribal or group loyalties (McGuinness 23/7/02: II). 
In the first of the series of trials prominently reported by the media 
in August 2001, four youths, two of whom were brothers, submit-
ted pleas of guilty: three men accepting two counts each of aggra-
vated sexual assault and the fourth man pleading guilty to detaining 
for advantage. They further admitted a number of other sexually 
related crimes, which were to be considered in sentencing them. 
In September 2000 they had offered a ride in their car to two young 
women waiting at a railway station, then taken them to a house in 
western Sydney where they were threatened with a knife and forced 
to have sex a number of times (Temple 1118/01:3). An effect of 
their pleading guilty, in addition to guaranteeing their conviction, is 
that the victims were spared the trauma of having to confront their 
attackers in court and to relive their experiences in a harrowing 
and drawn-out trial, and they also avoided the often humiliating and 
painful process that cross-examination can take in such cases. To 
encourage this preferable course, which also delivers savings of 
court time and expense for the State, sentences are routinely dis-
counted for such pleas. This became one issue in the moral panic 
which ensued. 
Another issue was also a matter of routine in the process of 
'charge bargaining'. In order to secure a plea of guilty and obtain a 
definite conviction with minimal delay and cost to the State and 
(the cynical might argue, not so crucially, from the State's point of 
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view) less suffering to the victims, lesser or fewer charges are 
usually proffered: ones which both prosecution and defence agree 
would be likely to be sustained in the event of a defended trial. 
Moreover, an agreed statement of 'facts' of the case is commonly 
in such instances negotiated between prosecution and defence, to 
go before the judge in determining sentence. Again, this avoids 
questioning and cross-examining defendants, victims and other 
witnesses in the process of an expensive and protracted trial which 
would also cause further pain for the victims. 
A third issue in the subsequent moral panic was the length of 
custodial sentence initially determined, which fell within the usual 
range for such offences: a norm which came under sudden, strident 
and unrelenting attack in the media from commentators, journalists 
and politicians. The type of corrective institution - the prisoners 
were minors - also became a issue, albeit a subsidiary one, linked 
to the general ideology about judicial leniency. 
Finally, there was a significant media campaign to have the 
names of the convicted released to the public: something normally 
precluded by law in the case of minors except where a judicial 
determination is made that it is in the public interest. (This very 
exception had been provided for as the result of previous moral 
panic and law and order auctioneering). 
Two days after this case was adjourned for sentencing, and 
while the judgment was being awaited, the weekend tabloid Sun-
Herald carried an article by its state political editor, Alex Mitchell, 
entitled 'Libs push life terms for gang rapists' (12/8/01:31). The 
story was based largely on quotations from the Liberal Party 
Opposition police spokesman, Andrew Tink, clearly intending to 
make political capital out of the case before the courts, and was 
plainly aimed by the newspaper at influencing the sentence. Tink 
complained that the Wran Labor Government had done away with 
life sentences for rape in 1981, and had defeated the Liberal Party 
amendment then proposed to its Crimes (Sexual Assault) Act, 
stipulating a maximum sentence of 'penal servitude for life'. Tink 
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called for a major review of sentencing for sexual assault, following 
what Mitchell called' an alarming increase in pack rapes, particularly 
in the Bankstown area'. The President ofthe NSW Police Assoc-
iation was quoted in support, saying: 
These predators are roaming around like a pack of dingos 
attacking young girls ... Every decent-thinking citizen will want 
to see them locked away for the maximum ... We have to make 
the penalty fit the crime and lock them away for as long as we 
can (Mitchell 12/8/01 :31). 
That same issue of the Sun-Herald carried an opinion column by 
Miranda Devine (12/8/01: 15), reiterating that newspaper's supposed 
70 rapes, and attributing racial motivations to the sexual assaults. It 
repeated from talkback radio the version of events with 'Middle 
Eastern' and 'Lebanese' perpetrators and 'Australian' and 'Cau-
casian appearance' victims. Devine (19/8/01: 15), followed up in 
the next issue of the Sun-Herald, retelling the 'story of a neigh-
bourhood under siege, divided between "skips" (Australians of 
Caucasian appearance) and "lebs" (Australians of Middle Eastern 
appearance)'. Every day between this weekend (Chulov 18-19/8/ 
01) and when the sentence was handed down on 23 August in the 
case before the court (Toy & Knowles 24/8/01: 1), the newspapers 
were replete with articles, letters, columns and editorials about the 
rapes. 
The judge did not succumb to this campaign: the sentences 
ranging from 1 year for detaining for advantage to 6 years for 
aggravated sexual assault left the tabloids and the t;:tlkback opinion-
vendors, and the politicians who are so much at their mercy -
including both Premier and Opposition Leader - as well as the 
Police Commissioner, disappointed and outraged. Then, daily, 
editorials soapboxed, Votelines vox-popped, cartoons chided, letter-
writers lambasted. Miranda Devine (26/8/01: 15) devoted her third 
weekly column in as many weeks, weighing in with, 'Sorry, but the 
rapists mentioned race first'. For Judge Megan Latham had also 
fallen short of expectations by explicitly rejecting their unsubstant-
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iated and irresponsible inferences of racial motivation. The written 
judgment included the observation, 'There is no evidence before 
me of any racial element in the commission of these offences'. 
Judge Latham also remarked therein, 'There is nothing said or done 
by any of the offenders which provides the slightest basis for 
imputing to them some discrimination in terms ofthe nationality of 
their victims' (Daily Telegraph 24/8/01:26). 
Premier Carr reacted rapidly to the public criticism over the 
'soft' punishment, announcing that he would meet with the Chief 
Justice to 'express concerns' over the supposed leniency of the 
sentences, 'passing on concerns of the public over the sentencing 
to Justice Spigelman and other legal bodies'. The Government had 
immediately referred the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) for review (Jacobsen, Burke & Connolly 25-26/8/01 :2). 
The outcome ofthe DPP's deliberations in the prevailing climate 
may well have been a foregone conclusion. As the President of 
the NSW Law Society Mr Nick Meagher was reported by the 
Herald as saying, 'Judges did reflect public opinion and the current 
debate would "probably influence what judges do'" (Jacobsen, Burke 
& Connolly 25-26/8/01 :2). Indeed it did. 
Journalist and lawyer Richard Ackland commented on the 
'political posturing' in Premier Carr's hurried appearance 'on the 
doorstep of Chief Justice Jim Spigelman', with the result that the 
case, with the original sentence duly appealed by the DPP and 
with the benefit of the swiftly announced 'Aggravated Sexual 
Assault in Compapy legislation' making those convicted of this crime 
liable for life sentences, would be heard in the Supreme Court by a 
now severely chastised judiciary. Ackland remarked graphically 
upon: 
the unseemly haste with which the Chief Justice made his 
announcement ... within moments of his meeting with the 
Premier. One would have thought that if Carr wanted to scratch 
his fleas all over the Chief Justice, prudence would have dictated 
that at least the head of the judiciary could have left a decent 
interval before making any response (Ackland 8/9/01: 1 0). 
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This posturing was taking place just prior to the state by-election in 
Auburn in western Sydney, in the campaign for which ethnicity 
and crime and law and order were key issues. The Law Society 
'accused the government of politic ising the sexual assault sentences 
because of recent media attention on ethnic related crime' (ABC 
Online 24/8/01). The Opposition, for its part, promised to introduce 
legislation stipulating life sentences for 'pack rape' (Videnieks & 
Leech 25-26/8/01 :4; Jacobsen, Burke & Connolly 25-26/8/01 :2). 
As a matter of fact, the sentences under question were not 
especially light. John North, past president of the NSW Law Society, 
commented that the sentence was neither unusual nor lenient and 
that 'politicians should not meddle with the law' (PM 24/8/01). 
Judicial Commission statistics indicated that, of the 237 people 
charged with sexual assault over the previous seven years, the 
average minimum sentence was around 4 years and the average 
maximum 6 years. Almost half of those gaoled received sentences 
between five and eight years (Videnieks & Leech 25-26/8/01:4). 
Richard Ackland (8/9/01 :8) compared the case here under discus-
sion to R v Rushby 2 in 1999, pointing out that the offences in that 
case were almost in the 'worst category' of the new scale con-
cocted by the Premier: 'forced vaginal and anal intercourse of a 
13-year-old girl by an 18-year-old male and his 16-year-old male 
companion', who 'pleaded guilty and were given total sentences of 
six and seven years respectively'. Ackland reports that, notwith-
standing' certain aggravating circumstances, including the fact that 
the victim was tied up and left in a remote location', there was no 
intervention by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Nor, manifestly, was 
there a campaign by the tabloids accompanied by political 
grandstanding. This must surely lead us to ask, ifthere had been no 
outcry over such leniency for the preceding seven years, why did it 
suddenly emerge in this case? The obvious answer lies in the moral 
panic linking ethnicity to the cause of the crime in this instance. 
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As we have pointed out earlier, the moral panic over 'ethnic 
rape gangs' was preceded by, and then developed coterminously 
with, a more generalised moral panic in urban Australia, and 
especially Sydney, about 'ethnic crime gangs'. Both 'Middle 
Eastern' and 'Asian' gangs had been focused upon in this cycle of 
media frenzy. Front-page stories, also occurring in August 2001, 
included supposed recruitment of schoolchildren as drug runners 
and extortionists in 'Asian' gangs. (See, for example, the five pages 
of the Daily Telegraph of 6 August 2001, bearing: the front-page 
lead story, numerous articles on pages 4 and 5, the editorial and the 
main daily cartoon.) This story was promoted by a right-wing group 
consisting of: 'disgruntled detective' Tim Priest, the self-styled 
'whistle-blower' who received much media attention for accusing 
the government and police hierarchy of turning a blind eye to 
problems of ethnic crime and gangs in westem Sydney; psychological 
anthropologist Richard Basham, who claims 'far more in common 
with police than with academics' (cited in Dixon 2003: 197) and 
presents himself as an expert on 'Asian crime'; radio personality 
Alan Jones; and Ross Treyvaud, a western Sydney publican and 
Cabramatta Chamber of Commerce chairman who has campaigned 
to clean up the streets of drugs and crime in his locality. One 
supposed expose of such practices by a 'former gang member', 
which was highly publicised by this high-profile coalition, was 
demonstrated by the ABC program, Four Corners (6/5/02), to be 
a total fraud. The schoolboy 'James' had never attended the school 
in question! 
Other front-page tabloid stories from within a fortnight's period 
also in August 200 1, as well as 'Gangland' (McDougall, Lawrence, 
Morris & Miranda 6/8/01 : 1), included the gang rape story, 'Women 
told to beware' (Gee 9/8/01:1). 'Gang Force: 240 police to fight 
crime' (Gee 10/8/01:1) followed next- an 'announcement' later 
denied by the police hierarchy and' adopted' after a top-brass police 
regime change and months of tabloid campaigning (Poynting 2002). 
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Then came 'How one family's campaign paralysed a police station' 
(Miranda 15/8/01: 1) which vilified as vexatious and criminal an 
entire Lebanese Australian family whose members had complained 
about police harassment, then 'Guns for Hire: Red Army soldiers 
recruited to city gangs' (Miranda 16/8/01: 1), and 'Gangs steal kids' 
future' (Wood 19/8/01: 1). Aspects of this moral panic included 
themes of importing crime; an attack on multicultural 'political 
correctness', including blaming this for supposed official reticence 
to identify ethnic crime as such, and the associated failure to record 
ethnicity-based crime statistics; the related supposed indulgence 
towards the civil rights of ethnic minorities and criminals, making 
the job of policing impossible; the need for tough policing and 
crackdowns on (ethnic) gangs; and an attack on ethnic leaders for 
refusing to accept responsibility for, and to remedy, the alleged 
criminality of their communities. 
In the context of this wave of moral panic, the DPP did decide, 
as expected, to appeal against the 'ridiculously lenient' sentences 
using, as a mechanism for appeal, the pending application for 
sentencing guideline which was instigated by the Premier. The 
Crown Advocate was to submit, on behalf ofthe Attorney-General, 
that there was a 'trend toward judicial leniency in the cases of 
rape and gang rape' (Morris 7/9/01:4). Upon appeal, the sentences 
were more than doubled, to 13, 14 and 13 years respectively for 
the three young men first convicted (Wockner 14/3/02:3). There 
was a further reference to the DPP, and a further outcry, when the 
fourth offender who pleaded guilty in this case was sentenced in 
November2001 to four years' imprisonment. The type of corrective 
institution also became an issue: '''Why should this bastard ... have 
the rest of his sentence in a juvenile jail? He committed the crime 
of an adult, he should have the sentence of an adult," the mother of 
one of the victims said outside the District Court' (Connolly 3-4/ 
1110 I :5). After the determination of the NSW Court of Criminal 
Appeal, the two youngest of those convicted were ordered to serve 
the remainder of their sentence in an adult jail, rather than the 
juvenile detention centre previously stipulated (Wockner 14/3/02:3). 
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In the later, and more notorious case, the 'ringleader' of one 
group of offenders was sentenced, to a total of 55 years' imprison-
ment - more than most murderers receive. This was the effect of 
the new, tougher legislation celebrated by the Telegraph: 'Die in 
jail: Carr's new sentences' (Peterson 5/9/02). The tabloids 
'applauded', to use Piers Akerman's term (18/8/02:83). 'Well done, 
your honor', the Telegraph (17/8/02: 18) headed its congratulatory 
letters. To underline the point, and in a truly popular approach to 
justice, it contributed a 'Vote-line': 1060 votes for and 193 against 
the severity of the sentence (17/8/02: 19). Miranda Devine (18/8/ 
02:15) called it a 'sentence to smile about'. The Premier and 
Opposition Leader blilth endorsed the sentence, the latter saying 
'he hoped the rapist would rot injail' (Pryor & Totaro 16/8/02:2). 
Even the Prime Minister, not one to miss a populist gesture, gave 
tacit approval (Daily Telegraph 19/8/02:4). One victim gave a 
door-stop interview outside the court, saying, 'I'd just like to say 
thank you to all of the media for your support ... if it wasn't for 
your support it wouldn't be such a hefty sentence' (Crichton & 
Stevenson 14-15/9/02:30). Quite so. 
As mentioned earlier, it was not only the severity or otherwise 
of the sentences that was in contention during the course of the 
moral panic. One of the issues canvassed especially by the Daily 
Telegraph, beginning while the young men were still awaiting 
sentence, was that the process of charge-bargaining explained to, 
and agreed to by, the young women victims, left them feeling that 
their story had not been fully told in court - as indeed it had not 
(Wockner 25/8/01:4-5). In particular, they expressed repeatedly in 
the media their experience of the sexual assaults as racial 
humiliation, and' their perception that the attacks were racially 
motivated. They appeared to view the omission of this emphasis of 
theirs, which loomed large for them in importance, as somehow 
lessening the gravity of the crime for which the youths were being 
convicted. The Daily Telegraph clearly shared this view. It 
editorialised, in a column which railed against denial, selectivity 
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and distortion, and suggested that Judge Latham may have 
gratuitously intruded a 'personal view' into her judgment: 
... there is evidence that race has been a factor in a number of 
assaults, particularly on women. If law enforcement and the 
judicial process are permitted to obscure the truth - and no 
one speaks up to object - then we will all be complicit if racial 
crime does become a widespread problem (Daily Telegraph 
25/8/01 : 16). 
The victims further complained that their victims' impact statements, 
in which they also told of their experiencing the ordeal as racial 
humiliation, were not taken into account in summing up and 
determining sentences. Judge Latham said that she had disregarded 
the aspects of the Victim Impact Statement that went 'beyond the 
agreed facts upon which the offenders stand to be sentenced' 
(Connolly 25-26/8/01 :2). This is apparently usual and proper legal 
procedure. Whatever discrepancy there may have been between 
the intention, the representation, and the actual legal status of victims' 
impact statements, it is clear that there is nothing unusual and 
certainly no bias involved, in the inability of these statements to 
become a vehicle for the telling of the girls' story. So they told their 
story instead to the very willing media, while the young men, without 
right of reply, were yet to be sentenced. The Telegraph could 
offer sympathy to the victims, and posture on the moral high ground, 
while gratuitously, incessantly picking over the sordid facts of the 
case which, along with the controversy it generated, doubtless 
garnered considerable profits for News Ltd. 
The young women also protested that the 'agreed statement 
of facts', agreed between prosecution and defence lawyers, was 
never agreed to by them, the victims, and diminished the crime 
while making them appear foolhardy at best, voluntarily accepting 
a ride in a car late at night with a group of young male strangers, 
whereas they claimed they were forced at knifepoint. Neither the 
perception of motivation nor this version of events was ever tested 
in court or subjected to cross-examination; this is the effect of 
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charge-bargaining to secure a plea of guilty and precisely to spare 
the victims the further humiliation and anguish of cross-examination. 
An agreed statement of facts is exactly that - a set of facts 
uncontested from the point of view of both prosecution and defence, 
that can be agreed by both parties. The naivete of the teenage girls 
in not grasping this is quite understandable, and a failure of the 
legal process. On the other hand, the Telegraph and other tabloid 
style media portrayed the process as one of censoring,3 and linked 
this ideologically with 'political correctness' and reluctance to offend 
ethnic sensibilities. 'There is a tendency in our society to deny the 
truth instead of confronting it, on the basis that it may cause offence 
or challenge fashionable beliefs', pronounced the Telegraph 
editorial in criticising the legal process in the case heard by Judge 
Latham (Daily Telegraph 24/8/01 :26). This portrayal was disingen-
uous, wilful 'dog-whistling' (a process we shall explore in the next 
chapter), and highly irresponsible. 
Some ofthe damaging effects of this irresponsibility ironically 
involved both sexual assault and racial hatred: evils which the 
commercial media claimed to be exposing and opposing. Hind 
Karouche, a member of the Supreme Islamic Council of NSW, 
complained that women wearing the hijab 'had become targets' 
because of the reporting about the supposedly race-based sexual 
assaults being blamed on Muslim and Lebanese communities. She 
told how 'They are abusing them, they are threatening to rape 
them' (Morris 5/9/01 :6). The Sydney Morning Herald reported 
that 'Muslim women and girls have become the targets ofthreats 
and abuse in Sydney's south-west following police reports that 
blame Middle-Eastern men for recent gang rapes of European 
women'. Keysar Trad, Vice-President of the Lebanese Muslim 
Association, said, 'They have been receiving threats of rape and 
also some ladies in our community have been spat on in the street'. 
He reported that an anonymous telephone call to a western Sydney 
Islamic school had threatened to abduct and rape pupils (Kennedy 
17/8/0 I). According to Sheikh Al Hilaly, the Imam ofthe Lakemba 
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mosque, such threats were not idle ones: he told of the rape by a 
'Caucasian' man of an 18-year-old Muslim girl producing 'uproar' 
in the community and a very dangerous situation. The victim was a 
virgin, according to Key.sar Trad, who said the case, though not 
recorded by the police, was known to elders of the community 
(Walker 26/8/01: 10). 
The Telegraph's words, 'we will all be complicit if racial crime 
does become a widespread problem' (Daily Telegraph 25/8/01: 16), 
though unintendingly, cannot have been more prescient. Complicit 
they were. 'Rape, hatred and racism' have never been accorded 
the column-inches and the air-time when suffered by subordinated 
cultures, be they Indigenous or immigrant. Now, if a '.racist giant 
awakes in south-west Sydney', to use Miranda Devine's own phrase 
(12/8/02: 15), the Daily Telegraph, the Sun-Herald and the populist 
talkback comperes have coloured its dreams and aroused it in anger. 
Unholy trinity: power, thuggery and silence 
One case of comparison will suffice to show that the media furore 
about the process of charge bargaining and the overlooking of the 
victims' impact statements was determined by relations of racism 
and class.4 This case in Sydney's inner west came to light in October 
2000, at much the same time as the group sexual assaults in south-
western Sydney, and went to trial in 2001. It involved at least 75 
-sexual assaults over a four-month period - 50 on one victim and 
25 on another - often 'in front of "spectators'" (Connolly 21/12/ 
00) who 'stood by and cheered them on and laughed as the victims 
screamed' (Overington 4/2/01). The perpetrators were teenage 
males from the same religious background, and police stated to the 
court that the practices of violence, humiliation and bullying were 
endemic to the subculture of these young men. The group sexual 
assaults involved elements of torture - a description Justice Finnane 
used about the rapes discussed above (Wockner 9/8/02) - tying 
v • 
. up and beating. were part of the ritual violence. 
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As in the case we have been concerned with here, charge 
bargaining took place, which shaped the course and outcome of 
the trials. The offenders agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges 
and the prosecution 'agreed to accept the pleas and drop more 
serious charges of sexual assault', in return for the guilty pleas 
which 'saved the victim the stress and trauma of having to give 
evidence .. .'. (Walker 1112/01). In one instance, 'two counts of 
aggravated sexual assault were reduced to one count of intimidation' 
(Sydney Morning Herald 24/2/0 1 :2). In all, 'Twelve other charges 
were dropped in exchange for the guilty pleas' on the basis of this 
agreement. One other youth had already accepted the offer of a 
guilty plea in January, when the DPP: 
offered a plea to the boys of aggravated indecent assault, 
whereas in December, back-up charges (made on the advice of 
the DPP) included aggravated sexual intercourse and sexual 
intercourse without consent. (If defendants admit to a form of 
penetration they are allowed to plea to a lesser charge.) One 
said yes, the others no (Lawson 10/2/01). 
Nevertheless, the story told by the agreed statement of facts was 
horrific. A children's court magistrate was reported as saying that 
there was an ongoing culture of bullying and abuse, in which victims 
were tied to beds and sexually assaulted in front of their peers 
(Connolly 6/2/01). In passing sentence, the magistrate 'said the 
offences were committed in company, were ongoing, and involved 
the use of implements "in a most degrading way for the victim'" . 
(AAP/Weekend Australian 24-25/3/01: 11). 
As the victims did not give evidence at the hearings, when 
they became disappointed at and hurt by the lenient sentences, and 
felt betrayed by information management and denial, they told their 
story instead to the press. It involved racism and bullyi~g (Walker 
1112/01). 
Two 16-year-old offenders were given twelve-month good 
behaviour bonds and had no conviction recorded (Sydney Morning 
Herald 10/2/01:40; ABC News Online 24/3/01). The one youth 
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who admitted using his school tie to bind one of two victims who 
had been sexually assaulted more than 75 times over four months , 
was found guilty of intimidation and released on a good behaviour 
bond of six months without a conviction recorded. A fourth boy 
was allowed to plead guilty to intimidation in return for the 
withdrawal of two charges of aggravated indecent assault, and 
was placed on a good behaviour bond of six months, with no 
conviction recorded (AAP 8/3/01). 
Each young man had his own team of lawyers. These were 
ruling-class boys. They and their victims had been boarders at the 
exclusive, Anglican, all-boys Trinity Grammar School, in whose 
boarding house the sexual assaults routinely occurred. 
There was no moral outrage expressed in the media about the 
charge bargaining process. There was no shock or disgust voiced 
by press or politicians at the leniency of the sentences. No change 
was proposed to the law. The same tabloids which, in the 'ethnic 
gang rape' case, campaigned stridently to have the offenders 
publicly named (e.g. Daily Telegraph 13/7/01 :20), even though 
they were minors, seemed to accept as appropriate that the offend-
ers not be named in this instance, in the interests of rehabilitation 
- certainly, there was no campaign for them to be identified. Nor 
were their families identified. In this instance, the media did not 
make an issue of the common religion of the offenders. The contrast 
with the media, political and juridical treatment of working-class, 
poorly educated Muslim boys speaks volumes. 
Blind spot allows barbarism to flourish 
In July 2002, as the young men convicted of the south-west Sydney 
rapes were awaiting their sentences in prison, the conservative 
Australian columnist, Janet Albrechtsen (17/7/02) wrote a 
provocative and misleading opinion piece entitled' Blind Spot Allows 
Barbarism to Flourish'. The 'blind spot' was multiculturalism and 
the barbarism was 'racially motivated gang-rape' practised by 
'Muslim pack-rapists' frOIJl~ 'a culture that can treat women as 
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second-class citizens', 'a culture which places so little value on 
gender equality'. The article not only took racial vilification to new 
depths among Australian broadsheet newspaper journalists, it 
regurgitated borrowed and unacknowledged material, misrep-
resenting the original stories and 'verballing' sources (Australian 
Muslim Public Affairs Committee 200 I). The piece is of particular 
interest, because of the extent to which exactly the same ideological 
elements, phrases, stories, comparisons, distorted logic and common-
sense cultural-political conclusions were picked up and circulated 
widely on talkback radio and in everyday conversations; one can 
find some of the very same formulations in rabid, racist letters to 
the editor oftabloids. The fact that the article appeared in a 'quality' 
broadsheet, the Murdoch 'flagship' in Australia, gave authority and 
apparent credibility to the ideas. The same ideas, expressions and 
arguments did not have either this circulation in Australia, nor this 
cachet, when they appeared on a US neo-Nazi website a year 
earlier, below the swastika and the heading 'New multiracial sport: 
GANG RAPE!' (Francis 26/8/01). Both the author of this article, 
Sam Francis, and Janet Albrechtsen had picked up on a media 
story from France, about an allegedly cultural or racial practice 
there dubbed tournante (Francis) or tournantes (Albrechtsen), 
translated (by both) as 'take your tum'. Francis (26/8/01) wrote, 
on the white supremacist American web page, 'It consists in the 
ritual gang rape of white women by non-white immigrants', and 
further (referring to the Sun-Herald's fallacious front-page story 
of31 July 2001), 'France isn't the only nation to experience the 
pleasures of diversity. Reports from Australia reveal that racially 
motivated rapes are catching on there as well'. Albrechtsen 
described tournante as 'the French term for the pack-rape of white 
girls by young Muslim men'. Like Francis, she took a swipe at 
multiculturalism: 'For 20 years the French ignored the ethnic causes 
of these barbaric crimes for fear of offending multicultural man. 
Along the way, more innocent young girls were pack-raped'. She 
continued: 
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Now it's in Australia. Last week two Muslim brothers were 
found guilty ofthe gang-rape of a young Australian girl ... She 
was invited for a drive but taken to a secluded park and gang-
raped while 14 Muslim boys watched (Albrechtsen 1717/02). 
The main difference in the two accounts seems to be that Francis 
is more interested in race (white/non-white) whereas Albrechtsen 
focuses more on culture (,white' girls but 'Muslim' men) in the 
mode of what has been called the New Racism (Barker 1981), 
which in Australia is basically the form of racism of One Nation, 
as outlined in Chapter Five. Both refer to the press statement of 
French magistrate Sylvie Lotteau, undated but (northern) spring 
2001, according to Francis. The latter refers to 'black male' rap-
ists, Albrechtsen to the religion ofthe young men, both attributing 
this meaning to Lotteau. Francis describes the typical victim as 'a 
white female'; Albrechtsen (purporting to quote Lotteau directly) 
as 'a white girl'. The French tournante story and its comparison 
to the 'ethnic gang rape' crisis in Australia had already appeared a 
year before Albrechtsen's effort, in the column of fellow critic of 
multiculturalism, Paul Sheehan (29/8/01 :20), three days after the 
Francis piece, and also in Jackman (29/8/01 :31).5 
Albrechtsen reproduces a version of the 'caught between 
cultures' myth, which we have critiqued in Chapter Three, and 
presents it as a cultural cause of endemic gang rape: 'French and 
Danish experts say perpetrators of gang rape flounder between 
their parents' Islamic values and society'S more liberal democratic 
values, falling back on the most basic pack mentality of violence 
and self-gratification' (Albrechtsen 17/7102). Media Watch (9/9/ 
02) argues convincingly that she lifted this story without citation 
from an article by Adam Sage in the Times, some 16 months earlier: 
'Caught between their parents' Islamic values and societies [sic] 
Christian and social democratic values, some youths appear to have 
fallen back on the most basic instincts of violence and pleasure' 
(Sage 5112/01, cited in Media Watch 9/9/02). Albrechtsen falsely 
ascribes to the 'French and Danish experts' the identification of 
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the rapists as Muslim and the victims as 'white'. Sage's original 
article had quoted French Psychotherapist Jean-Jacques Rassial 
as saying that, 'gang rape had become an initiation rite for male 
adolescents in city suburbs'. In Albrechtsen 's rather more creative 
version, 'male adolescents' becomes 'a small section of young male 
Muslim youths', and 'gang rape' of unspecified victims becomes 
'pack rape of white girls' (Media Watch 9/9102; Australian Muslim 
Public Affairs Committee 2001). The Danish expert, criminologist 
Flemming Balvig, receives similar treatment, with Albrechtsen, still 
referring to the 'young male Muslim youths', claiming that he 
corroborated 'the French experience of this barbaric rite of passage 
into manhood for some of these young men' (Media Watch 9/9/ 
02). When Balvig was presented by Media Watch with 
Albrechtsen's misuse of his work, he rejected this interpretation 
indignantly: 'The citation is completely wrong. What I have said is, 
that the main explanation of gang rape probably is social, and not 
cultural or religious' (Media Watch 9/9/02). 
Not only did Albrechtsen add to the European academics' 
accounts her own supposition that the rapists were Muslim, she 
also omitted that some of the victims whom she (but not the 
academics) described as 'white' were themselves Muslim. Scott 
Johnson's Newsweek report of August 20, 2001 is quoted on this 
by Australian Muslim Public Affairs Committee (2001): 
There are increasing reports of gang rapes called toumantes 
by bands of adolescent boys, some no older than 14. The 
victims are often young Muslim girls, doubly victimized by 
depressed socioeconomic circumstance and the fury of the 
boys who haunt the abandoned buildings where the rapes 
take place. 
We have seen some stark examples in this chapter of how racial or 
ethnic profiling of a particular type of crime, and the dominance of 
racist mindsets in the social context in which it takes place, can 
'bleach' victims to 'white' and 'blacken' offenders to 'non-white'. 
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As magistrate and Aboriginal woman Pat 0' Shane wrote in her 
letter to the Australian (19/7102), this way oflooking flies in the 
face of history: 
Janet Albrechtsen does not let Australian history stand in the 
way of a few prejudices. Her comments about racially motivated 
gang-rapes, and that this first hit in the last 12 months, ignore 
200 years of such events. Indigenous Australian women have 
been subject to such criminal behaviour by Anglo-Australian 
men, many ofthem in positions of control over the women and 
their communities, without a single bleat from the likes of 
Albrechtsen. 
We wish to make a methodological point about appearances and 
ways oflooking, empiricism and causality, and a political point about 
'correctness', before concluding this chapter with a cautionary tale 
about how the assumed 'non-whiteness' of a crime can produce 
false conclusions about suspects. 
'Open eyes to ethnic crime' 
Albrechtsen's, Sheehan's, Devine's and Duffy's (17/8/02: 16) tirades 
about the supposed ethnic causes of gang rapes were each inter-
woven with an attack on 'political correctness' in relation to 
multiculturalism. Both the July-August 2001 and July-August 2002 
rounds ofthis story coincided with a media campaign to have 'ethnic 
crime' named and dealt with as such, in the face of the suppression 
of this 'truth' by misguided liberals and academics and the stubborn 
refusal to recognise it on the part of purblind' ethnic leaders'. An 
aspect of this campaign was the push to have 'ethnicity data' 
recorded in crime statistics in NSW. 
In 2000, the present authors agreed - with reservations -
with the suggestion then being floated that ethnicity data be gathered 
and recorded in the criminal justice system ofNSW The reservations 
had to do with the practical difficulties of obtaining accurate data 
(what would count as ethnicity and who would count 'it'?), as well 
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as its possible ideological misuses (Collins et al. 2000). In the end, 
we were convinced by the arguments being put forward by Don 
Weatherburn of the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, and 
others, that such data would be useful in determining whether there 
was over-policing of certain ethnic groups, or overrepresentation 
in arrests, convictions, incarceration, and so on, as indeed analogous 
statistics had demonstrated with Aboriginal people, especially young 
men (Cunneen 2001). If the data were objective and 'true', why, 
indeed, should social scientists or the people in general fear their 
being known? In retrospect, perhaps we should have had more 
reservations about why the data and why these particular data 
were being demanded. What ethnicities and what crimes were 
focused upon in the popular label 'ethnic crime' or in the practical 
labour of data collection to which it gave rise? Imagine if, because 
of a few high profile cases and longstanding cultural stereotypes, 
the demand were raised to keep statistics on, say, Jewish busines-
smen in white collar crime? The proposal would rightly be rejected, 
with contempt and outrage, as racist. Why then, Lebanese car 
theft, Muslim rapists, Middle-Eastern appearances? 
Even the ABC's 7:30 Report became caught up in the ethnic 
labelling and attacks on 'political correctness'. Journalist Maxine 
McKew, leading into the piece with comments about 'squeam-
ishness' over 'crime and ethnicity' and 'political correctness', put 
to NSW Director of Public Prosecutions, Nicholas Cowdery, that 
'what makes this [the "brutal gang rapes"] case unique was a 
particular ethnic group targeting another exclusively' (7:30 Report 
15/7/02). Apart from the 'particular ethnic group' coming into focus 
in a certain way of looking, we have also seen that the exclusive 
targeting of 'another' ethnic group was more folklore than reality 
- just as it was in the French cases. McKew made clear who that 
other targeted group is: ' ... there were seven women and all Anglo-
Celtic'. Wrong. 6 Cowdery assents both times. The first time, he 
replies: 
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That was certainly the case in the recent series of matters that 
have been dealt with, And that of course makes it doubly 
relevant How can you say it is not relevant when it seems to 
be a factor in the motivation of the actions of the perpetrators 
of offences' (7: 30 Report 15/7/02), 
Seems. Appearance is everything. What causal mechanisms have 
been proposed and tested? We have seen no explanations beyond 
the sorts of folk prejudices rightly dismissed by Pat O'Shane. What 
tests, beyond the market research of the successful manufacturing 
of 'public opinion'? Beyond social-scientific knowledge, was the 
purported motivation ever proven at law? 
In the same interview, Keysar Trad, Vice President of the 
Lebanese Muslim Association, makes a telling argument, going 
directly to the question of causation and refuting its (ideological) 
link with ethnicity. McKew Asks him, ' ... what about this crime? 
This was a particular group targeting western women, non-Muslim 
women'. Trad replies: 
This is the issue that I'm getting at. That I've received reports 
from Muslim women who feel that they were also targeted by 
rape, sexual harassment, so forth. Now, the issue in this case is 
that the lady who came forward and reported the complaint 
happened to be an Anglo-Celtic woman. I believe that if we 
follow the case further, you will find that the motivation itself 
ofthese people, even though they are making derogatory, racist 
slurs, that their motivation was the object oftheir gratification 
rather than the race ofthe object of their gratification. 
Cowdery then concurs: 
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I think that's right. I think the criminality ofthe crime of rape, as 
we used to call it, was the primary motivating factor and I think 
the rest was just regarded as an embellishment by the people 
who were involved. I have difficulty accepting that this was 
some sort of ethnic offence by one ethnic group against another 
ethnic group, I think it was delinquent male behaviour (7:30 
Report 15/7/02). 
'You dcscn'c it because you are Australian' 
How did the papers report this? The Herald headlined, 'Open eyes 
to ethnic crime: DPP' (Stevenson 13-14/7/02:7); the Telegraph, 
'Racism a factor in gang rapes: Cowdery' (Hilderbrande & Morris 
16/7 /0:4). Racism was indeed a factor, but not the way the 
Telegraph meant. 
'Gang wrongly jailed for rape' 
Empiricism - the leap from the observable conjunction (say, 
statistical regularities) of particular ethnicities and given crimes to 
the assumption that the ethnicity is a causal factor in the crime -
is not the only difficulty, but it is a besetting one. We also need to be 
especially alert to the ideological ladenness of the observations, 
and we need to take into account the impact of the social relations 
of racism pervading the State which is doing the policing, charging, 
trying, sentencing, incarceration, along with the intimidation, 
harassment, humiliation and sanctioned violence, as well as doing 
the statistics, objectivity, recording, reporting. We need theories 
which can grasp this. 
The authors were impressed by the analysis of James Messer-
schmidt (1993), who attempts - as is in our view greatly needed 
- to grasp theoretically the complex interplay of class and gender 
(masculinity) relations in crime. In fact, we are still impressed, though 
chastened with a salutary lesson. In his groundbreaking study of 
masculinity and crime, Messerschmidt postulates that racial 
subordination can be ideologically inverted in acts of sexual violence, 
in a process by which the less powerful (racialised minority) men 
are made to feel more powerful in a collective practice of violence 
expressing momentary but significant power over women victims 
who come from a more powerful position in the prevailing class 
and ethnic relations. He may be right. It is an open question, to be 
tested, like all theory of any use, empirically. 
The embarrassment of those of us impressed by this analysis 
- and doubtless now also of Messerschmidt - is that he used the 
1989 New York Central Park 'wilding' case to instantiate his theory. 
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Five black and Latino youths were jailed for up to 13 years for the 
rape, brutal bashing and leaving for dead of a middle-class white 
woman jogger in Central Park. The viciousness of the violence 
was a factor to be explained. The 'gang' of young men had been 
identified 'wilding' in the park, that is, carrying on in a wild manner, 
skylarking and scaring people. The five matched the ethnic or racial 
profile fitted by the police to the crime. They were interrogated 
and they confessed, and their confessions were recorded. Their 
conviction was a matter of course. The American media called 
them 'animals', and the rapes were invariably reported in terms of 
race. They fitted the profile. They were, however, innocent of the 
crime. Recently, another man has confessed to the rape and near-
fatal beating, and DNA evidence has shown him to be the offender 
and the five who were convicted to be innocent (Gordon 71121 
02:28; Weekend Australian 7-8/12102: 15; Sauiny 21-22112/02: 13).7 
So, in addition to the questions about the inexplicable violence of 
the assault, we now need to explain why and under what circum-
stances the five convicted but innocent men confessed. We have 
no answers, but the question takes us back to the point about racism 
within the State. We also need to ask why Messerschmidt - and, 
reading him, why we - did not raise these questions then. 
The point of this example is not to suggest that those convicted 
of the gang rapes in Sydney in 2000 are innocent. It is to say that, 
until proven otherwise, it is scientifically prudent and socially 
responsible - not merely 'politically correct' - not to assume 
that their culture is an accomplice, that their ethnicity is a causal 
factor in the crime. It remains an open question, and one to be 
investigated empirically, what interrelations were at work between 
the masculinities of the perpetrators and the class relations and 
social relations of racism in which they were constructed and in 
which the young men lived. 
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The poverty of tabloid 'sociology' 
One unnamed 'Sydney sociologist who has worked extensively 
with the Lebanese community' was quoted in the Weekend 
Australian as saying, of the western Sydney gang rapists: 
They want to impose themselves, albeit in a perverse way, over 
a culture that they feel has done them wrong ... And that culture 
could be a Christian culture or perhaps any culture that is non-
Muslim. There are few worse sins for a young Muslim youth 
than to sleep with a girl outside of marriage, so they find 
strength in numbers (Chulov & Pay ten 13-14/7/02:23). 
This is sheer speculation. Where is the evidence? What is the theory, 
the explanation for the articulation of reaction to racism (or is it 
class exploitation, or both?) to sexual violence? This is exactly the 
sort of glib formula much sought-after by busy journalists with tight 
deadlines, little time for investigation and less for reflection, and 
pressure to publish saleable copy. Sydney University anthropologist, 
Richard Basham, was a key source for two tabloid 'Gangland' 
beatups: one in the Sun-Herald (Walker 8/4/01: 1,6-7) and one in 
the Daily Telegraph (McDougall et al. 6/8/01:1,4-5). The latter 
cited him thus: 
Anthropologist and crime researcher Dr Richard Basham 
believes the gang problem has spread in Sydney and become 
more entrenched: 'The most powerful [gangs ]nes [sic] are 
ethnic [and] the Chinese the most structured'. 
But the crime and violence does not just happen between the 
gangs. It has already affected the broader community through 
the pack rape of more than 30 Caucasian girls and drug dealing 
on a huge scale ... 
Dr Basham believes the gangs have little fear of Australian 
police. 
'It's part of their culture and it's being imported here,' he said 
(McDougall & Miranda 6/8/01 :5, original parentheses). 
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Alec Pemberton, a senior lecturer in sociology at the University of 
Sydney, wrote in the Daily Telegraph that 'Black Panthers targeted 
white blonde women for rape during the Black Power movement 
in the 1960s'. He did concede that 'we don't know if this is 
happening here', but immediately followed this with the (non-) 
sentence: 
The persistent suggestion that fundamentalist Islamic attitudes, 
married to feelings of marginalisation and devaluing of Leba-
nese youth, might well have led to an explosive mixture and 
specific targeting of Caucasian women (Pemberton 22/8/01 :4). 
It might not have, too! Whose persistent suggestion was it? What 
motivated this persistence? What corroborated the suggestion? To 
reproduce the folklore about the Black Panthers in this context -
irrespective of the slander to them - is plain silliness. Beyond 
that, it is exactly this sort of racially framed common sense, and 
irresponsible attribution of criminality to cultural causes, which led 
the five Black and Hispanic youths, innocent but convicted of the 
Central Park 'wilding' rape, to be targeted by police, to have false 
confessions extracted, to be taken to be guilty, to 'rot injail' for 5 to 
13 years. To this must be added the untold damage suffered by the 
rest of the communities of blame, which are assembled by such 
assumptions and the associated profiling. 
The argument has been canvassed in Chapter One that the 
discourse of orientalism began among academic 'experts' and 
filtered into everyday common sense. This is one moment of a 
two-way, developing process. No doubt there is a dialectic at work, 
as Antonio Gramsci (1971) has argued, whereby the folklore of 
the 'masses' is picked up by intellectuals, worked up into more 
coherent form, and fed back into popular circulation. In any case, 
the sorts ofleUers to the editor of tabloid newspapers which reflect 
everyday lay conversations, contain the same myths about Arab/ 
Muslim/Lebanese masculinity. Jennifer Whaite, writes to the 
Telegraph (24/8/01:28) that 'many years ago' she 'spent some 
time in the Lebanon'. The natives were friendly, she reports, but 
the men incessantly: 
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made ... the obvious assumption that, as a European woman, I 
was a whore who would welcome any sexual advance ... This 
sort of behaviour is at one end of the spectrum whose other 
end is gang rape. ' 
Irene Lesley, in the same edition (Daily Telegraph 24/8/01:28), 
writes of 'the misogyny that one specifically associates with Is-
lam'. She instances 'young women here in Sydney who have re-
pressive dress restrictions imposed on them that do not apply to 
their brothers, or other Australian women'. She is clear that it is 
the masculinity in the culture that is the problem: just 'ask female 
high school teachers how Muslim boys treat them'. Jodi Farr, on 
the same page, concurs; it is the boys who are problematic: 'Iflack 
of discipline is the problem', she replies to Sheikh Taj el-Din Al 
Hilaly, 'then why don't we see gangs of Arabic girls cruising the 
streets causing pain and suffering?' (Daily Telegraph 24/8/01 :28). 
We have enumerated the ideological elements of the rac-
ialisation of deviant, 'Arab Other' masculinity as its supposed: 
deprecation of all women, oppression and subjugation of their own 
women, denigrating 'western' women as immoral and sexually 
promiscuous, sexual violence towards 'white' /Caucasianlwestern 
women as a manifestation of bitterness and hatred towards the 
'west'. Arab and Muslim cultures are thus ideologically represented 
as backward, brutal and misogynistic, and their masculinities present 
a problem to be firmly rectified. 
Such folk prejudices should not be elevated to the level of 
scientific pronouncements. They cannot be superseded by social-
theoretical critique alone, but must be confronted in practice. Well 
informed social-scientific alternatives will need to be empirically 
based, and the authors intend the previous chapter (Three) to be a 
modest contribution to that project. Chapter Five will now examine 
what happens when racist folk prejudices lead, beyond social-
scientific pronouncements, to social policy announcements. 
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Notes 
1 The authors are grateful to Ruth McCausland of the NSW Anti-
Discrimination Board for this reference. The point is made in 
NSW Anti-Discrimination Board (2003 :82n). 
2 [1999] NSWCCA 104 (24 May 1999). 
3 The Warren cartoon in the Daily Telegraph of 25 August (25/ 
8/01: 19) depicts censorship, confusing the charge bargaining 
process with the victim's impact statement. It shows bewigged 
woman judge reading a document headed 'Victim's Impact 
Statement' in which most of the text is blacked out, leaving 
only, 'On ... and then ... again ... repeatedly'. 
4 This case is traced in detail, and analysed in terms of ruling-
class masculinity, in Poynting and Donaldson (2002). 
5 An earlier article in the Daily Telegraph by Christine Middap 
(2118/01:6), reporting from London, drew on the French 
tournante story from Le Monde. Though it did not explicitly 
compare events there with the Sydney rapes, the story was 
juxtaposed with two other pieces on the page, which did deal 
with the latter. 
6 Or, at best, raising some very sticky questions about 'objectively' 
identifying ethnicity, as alluded to above. 
7 The authors are grateful to Michael Stutt, of Justice Action, for 
bringing the re-opening of this case to our attention. 
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The dog-whistle election 
'Dog-whistle politics' was the subject of considerable discussion 
around the 2001 Australian federal election campaign (e.g. Barkham 
10/11/01; Green 6/1 % 1; Oakes 13/11/01: 18; Goot 30/8/02). The 
notion involves sending a particularly sharp message which calls 
clearly to those intended, and goes unheard by the rest of the 
population, like the dog whistles advertised in 1960s comic books. 
Prime Minister Howard's 'We will decide who comes to this 
country and the circumstances in which they come' conveyed to a 
particular 'we' a message that deliberately went beyond the words. 
Ostensibly it was an impeccably reasonable statement about national 
sovereignty which almost goes without saying in a contemporary 
nation state. At the inaudible level, it spoke to those disaffected, 
disoriented and displaced by local effects of globalised economic 
restructuring - those whose insecurity and ignorance leaves them 
susceptible to populist claims that their relaxed and comfortable 
past had been stolen away by cosmopolitan, 'politically correct' 
elites and the 'multicultural industry', by favouring Asian and Middle-
Eastern immigrants, refugees, and by privileging Aborigines. Thus 
it silently but successfully promised barriers against the 
unassimilable, the irrevocably different races or cultures - non-
Christian, non-white, non- 'western' - against whom the previous 
supporters of One Nation had raised their voices, once the consensus 
of bipartisan multiculturalism had been ruptured in the mid-1990s 
(see, e.g. Manne 29/10/01 :16; Oakes 13/11/01:18; Ramsay 27-28/ 
10/01:40; Hogg2002:139; Simms 2002:99-103). 
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In 1996, the assimiliationist, anti-multiculturalist Pauline Hanson 
was elected to federal parliament for the Queensland seat of Oxley 
as an independent MP following her expulsion from the Liberals 
after unguarded comments about' handouts to Aborigines' and other 
racist remarks. The One Nation party which she founded attracted 
huge media attention and garnered up to ten per cent of the vote in 
several subsequent state elections in addition to the federal one, by 
opposing immigration and rearticulating the racism of the old 'white 
Australia policy'. Their supporters object to immigration especially 
from 'non-Christian countries', and accuse immigrants of bringing 
unemployment, crime, corruption, communal strife, disease, among 
a list of social ills. 
While these 'White Australia', assimilationist principles could 
be enunciated explicitly by mainstream politicians and newspapers 
in 1901, they could not in 2001. The right of the Coalition parties 
had railed against 'political correctness' before the 1996 election, 
as an imposition against freedom of speech and suppression of 
genuine debate. They were not only the province of Ms Hanson; 
they opened up a space for the ideas which she represented to be 
aired with some sort of respectability and taken seriously. In the 
light ofthe electoral impact of the re-emerging popular racism, the 
backlash against multiculturalism was partly adopted by both 
Government and Opposition. Only partly, however, for the two major 
parties wanted to retain the 'ethnic vote' and that of the small-l 
liberals among the middle strata, while courting the disaffected 
minority which had turned to One Nation. Hence the strategy of 
sending different messages to each cohort on distinct wavelengths, 
as it were. In the event, the dog whistle worked for the government 
in the 2001 federal election, in the context of a moral panic over 
the Middle-Eastern 'queue-jumpers' rescued by the MV Tampa 
off Western Australia in August and the fear and insecurity induced 
by the airborne terrorist attacks of September 11 in the USA. 
In August 2001, before the fateful date in September and 
before the federal election, there was a meeting between NSW 
Premier Bob Carr and the federal Minister for Immigration Philip 
154 
Dog-whistle politics 
Ruddock after Mr Carr 'had called for tightening of immigration 
policies to reduce ethnic crime on Sydney's streets'. Mr Carr 
remarked that ethnic crime gangs were 'causing mayhem on the 
streets' and announced that the federal-state plan devised at the 
meeting was to address 'problems ... because of decisions about 
immigration made decades ago' and was 'about making it harder 
for criminals to get into Australia and about making it easier for us 
to kick them out' (O'Malley, Jacobsen & Kennedy 2001 :3; Morris 
2001:8). Mr Carr's whistle was sounding the same note as Mr 
Howard's. 
While immigration policy and 'border defence' are federal 
responsibilities in Australia, law and order are by and large matters 
of state jurisdiction. State politics in Australia, especially in the 
leadup to elections, have been redolent in recent years of' law and 
order auctions'. New South Wales in late 2002-early 2003 had its 
third such election campaign in a row (Poynting 2002). Premier 
Bob Carr appears as attracted as Mr Howard by the campaign 
tactics of dog-whistling. He advocates tighter limits on immigration 
- ostensibly on environmental grounds. He vociferously opposes 
further expansion of Sydney through immigration - because of 
want of infrastructure and impact on amenity, he argues (Lipari & 
Skelsey 26/2/02:8; PM 25/11/02; Wainwright 26/11/02:4; Daily 
Telegraph 26/11/02:2). He names cultures and communities in 
association with criminal gangs or delinquent youth cultures: not 
blaming, he says, but facing stark reality and bravely standing up to 
the politically correct (e.g. Chulov 2001: 1). It goes down a treat in 
the tabloids and with the talkback populists whom he allows to vet 
his police ministers and his police commissioners (Wilkinson 21/11/ 
01;24/11/01). 
Dog-whistle journalism 
Meanwhile, there is some dog-whistling about cultural minorities in 
the tabloid press, with the shrill becoming deafening in subsequent 
reverberation on talkback, in letters columns and pay-as-you-voice 
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'vote-lines'.1 A seeming good news story about a Muslim women's 
gym, for example, provoked a predictable backlash from those who 
resent any space for the unassimilated (Murray & Morris 13/8/ 
02: 10; Daily Telegraph 16/8/02:26,23/8/02:22; Murray 22/8/02:21; 
Puplick 22/8/02:21). Why was it full-page news? Could it be just 
for that reason? The story was about a women's-only gymnasium 
in south-west Sydney which catered exclusively to Muslim women, 
as a place where they could exercise within the dress constraints 
of their culture without being made to feel uncomfortable or the 
objects of scrutiny. The proprietors had taken the precaution of 
checking their entry restrictions with the NSW Anti-Discrimination 
Board, which approved them (Murray & Morris 13/8/02: 10). The 
report was situated among strident stories about the heavy sen-
tencing of several of the much-publicised gang rapists, which made 
much of their Muslim background. A backlash followed, in talkback 
programs, opinion columns, letters pages. The story melded with 
another myth aired in dial-in and tabloid complaints, about a public 
swimming pool proposing to close to the public for several hours to 
allow for the exclusive use by an Islamic girls' school 'in all their 
clobber' (Alan Jones program 22/8/02, cited in Duffy 14/9/02a: 18; 
also in Media Watch 9111102 and Anti-Discrimination Board 
2003 :71). Despite school hire being a longstanding normal practice, 
the pool was forced by the furore to revoke its agreement with the 
school (Media Watch 9/11102). The Daily Telegraph 'Vote-line' 
for 14 September 2002 asked, 'The Anti-Discrimination Board has 
granted an exemption for a muslim (sic) women-only gym. Does 
this discriminate against others?' Some 471 replied 'Yes' and a 
mere 11 'No'. The question for the day, above this reported 98% 
to 2% breakdown, was: 'The ringleader of the south-west Sydney 
rape attacks has been sentenced to 55 years jail. Is this penalty too 
severe for his crimes?'. Was the juxtaposition a coincidence, or 
was there some dog-whistling involved? 
Another seeming success story, this one about halal ham-
burgers, in which there was nothing new at all, blew up into a 
major controversy. Why was it 'news' at this time? A rival fast 
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food chain has been serving halal food in the same Sydney 
neighborhood for several years. Nevertheless, an apparently positive 
article occupying most of a tabloid page in the Daily Telegraph 
was published in September 2002 (two days before the well-
publicised anniversary of the Islamic fundamentalist terror attacks), 
accompanied by a pleasant photograph of a smiling young woman 
eating one of the burgers in question: 'McDonald's is a mecca 
(sic) for Sydney Muslims' (Saleh & Hudson 2002: 11). Predictably, 
the letters pages resonated on following days with outrage about 
special provision for Muslims, lack of choice for non-Muslims (in a 
city with dozens of non-hala I outlets of the same 'family restaurant') 
and the prospect of being defiled by unwittingly eating food over 
which such heathen rites had been performed. The Daily Telegraph 
'Vote-line' for 11 September 2002 recorded that 75% of voting 
readers responded 'No' to the question: 'A McDonald's restaurant 
in Punchbowl now serves only halal meat in its burgers. Is this 
practice fair to other customers?' (Daily Telegraph 1119/02:33). 
The result was printed under the question for that memorable date: 
'Some readers are concerned about media coverage of the Sept-
ember 11 anniversary. Is it important to remember the tragedy?'. 
The momentous debate resounded for several days on talkback 
radio and in opinion columns, and numerous letters to the editor 
were positioned alongside those discussing the morality or otherwise 
of the sentence under Sharia law to death by stoning of a young 
Nigerian woman convicted of adultery. 
Another example is the report about a Muslim man suddenly 
threatened with the sack for praying at work, where he had 
previously done so without problems for many months. The story 
at first appeared sympathetic, but the paper could anticipate the 
response it would provoke from readers well primed for the game. 
'Stop praying or be sacked' (Denholm 10/10/02:3) appeared to 
take the part of the threatened worker, in a full-page article with 
coloured photographs of the man, in traditional garb, kneeling with 
the Koran in hand, and another picture of the man in the grounds at 
lunch hour, along with an unnamed woman co-religionist in hijab-
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the usual media cliche for Islam. Again followed the tirade ofletters 
to editors, of calls to the shockjocks, and a plethora of press articles 
both tabloid and broadsheet (see also Nixon 10/10102:3, 11110102:4; 
Karvelas 11110102:5, Daily Telegraph 14110102:17). Once again 
these were interspersed with reports about the gang rape sentences 
with headlines like' Wild Animal' (Knowles 11110102: I ; Illawarra 
Mercury 1111 0102: I). The Daily Telegraph 'Vote-line' reported 
on 12 October 2002 that 612 (87%) of readers' votes responded 
affirmatively to the question, 'A Muslim computer technician has 
been threatened with the sack for praying during working hours. Is 
his employer acting fairly?'. Only 88 (13%) answered 'No'. 
All this was before the Bali bombing. For about four years, 
Sydney has been treated to an irrational and ignorant, but powerful 
formula from populist columnists and opportunist politicians, equating 
terrorism, ethnic crime gangs, Islam, misogynist violent crime, 
Muslim ethnic-religious leaders, Middle-Eastern asylum seekers. 
This ideology is now becoming frenzied. The dog-whistling provokes 
racial vilification, which incites attacks. 
'The fire last time 
From early 1991 in the context of the Gulf War, there was an 
outbreak of racist hate crime in Australia against Arabs, Muslims, 
Or those who apparently seemed so to the attackers (Poynting 
2002b). The Hawke Government response urged 'tolerance' 
towards minorities under its policy of multiculturalism, though it did 
little to act effectively against racial vilification, and neither did 
state governments (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Com-
l11ission - hereafter 'HREOC' 1991; Newell 1990; Hage 1991). 
Many Muslim women wearing their hijab, or traditional 
headscarf, in public places, were assaulted, abused and had strangers 
of both genders, but usually men, grabbing at their scarves to tear 
them away. Most of the victims were not Iraqi; some were not 
even of Arab, but rather of South-East Asian background; but such 
Confusions of the object of racial hatred are not unusual in the 
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history of Australian racism. There was an outbreak of incidents 
of people in Islamic dress or of 'Middle Eastern appearance' being 
spat upon or more violently assaulted in the street, of incidents of 
arson, vandalism, threats, harassment and other racist attacks 
directed by 'white-thinking' people against these newly discovered 
enemies within. It was as if, as Ghassan Hage has recently put it, 
there were now manifold 'borders' internal to the nation rather 
than around its edges to be patrolled against the non-Christian, non-
western, 'third-world looking' outsiders who might endanger the 
good life from within (Hage 1998; 2002). The Prime Minister's 
appeal during the Gulf War for 'us' to be 'tolerant' only served to 
underline who was in a position to tolerate and who was to be 
magnanimously tolerated (or not) (Hage 1991). 'Tabloid' media, 
and especially their 'personalities' on commercial television and 
talkback radio, demanded that Arab-background migrant leaders 
declare their allegiance to Australia and that they simultaneously 
renounce and apologise for the evils of Saddam Hussein. 
Can these latter verbal attacks, these media discourses of what 
amount to racial vilification, be causally linked to the physical attacks 
just outlined? The case for such connections would be strengthened 
if a repeat cycle ofthis sort of media attack were accompanied by 
another round of racist hate crime in the streets, shops and 
workplaces. The case would be further fortified if similar ideological 
elements could be found between the attacks of the tabloid and 
talkback rants and the attacks of the street. If this similarity were 
repeated in more than one cycle of xenophobia and racism, then 
the case would be even stronger. All of these conditions obtained 
in Australia in 200 I - before and after the airborne terror of 11 
September. 
Having experienced the fire last time, the Community Relations 
Commission for a Multicultural New South Wales established a 
bilingual (English and Arabic) Anti-Racism Hotline as early as 12 
September 2001, to enable persons experiencing racial vilification 
to report such incidents and to be referred to other agencies as 
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appropriate. Already by the end of September, the Hotline had 
logged well over 300 calls (Brown 2001 :2); by the time it finished 
operation on 9 November, there were about 400 responses recorded. 
Another such Hotline was opened immediately after the Bali 
bombing in October 2002 (Community Relations Commission 2002). 
It needs to be recognised that the number of incidents actually 
tallied in this way is a measure only of the 'tip of the iceberg': 
those with knowledge ofthe Hotline and with the most motivation 
and means to complain. Other official bodies, such as the New 
South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB), also received and 
recorded a plethora of such complaints, and community org-
anisations, too, such as the Sydney-based Australian Arabic 
Communities Council (AACC) and the Lebanese Muslim 
Association kept logs of telephone and mail complaints of racist 
attacks. The Melbourne office of the Australian Arabic Council 
(AAC) has maintained a Racism Register since the time of the 
Gulf War, and also reported a rapid and twenty-fold rise in the rate 
of incidence of anti-Arab racial vilification immediately after 11 
September 2001. This organisation itself received ten threatening 
letters and 14 abusive telephone calls in just a few days following 
the plane attacks in the United States. One normally quiet community 
welfare office alone had 20-odd instances of racist harassment by 
phone (Australian Arabic Council 200 1). 
So just as during the Gulf War Arab and Muslim communities 
in particular experienced a marked rise in the incidence of racial 
harassment and attacks (HREOC 1991:362); community 
organisations across Australia reported a similar increase 
immediately after the airliner attacks in the United States on 11 
September and also after the bombing in Bali on 12 October 2002. 
This upsurge was widely reported in the media (Jopson 2001; Brown 
2001; PM200I; Burke 2001; Daily Telegraph 17110102:11; Lipari 
2002:6). In each case, there was an intensification of existing, 
ongoing and everyday forms and patterns of vilification. The AAC's 
records of an increase of twenty times virtually overnight indicates 
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an existing base level of incidence of such attacks and an underlying 
tendency waiting for an immediate cause to realise it. The range of 
types of racist attack, moreover, remains continuous: only the 
intensity surges. 
The pattern repeated 
At the time of the Gulf War, the brunt of racial attacks was dis-
proportionately borne by women, notably Muslim women and girls 
wearing the hijab (Newell 1990:21 ). This pattern continued following 
the events of September 2001 and October 2002 (Burke & AAP 
2001:8; Rath 2001; Jopson 2001:18; Daily Telegraph 16/9101:9; 
Daily Telegraph 26111/01:13; AACC Racism Register 2001; 
Poynting 2002; Donald 21111102). For instance, a middle-aged 
housewife recorded on the Australian Arabic Communities Council 
Racism Register on 17 September 2001 an attack by 'a group of 
Australians' on her and her daughter in a south-west Sydney 
supermarket: 
She had the veil taken off her and her daughter's head. Then 
[they] had dragged both of them to the floor and beaten them 
up, at the same time yelling obscenities. The daughter's arm 
was broken (AACC Racism Register 200 1). 
A number of the recent attacks were explicitly sexualised, involving, 
for example, indecent exposure and offensive sexual suggestions. 
For example, on 17 September in a south-west suburb of Sydney a 
young 'Australian' male on a bicycle confronted S, a woman, 
between 45 and 60 years old, wearing hijab: 
She was coming back from the shop when she was stopped by 
someone on a bike. He asked her a question, which she thought 
he is asking her about a place. She referred him to the shop, 
then he said, 'What I want is to fuck you', and he showed her 
his penis. The woman now [finds it] difficult to go outside the 
house. (AACC Racism Register). 
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HREOC (1991:362) notes that, in 1991, 'There were also reports 
of violence and harassment against people of Middle Eastern origin 
who are neither Arab or Muslim'. The recent round of attacks 
included assaults on people who were neither, such as Sikh men 
wearing turbans; and others who were not Muslim, such as painted 
swastikas and racist graffiti and arson attacks on Orthodox Christian 
churches that bore signs in Arabic script such as in Western 
Sydney's Merrylands (Rath 2001; Daily Telegraph 14/9/01 :8). In 
Lidcombe, a Russian Orthodox church was vandalised with racist 
slogans, according to the Telegraph (15/9/01: 1 0). 
Schools, places of worship, workplaces, shops and streets were 
all sites of racist attack. Vilification came by internet as well as 
radio, telephone and mail. A busload of Muslim schoolchildren was 
attacked with stones and bottles in Brisbane. An Islamic school in 
Adelaide at first hired 24-hour security guards and later was forced 
to close down for about a fortnight (ABC 12/9/01; Phillips 2001; 
PM 14/9/01). A school in Melbourne's south-east was graffitied 
with 'death to Muslim scum', and a 16 year old male student was 
verbally threatened there. The AAC's Racism Register records 
that a schoolboy was set upon by 3 men 'of Australian descent' 
aged 20-25, and had his legs slashed and was punched and kicked 
while racist abuse was shouted at him (AAC 2001). Australia was 
far from unique in this respect: five schoolchildren with Arab-
sounding names were assaulted in Oakville, Ontario, for example; 
and Kuwaiti embassy workers had to counsel terrified Kuwaiti 
children subjected to vilification in schools across the United States. 
A mosque was subjected to an arson attack in Kuraby, Queensland. 
Another mosque in Mirrabooka, Western Australia, was defiled 
with human excrement (Burke & AAP 2001 :8; AAP 13/9/01). 
Some 1000 worshippers were evacuated from a Turkish mosque 
in western Sydney's Auburn after a bomb threat on 14 September 
(Daily Telegraph 15/9/01: 10). Similar attacks on mosques were 
also occurring overseas: incendiaries were also thrown at mosques 
in Chicago and Montreal (Guardian Unlimited 13/9/01 ; PM 14/9/ 
01). While George Bush visited a Washington mosque 'to calm 
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anti-Muslim sentiment', and Prince Charles later did the same in 
east London, Prime Minister John Howard declared himself 'too 
busy' to accept an invitation to a mosque in Sydney2 (Clark 2001 :2; 
Sunday Telegraph 25111/01 :89). Like former Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke who had called for (White Australian) tolerance towards 
Arab Australians during the Gulf War, Mr Howard 'appealed to 
Australians to show tolerance to Australian-Lebanese and other 
people of Arab heritage in their midst' (Grattan 2001 :6). 
The Internet was not immune from anti-Muslim and anti-Arab 
racism. In a discriminatory (and probably illegal) reaction to the 
political climate, a number of private sector employers proscribed 
Muslim employees from sending or receiving emails in Arabic and 
from accessing Arabic websites (Daily Telegraph 9/1 % 1 :7). By 
20 September, the level of racial hatred expressed on 'Sydney's 
most trafficked Web site', Ninemsm, became so intense that its 
online discussion board was closed down, though a censored 
condolence book remained available (Needham 2001 :3). 
The spate of racist attacks continued long after September 
2001. For example, the Melbourne Magistrate's Court was told 
that on 6 March 2002 a South Yarra man had threatened a Muslim 
taxi driver with a 26 cm knife and forced him to drive around 
Melbourne while he scolded him over his religion and the September 
11 attacks (Calvert 2002). It bears repeating that this outbreak of 
racial vilification was but an upsurge, albeit a dramatic one, against 
a background of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racist attacks that 
existed in Australia well before 11 September. As Ghassan Hage 
(2001 :241-2) puts it, with the recent racism directed at Middle 
Eastern 'boat people' and so-called 'Lebanese rapist gangs', 
"'September 11" happened right after "June, July and August 11, 
12 and 13"'. 
Again after the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, mosques 
were attacked in Australia; a Muslim cleric in western Sydney 
was even besieged in his house by an angry and violent mob 
(Cameron 16/10/02:3). The office of a Liberal-voting, cricket-
playing, small businessman Muslim Australian of Tanzanian origin 
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suffered a smashed window, and his household was the subject of 
an arson episode after he applied to build an Islamic meeting hall in 
middle-class Baulkham Hills (Cameron 28/11102). 
Women in hijab were once more singled out for assault and 
vilification (Daily Telegraph 17/10102; Sydney Morning Herald 
1711 0102; Donald 21111102). A letter-writer to the Sydney Morning 
Herald, M Ferrie, recounted: 
I was on the train when the peace was suddenly shattered. 
From the other end ofthe carriage a booming male voice was 
verbally abusing someone at length, apparently blaming him, 
or her, for the bombing in Bali ... When I went to get off the 
train, there, in the end compartment, was a young woman, 
trembling, and being studiously ignored by the other pas-
sengers. She was wearing a headscarf (17/10/02: 16). 
The vilifiers included fundamentalist Christian MP, Rev. Fred Nile, 
who even proposed in the NSW Parliament that women be banned 
from wearing the Islamic head-to-toe chador in public gatherings, 
to prevent the possibility of concealing terrorist weapons (AM 211 
11102; ABC News Online; PM 21111102; Riley & Burke 22/111 
02: 1). ABC journalist Annie White suggested that shopping-centre 
santas might share the same fate (PM 21111102). Nile later said 
that only 'extremist' and not 'normal' Muslim women wore the 
chador (Riley 23-24/11/02:10). One Nation MP David Oldfield 
joined the controversy, objecting to the presence of a veiled woman 
in the public gallery of the NSW Parliament, and calling for body 
searches of women in such traditional dress (Homery & Wyld 251 
11102: 18). ABC reporter, Annie White (P M21111102; see also Riley 
23-24/11/02:10; Howard 21110102) recorded Prime Minister 
Howard's dog-whistling 'apparent equivocation' thus: 
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JOHN HOWARD: I don't have a clear response to what Fred's 
put, I mean I like Fred, and I don't always agree with him, but 
you know, Fred speaks for the views of a lot of people. 
On the other hand, I feel it's very important at the moment that 
the Islamic people don't feel they're being singled out. 
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The Sydney Morning Herald's front page the following day (Riley 
& Burke 22/11102:1) reported more equivocation from the PM's 
press office, 'clarifying' that Mr Howard 'neither ruled in his support 
[for the ban] nor ruled it out' . 
'The PM stole my boat people' 
We have discussed in Chapter One the moral panic about 'boat 
people' which reached a crescendo in 2001 with the 'Tampa Crisis' . 
Here dog-whistle politics came to the fore. On the day the Tampa 
departed from Australian waters, an 'e-talk' letter to the editor of 
the Telegraph by a reader from Queensland quipped, 'Sorry, 
Pauline, we don't need you any more, John Howard is doing your 
job' (Daily Telegraph 4/9/01: 19). 
The One Nation party founded by Pauline Hanson espouses a 
zero nett migration policy and links this ideologically with stopping 
illegal immigration: 
Economically immigration is unsustainable and socially, if 
continued as is, will lead to an ethnically divided Australia. 
Current policy is encouraging large numbers of illegal migrants 
and it is time Australia, while recognising the contribution made 
by migrants in the past, send to the world the message that 
mass immigration has passed its use by date (Pauline Hanson's 
One Nation 2001). 
One Nation and their supporters oppose immigration by those who 
are not 'assimilable'; they rail against immigrants who keep to 
themselves, remain different and form enclaves in 'ethnic ghettoes'. 
They claim that immigration produces increases in crime, that many 
immigrants are lawless, and that alien lawbreakers should be 
deported: 
It is no good having a rich country if it is falling apart because 
of violence, gang warfare and ethnic separatism. We do not 
want little ethnic islands separated from the rest of the Australian 
community. We do want migrants who can integrate into 
Australian society, not congregate in just a few areas. 
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If I am allowed to decide who can come into my home, we 
Australians should be allowed to decide who can come and 
live in our country.3 Migrant crime gangs have flourished over 
the last 20 years, with drugs and money laundering, something 
we rarely used to hear about. 
00. The present situation is just not good enough. Criminals 
convicted of serious crimes should be deported if not Australian 
citizens and, if they are, there should be harsher penalties to 
deter this sort of crime (Hanson 1996). 
It is One Nation policy that refugees be offered only temporary 
protection, rather than given the right to immigrate (Pauline Hanson's 
One Nation 2001). Amnesty International argued in 1999 that the 
federal government's Border Protection Bill and new refugee visa 
regulations introduced atthis time in fact 'mirror 00' Pauline Hanson's 
policies and receive the support of the Opposition and the press' 
(Head 1999). Robert Manne (10/6/02: 15) likewise refers to the 
government's temporary protection visa policy as 'Hanson inspired'. 
During the 2001 election campaign, Ms Hanson herself claimed 
that the Prime Minister had embraced her policies (Scott 3111 0/ 
01: 10), in turning away boats of asylum-seekers and sending 'boat 
people' to other countries: 
I am pleased to see they have listened to what I've been saying. 
00' A lot of people are actually saying I'm John Howard's adviser 
because he's picking up a lot of the policies and issues I have 
raised and spoken about over the years (ClenneII 2001). 
Howard wanted to whistle up support from One Nation supporters; 
in fact, he probably shares many of their views. Certainly, in 
defending Pauline Hanson's right to make racist public statements, 
he has called them 'an accurate reflection of what people feel' 
(cited by Kitney 23-24/11102: 1 0). Notwithstanding the recent media 
opprobrium when an Opposition spokesman recalled the matter to 
public attention (Kitney 22/11/02: 13), John Howard in 1988 
deliberately made controversial comments about too much Asian 
immigration to Australia. As Laurie Oakes (13/11/01: 18) reminds 
us, Howard himself devised the slogan 'One Australia' long before 
Pauline Hanson's 'One Nation', and stated at a Young Liberal 
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conference in 1988: 'Our national interest will be served by a 
migration program which preserves and promotes the unity and 
cohesion of Australian society'. Only recently, Howard declared 
that immigrants 'must understand that when they come to Australia, 
they make a decision to accept, they can't cherry pick the Australian 
way oflife' (Banham 25111/02:4). While Howard sought to gamer 
the votes of One Nation sympathisers, he could not afford to aliepate 
those of well-meaning white liberals (nor the 'ethnic vote') by 
explicitly and unambiguously espousing the views which Pauline 
Hanson expresses. His response to them, therefore, was akin to 
that of a rightwing talkback radio announcer when taking an on-air 
call from a rabid racist: allowing them to rave on radio and then 
(ever so slightly, equivocally) distancing himself by declaring the 
views interesting, not ones that all would share, of course, but ones 
strongly and sincerely held by many in the community who have a 
right to express them (Media Report 7/11102). Dog-whistle politics 
and dog-whistle journalism go hand in glove. 
'Jihad declared on Australia' 
On I November 200 1, during the US/uK bombardment of Afghan-
istan, a persistent Australian reporter goaded the Taliban ambassador 
to Pakistan into saying that Australia would be included in their 
holy war being declared on their attackers. (Some days earlier, the 
same spokesman had scoffed at the suggestion that Australian 
involvement had any importance, remarking that the superpower 
arraigned against his country hardly needed such help.) In the federal 
election campaign becoming coloured 'khaki' (Hogg 2002; Simms 
2002:99-103), this became front-page fodder for the tabloids and a 
fillip for the campaign of the incumbent government (McPhedran 
2111/01: 1). The same page one of the Daily Telegraph which bore 
the headline, 'Jihad declared on Australia', also had the headline, 
'Suspected terror camp raided in NSW'. Now 'we' were at war, 
there was also an enemy within (Callinan, Targett & Marx 2111/ 
01:3). 
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Divided or questionable loyalties can become tantamount to 
treason in times of war or crisis. Over a decade ago, during the 
Gulf War, there was widespread popular worrying about whether 
'we' had traitors in our midst. Saddam Hussein was the then current 
'face of evil', before most Australians had heard of Osama bin 
Laden, and many national worriers held fears that Iraqi immigrants 
- or perhaps all Arabs? - or was it Muslims? - in Australia 
were harbouring secret support or sympathy for the enemy: a fifth 
column allowed in by non-European and non-Christian immigration 
and indulged by multiculturalism. Arab Australian community leaders 
had microphones shoved in their faces by self-righteous media 
'personalities' , accompanied by demands that they pledge their true 
allegiance to Australia and give such commitment on behalf of 
their communities. And the more the well-tamed of the community 
leaders performed this trick, and the ratbag misfit ones rejected 
the demands, the more white-thinking Australians just knew there 
was ingratitude, disloyalty and indeed treachery in these com-
munities. Iraqi, Arab, Muslim: it doesn't much matter in the confused 
logic of racism. 
Such media vilification virtually demands heavy-handed action 
by the State against the 'enemy within' (Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies 1982:23), and incites vigilante style violence and 
individual acts of racist hatred. At the same time, the State's 
repressive measures invite 'where there's smoke there's fire' 
arguments: why should people object to covert surveillance, ongoing 
harassment, secret police, heavily armed dawn raids, and the like, 
for 'our' protection, if they have nothing to hide? Moreover, State 
terror of this sort seems to be interpreted by outraged pikestaffers 
as some sort of moral licence for their own violent racial attacks. 
In late September 2001, the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), accompanied by the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) and NSW police with 'intimate local knowledge', raided 
30-odd suburban households and workplaces in south-western 
Sydney. Some of the families raided stated that they brought the 
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media with them (Trad 2001; Kidman 30/9/01 :4-5). Certainly, the 
front page of the Sun-Herald of 30 September had a large front-
page colour photograph taken over a suburban paling fence of such 
a raid being conducted, with two uniformed federal policemen talking 
to a man and a woman, apparently residents, while a man in a dark 
suit talked on a mobile phone. The page carried the banner, 'War 
on Terror Exclusive' and the headline, 'Sydney raid: Suburban home 
searched as ASIO and police hunt Bin Laden connections' (Sun-
Herald 30/9/01: 1). The faces of the residents and the besuited 
officer were pixelled out, but not in the identical but smaller 
photograph, which additionally identified the suburb, accompanying 
Miranda Devine's column in the same newspaper on 11 November. 
Headed 'Where security counts, tolerance goes two ways', this 
opinion piece encouraged Muslims to cooperate with authorities in 
'having to contend with their homes being invaded at dawn by 
armed police' for it 'helps make us all a little safer' (Devine 11/111 
01:28). 
Devine explains eloquently why it is those targeted who must 
pay 'the price of such vigilance'. Citizenship does not go 'two 
ways': 
The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were young 
Middle-Eastern Muslim men. Bin Laden's followers are young 
Middle-Eastern Muslim men. So it is young men of Middle-
Eastern Muslim background who will be targeted in Sydney, 
many ofthem Australian citizens, who were born here (Devine 
llIIllO 1 :28). 
Whatever other purposes were intended, the raids were clearly 
meant to be a public gesture. They were also plainly designed to 
intimidate. In one case, 'five heavily armed officers stormed the 
house', forced a man to lie on the floor at gunpoint, and conducted 
a body search. His wife was escorted downstairs by a male and a 
female AFP officer, without time to cover her body adequately 
according to her religion. The house was thoroughly searched. The 
man was told, 'You have small children, you would not like for 
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them to not see you for ten years'. (Another man was similarly 
told, 'You have a beautiful daughter, I believe that you want to 
keep your daughter happy'). He was told that they would be back 
and would be searching again. The family was traumatised by the 
incident. The photograph of the wife appeared in the newspaper, 
and the couple found this picture stuck on their window, and the 
windows of their house were spat upon over the next few days. At 
the time of the interview, they were seeking to rent a house 
elsewhere, but fearful of not being able to do so, now that their 
pictures had been published in the press (Trad 2001). 
The Sun-Herald, in pages tagged with the 'war on terror' 
caption, dutifully characterised the raids as 'the first proof that the 
US's global anti-terrorist campaign has reached Australian shores' 
(Kidman 30/9/0 1 :4). The reporter affirmed that his newspaper was 
on hand to observe one of the raids at a home unit in Lakemba. 
The woman resident, a mother of two young children, complained 
(as did others raided) that a gun was put to her head and she was 
made to lie on the floor. She said 'police turned the residence "upside 
down" and interrogated her in front of her family'. 'Senior govern-
ment staff' denied that the firearm had been 'used' (Kidman 30/9/ 
01:4; ABC News Online 2/10/01). The Sunday Telegraph added 
that the raids were 'backed by armed teams ofthe State Protection 
Group' and that there were dozens such raids around the country 
(Watson 200 1: 15). The article was similarly signposted, 'War against 
terror', accompanied by a little picture of the United States flag. 
The reasons people were targeted for the raids, apart from 
the 'ethnic profiling' suggested by Devine, may have included, 
according to those raided in various cases: spending two and a half 
months in Pakistan the previous year when returning from a haj; 
spending five months at a Qur'an school in Pakistan many years 
ago when learning the Book by heart, not having left Australia 
since; travelling to Syria to visit a sick father after his stroke six 
weeks earlier, and staying for one week, not having exited Australia 
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for years prior to this; and simply being active in Muslim organisations 
(including youth organisations) and having to answer questions about 
whether one could fly a plane or had studied aviation (neither of 
which was the case) (Trad 2001; Daily Telegraph 5/1 % 1 :9). 
Some two years later, there has not been a single arrest or 
charge arising from these raids. Computers, papers, bank records, 
passports and mobile phones were confiscated. Cash was also 
taken. None of these was returned, and officials do not answer 
phone calls at the number they left (Trad 2001; Kremmer 2002). In 
terms of intelligence-gathering, such methods can only be seen as 
ham-fisted. In terms of intimidation, social control, repression, they 
may well prove quite functional. One ASIO officer left an inter-
rogated man a card with a contact name and number, in case he 
should come by 'any information as to who is behind the bombing'. 
This was after his home was 'visited' and he was obliged to be 
interviewed at his workplace in front of colleagues, during which 
interview his daughter was mentioned in what the man took to be 
thinly disguised threats. One Muslim community member, after his 
home was raided, said to the ASIO officer, ' I thought you had 
come to discuss ways to protect the Muslim community, as the 
Muslim community has been attacked, mosques have been damaged 
... ' and so on. The officer replied that this was a secondary concern 
(Trad 2001). 
'This is going to exacerbate problems the community has been 
facing since the terrorist attacks', said Ahmad Ali Mehboob, Chief 
Executive of the Australian Federation ofIslamic Councils (Labi 
2001:3); and so it did. 
'Hunt for faces of terror' 
On 30 October 2002, eighteen days after the Bali bombings, ASIO 
and Australian federal police operatives again conducted a series 
of raids on a score of suburban homes of Muslim citizens - this 
time mainly Australians ofIndonesian origin in Sydney, Perth and 
Melbourne (Karvelas & Chulov 30/1 0/02; Dunn 1111102; Powell 
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& Chulov 31/10/02: 1; Morris & Cameron 31/ 10/02: 1; Morris, 
Cameron & Cornford 1111/02:7; Banham 1111102: 1). Under coloured 
identification drawings of suspects in the Kuta attacks, the 
Australian had the front-page headline, 'Hunt for faces of terror' , 
followed by 'ASIO raids target 11 sleeper cell' (Powell & Chulov 
3111 0/02: 1). Perhaps 'sleepers' are families who are slumbering in 
bed at Sam when the security organisation and police break down 
their doors and burst in with machine-guns. Certainly, as with the 
2001 raids, there have (at least 11 months later, as this book goes to 
press) been no charges laid and no arrests made on terrorism-
related matters - though there was an arrest over a visa 
infringement. Neighbours of one home raided at dawn in Perth's 
working-class suburb of Thornlie reported the timber door being 
splintered with sledge hammers and windows being smashed by a 
gun-bearing squad wearing black helmets, balaclavas, goggles and 
flak jackets, issuing from two four-wheel drive vehicles (Daily 
Telegraph 31/10/02:7). A 17 year old, whose home in Perth was 
invaded, told of the trauma she experienced along with her three 
brothers and sisters, one only four years old, who 'saw balaclava-
clad officers thrust their machine guns in [their] faces' (Dunn 31/ 
10/02): 
We heard windows breaking, including my bedroom window, 
we were all sleeping when these men with sub-machineguns 
came barging into our house ... They pushed my dad on to the 
floor, they handcuffed him and one of the police officers stepped 
on his ear and told him not to move, he cannot hear properly 
out of that ear. They grabbed my mum, they told us to get on 
the floor and pointed guns at us' (Yulyani Suparta, cited in 
Dunn 3 1/10/02). 
In a simultaneous operation in Sydney's Belmore, some fifteen 
operatives confiscated mobile phones, computers, disks, passports, 
bank statements, and personal documents such as marriage and 
birth certificates, just as in the raids the previous year, along with 
- bizarrely - a copy of the Daily Telegraph reporting the Bali 
172 
Dog-whistle politics, 
attack (Morris & Rowlands 31/10/02:7). One Sydney family was 
'effectively held prisoner for five hours' (ABC News Online 31/ 
10/02) according to those held captive. In bursting into the home of 
a businessman in Greenacre in south-west Sydney, one of the agents 
said to him, 'You are one of 11'. The man said that he had not 
heard of Jemaah Islamiah, the group being blamed for the Bali 
terrorist attacks, until the Kuta nightclub bombings occurred. ASIO 
seized computers, documents and business records (Morris, 
Cameron & Cornford 1111/02:7). A man whose home in Sydney's 
south-western Lakemba was also raided by some fifteen officers 
with guns and a sledgehammer, said that he had no connections 
whatever with Jemaah Islamiah though he had attended two or 
three speeches made by alleged 11 leader in Sydney (Karvelas 311 
10/02:7; Morris & Rowlands 31/10/02:7). ABC Radio's AM 
program (31/10/02) reported that 'What appears to have been a 
key to the raids .,. is that men in the target families had been to 
lectures given by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader 
of Jemaah Islamiah, suspected in the Bali bombing'. 
The front page of the Sydney Morning Herald of 5 Novem-
ber had an article telling how the previous week's security service 
and federal police raids were justified by the seizure of the Muslim 
equivalent of a parish newsletter denouncing Hollywood and 
promiscuity, laden with double meanings and expressing sympathy 
towards Osama bin Laden (Morris & Thompson 5111/02: 1). The 
newsletter was called Al Haq which 'translates as Truth'. So, 
incidentally, did Pravda. Just as many labelled as 'communists' 
and 'fellow travellers' during the Cold War had not the slightest 
connection with the Communist Party nor with Stalinism, so not 
everyone branded a Muslim terrorist (or terrorist supporter or 
sympathiser) will prove to be one. Most will not, as in the armed 
ASIO raids in western Sydney over a year earlier, when citizens 
were forced to the floor and had guns pointed at their heads - a 
perfectly proportionate precaution, some will say, in the 'war on 
terror', a small price (for others) to pay for the defence offreedom, 
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civilisation and democracy. Nevertheless, the suppression of 
'terrorists' serves an important function in the maintenance ofthe 
prevailing hegemony. The effect goes well beyond those raided. It, 
too, is a form of terror, as is the gentler form of persuasion in the 
form of fear of the ubiquitous enemy, propagated by the repressive 
arm of the State and purveyed by its ideological apparatuses, above 
all the mogul-dominated media and those who mirror them. 
The Moir cartoon in the Sydney Morning Herald of 1 
November makes the point eloquently. A family is in bed as the 
security forces break in with sledgehammers and automatic 
weapons; 'Don't be alarmed', their leader shouts. The cartoon is 
captioned, 'Terrorism in Australia'. 
As with the raids of the previous year, the widely publicised 
appearance of strong and decisive action seems to have been a 
major goal of the State forces in these swoops. The President of 
the Council for Civil Liberties, Terry O'Gorman, said: 
F or police and ASIO to tum up in combat gear, heavily armed, 
breaking open gates and so on is simply a stunt ... There is 
absolutely no justification for the public way in which this raid 
was done (ABC News Online 31110/02). 
Intimidation of the communities concerned was certainly a major 
function of the action. According to the Age (1111102), Muslim 
leaders said the raids had 'caused hysteria and fear that anyone in 
the community could be targeted'. The Age quoted Sheikh Fehmi 
Naji, Imam of Preston Mosque, as saying that many Muslims were 
upset about the blaming of their community. 
Governments - federal and state - were unapologetic. 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, for example, said in an ABC 
Radio interview: 
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Well, obviously most Muslim homes in Australia are not going 
to be raided. I mean there are hundreds of thousands of Muslims 
in Australia. This won't affect hundreds ofthousands of people. 
There are a handful of people that the intelligence services, the 
police have some particular concerns about and you've got to 
remember that we have now proscribed in Australia Jemaah 
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Islamiah and where there might be links with an organisation 
like that, we have just got to, in the interests of the country's 
security, do what we can. If you know that there is a threat to 
security, or you're worried that there might be a threat to 
security, you can't just tum your back on it and ignore it. You 
have to be effective, maybe even a little ruthless in addressing 
it, you really must. It's all been done within our law and well I 
think the Australian public expect us to be tough on the iss~e 
of security and we are being (AM 1111102). 
Though these state actions were claimed to be within existing law, 
federal and state governments saw the need for further legislation 
effecting anti-terrorist measures. The Australian Security Intel-
ligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002 provides for the capacity hitherto unknown under Australian 
Commonwealth law to arrest a person merely for interrogation. 
According to Justice John Dowd, a judge in the Supreme Court of 
NSW, people could be held for a maximum of seven days under 
the pending new legislation, and when released, 'can be detained 
on a new warrant as they stand in the lobby ofthe building as they 
leave' (Lateline 26/11102a). The whole family of a 'person who 
may have information that may assist in preventing terrorist attacks 
or in prosecuting those who have committed a terrorist offence' 
could be detained in this manner (Sydney Morning Herald 28/111 
02: 12; Lateline 26111102a). 'People of interest' may be so held for 
a week under the legislation, without charge, without legal 
representation, without appearing in court, and without the right of 
silence (Morris 27/11/02:9; Lateline 26111/02b). The 'safeguards' 
regarding the issue of warrants were virtually valueless, in Dowd's 
experience: 
All of the so-called safeguards are there means it doesn't mean 
to need a very intelligent officer of ASIO to put together a 
case, quite well meaning. It may well be that he or she believes 
the material that's put before them to put out a case for a warrant 
to be issued ... they almost invariably are, not always (Late line 
26/11102a). 
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Justice Dowd argued that in 'an atmosphere of hysteria " 'Muslims 
stood to become the first victims of the new laws' (Morris 27/111 
02:9). Terry o 'Gorman, of the Australian Council for Civil Liberties, 
concurred: 
I think there's a very big risk that there'l1 be racial stereotyping 
in respect of these new ASIO laws. Keep in mind the warrants 
are not issued by a court. They're issued by the Attorney-
General, who's a politician (Lateline 26/11/02b). 
Similar and related legislation was introduced in the NSW Parliament 
by the Labor government of Bob Carr. This politician responded to 
the criticism of the civil libertarians and the International Commission 
of Jurors represented by John Dowd: 'Can't John Dowd get it into 
his thick head that Bali occurred, that we have a problem here, that 
these threats are real?' (Lateline 26111102b). Of course, conserva-
tive newspaper columnist, Miranda Devine (28111102: 13), chimed 
in: 
The way some people in Australia have been carrying on about 
new anti-terrorism laws you would think our government is 
more of a threat to the citizenry than the terrorists who murdered 
more than 80 Australians in Bali. For civil libertarians, human 
rights groups, lawyers and assorted interest groups, it is as if 
Bali and September 11 never happened. 
Innocent Muslims targeted as terrorists (and terrorist supporters 
and sympathisers) would just have to bear the imposition on their 
human rights for the good of 'us' all, argued Devine, just as she 
had after the previous year's raids4 (Devine 11111101). 
Premier Carr, however, prefers to dog-whistle the same tune 
at a higher, more subtle pitch. Thus he equivocates: 
Mr Carr warned against isolating the Australian Muslim 
community. He said making the Islamic community, particularly 
young people, feel isolated, would 'produce conditions of 
paranoia' which would produce 'a recruiting ground for 
extremists' (Banham 1/11/02:7). 
At the same time, he endorsed the raids: 'I think ASIO and the 
Federal Police would be criticised if they weren't investigating 
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people with alleged [Jemaah Islamiah] links. I feel somewhat 
reassured that they've done that ... ' (Banham 1111102:7). ASIO 
are not targeting Muslims; they are targeting terrorists: just as the 
cops are not targeting Lebanese; they are targeting criminals. 
Mr Carr announced that Australians with 'suspicious lifestyles' 
ought to expect attention from the State's security apparatus. Civil 
liberties would have to be sacrificed. Those who had written pam-
phlets praising bin Laden or had published web sites bearing his 
picture ought to be under investigation. Yet, the Telegraph put it 
well: 'Mr Carr warned against singling out Muslim Australians for 
the wave of terror'. Because of respect for their human rights, 
their civil liberties? No: 'Because that will drive young Muslims 
over time into the hands of extremists' (English & Morris 201111 
02:5). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced a number of cycles of attacks on Muslim 
and Middle-Eastern background people in Australia. These included 
racist media panics which criminalise whole communities, racist 
vilification for political advantage, physical assaults and property 
damage such as arson which are arguably provoked by the fore-
going, and police and security service raids which trample on civil 
rights, just as the human rights of refugees are being quashed with 
the aid of cynical political opportunism and the manipulation of the 
media. 
The burden ofthis chapter has been to demonstrate the common 
ideological patterns and to infer the existence of causal connections, 
however complex, multi-causal and indirect, between populist politics 
exploiting xenophobia; in symbiosis with manipulated and largely 
supine media; and repressive arms of the state responding to and 
dependent upon both of these. Thus raids at dawn are conducted 
by secret services in conjunction with tabloid journalists. Politically 
opportunist and sensationalist paper-selling 'attacks' in headlines 
lead to and give ideological licence to racist attacks in shops, streets 
and workplaces. Both these types of attack took place in Australia 
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before 11 September 2001, which marked but a dramatic upsurge 
in such incidents. Nor was this the first such rise. The recurrence 
after 12 October 2002, sadly, will not be the last. 
Notes 
1 Indeed, according to the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, 
talkback racism targeting Muslims has been so prevalent since 
11 September 2001, that there has been a marked decrease in 
anti-semitic racism on the airwaves, with Muslims bearing the 
brunt of radio racism (Burke 25111102: 5). 
2 Some five weeks after September 11, however, on the very day 
he announced Australia's joining the military intervention in 
Afghanistan, the Prime Minister did belatedly visit the Preston 
mosque in Victoria, 'to extend the hand of "Australian mateship" 
to a community under siege' (Gordon 7111102). There he told 
Sheikh Al Imam that Australians 'have no argument with his 
community' (PMI7/10/01). 
3 Compare John Howard's slogan during the 2001 election 
campaign: 'We will decide who comes to this country and the 
circumstances in which they come'. 
4 Devine used here exactly the same logic that she had earlier 
deployed when she argued that whole Muslim communities 
blamed for rapes in which they had no part, had to accept the 
shame for the good of 'us' all: 
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Yes, it is unfair that the vast bulk of law-abiding Lebanese 
Muslim boys and men should be smeared by association. 
But their temporary discomfort may be necessary so that the 
powerful social tool of shame is applied to the families and 
communities that nurtured the rapists, gave them succour 
and brought them up with such hatred of Australia's domi-
nant culture and contempt for its women (Devine 1417/02: 15). 
6 
'Our shame': 
ethnic community leadership and self-criminalisation 
In the first two chapters of this book we analysed the construction 
of an 'Arab Other' in contemporary Australian political discourse 
and media representations. This involved not just the conflation of 
diverse groups into a homogeneous category, but also the racial-
isation of crime and the criminalisation of the various cultures seen 
to be described by that category. These processes rested on a 
perception that crime and violence are an endemic, even pathological 
feature of those cultures. In previous chapters we saw how this 
frame was largely shared even by sympathetic accounts of the 
situation of young non-English speaking background people, and 
how it informed 'good news' stories through what has been called 
'dog-whistling', which we extended to include media discussion. 
We have not said much, however, about how communities of Arab 
or Middle Eastern or Muslim ancestry responded to this 
construction. In exploring how criminal acts of specific individuals 
and groups become emblematic of whole ethnic communities, a 
central facet must be the ways those communities, and especially 
their leaders, respond to and negotiate the symbolic processes at 
work. This chapter is a case study ofthe responses by the political, 
religious and cultural leaders of the various Arab or Muslim groups, 
and especially what is seen to be the 'Lebanese community' and 
their role in the criminalisation process in the years since the killing 
of Edward Lee in south-west Sydney in October 1998. 
Constructing an Other, like any form of symbolic practice, is 
never just a case of ideological representation; it involves addres-
sing particular groups of people. An act of representation - as an 
act of communication - speaks to a certain type of reader or 
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viewer in its mode of address, as contemporary communication 
and media theory has demonstrated. Yet in the act of addressing 
them, a message implicitly inscribes specific subjects in which 
certain readers or viewers recognise themselves, it hails them, it 
gets their attention and draws them into the act of communication. 
In doing this, it calls them into being. The mechanism of this process 
is best described by the concept of interpellation introduced by 
Louis Althusser (1971), and widely deployed since then in cultural 
analysis. Interpellation is basically a communicative act that involves 
the positioning of a person or a group of persons in a particular 
power location and the construction of their subjectivity according 
to the interest of the interpellator (or interpellating discourse). If 
the interpellator is a representative of the dominant social order, its 
terms of interpellating subordinate groups will be subservient to the 
interest of that order. 
A problem with Althusser's notion of interpellation, however, 
is that it does not deal with the process whereby social actors 
respond to the act of interpellation - in Althusser's theory it is 
required structurally, so it tends to be assumed. There is, of course, 
no guarantee that the 'right' person will receive the message, and 
there is no guarantee that they will 'decode' it in the way that the 
message is intended. However, the inscription of a reader or viewer 
tends to circumscribe the kinds of messages received, and circum-
scribes the extent to which these messages can be accepted, 
negotiated or opposed (Hall 1993). In a complex, mediated culture 
like Australia's, different audiences process the same coded 
message in different ways. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
construction of an Arab Other is largely directed towards a white 
community, tapping deep reservoirs of racism. However, these 
representations also address the communities that are being 
imagined, and especially their political and cultural leaders. 
We argue that, in responding to the ways they are interpellated 
by political and media discourses during the 'ethnic gang' crisis 
and the recent local and international events discussed in this book, 
leading members of Lebanese communities participated, by and 
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large, in the processes of racialisation and criminalisation. There 
was no single response, of course,just as there is no single 'Lebanese 
community'. As we have shown elsewhere, this 'community' and 
its leadership are themselves fashioned in response to the socio-
cultural, economic and political forces at play in Australia, and 
especially in relation to the structures of political patronage that 
emerge out of the model of multiculturalism arising from the Galbally 
Report in Australia in the 1970s. Fundamental to the recent 
experience of this 'community' and its leaders was a sense of 
victimisation which allowed for a 'community of suffering' to arise 
as a rallying point and point of resistance. At the same time, this 
network of alliances is strung across significant differences - of 
national, regional and cultural origin, religion, class and political 
allegiance - and is also caught in the paradox of community politics, 
beholden to political patrons 'above' and claiming to voice the 
interests of those 'below' in the desire to attain the recognition of 
both political authorities and community constituencies (Collins, 
Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2000: 199-222). 
Unsurprisingly, community leaders have responded in different 
ways to current events. Some leaders rejected the burden of com-
munity responsibility for these crimes. Yet many responses betrayed 
a complicity with the racialisation of crime by the dominant culture 
under pressure from government and media, who criticised the 
leaders for not facing up to 'reality'. These responses range from 
outright 'self-criminalisation' - or the acceptance of community 
blame - to attempts to blame others within the category of the 
Arab Other, to attempts to blame' Australian society'. Across these 
divergent strategies there is a common tendency to echo the 
dominant paradigm of the' cultural' explanation of criminal acts 
that frames the social understandings of these events, and to 
reproduce the way of seeing which allows crime to be seen as 
emanating from cultural background. In doing this, prominent 
community leaders accept the location of the Lebanese migrant 
community in a subordinate position and the shaping of its subjectivity 
by the dominant white culture. 
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Blaming the community 
We have, both in Kebabs and in the early chapters of this book, 
detailed the ways in which crime has become increasingly identified 
with particular ethnic groups, and especially with those of' Middle 
Eastern' or Muslim backgrounds. We do not want to go over that 
ground in detail, but it is useful to return to this material and begin 
to think of the ways in which it addresses not just a dominant white 
culture in Australia, but also interpellates Australian citizens within 
the targeted communities. 
Soon after the 1998 fatal stabbing in Punchbowl and the drive-
by shooting at a police station also in south-west Sydney, Premier 
Bob Carr and the then Police Commissioner Peter Ryan identified 
the presumed perpetrators as being members of a 'Lebanese gang' 
(English & Walsh 3/11/98:4). In 2000-2001, after the gang rapes 
and during the subsequent trials, politicians, senior police and 
influential journalists again consistently referred to the offenders 
as 'Lebanese Muslims' belonging to a 'Lebanese gang of rapists , 
(Chulov 18-19/8/01: 1). The identification of the offenders by their 
ethnicity was the first step towards the broad social acceptance of 
the racialisation of these crimes. Talkback callers and letter writers 
in mainstream newspapers provided abundant evidence indicating 
the extent to which Lebanese ethnicity was implicated in criminal 
activities. A large number of letters accusing Lebanese culture of 
criminality can be found in the Daily Telegraph and Sydney 
Morning Herald in August 2001 and between July and October 
2002, coinciding with the trials of the pack rapists. The following 
are typical: 
182 
While many Muslims would be genuinely appalled at these 
attacks, there is a widespread perception in the Muslim com-
munity that non-Muslim women, Western women in particular, 
who are free to drink, dance and engage in premarital sex, are 
immoral- which, to some young men, makes them fair game. 
In fact, the victims were the sort of young women these young 
men would be likely to date - while virtuous (and often 
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identifiably headscarved) Muslim women would be expected 
to remain at home. The fact that the attackers were invariably 
Muslim, their victims invariably seen to be non-Muslim, speaks 
for itself(Alam 27/8/01 :11). 
These boys may be born in Australia, but they consider them-
selves Muslim enough not to rape other Muslims. Their parents 
teach them to respect only Muslim women, making these boys 
believe Aussie women do not deserve respect (Gartside 26/8/ 
01:90). 
In addressing the issue of crime, representatives of the white 
community - political leaders, journalists and ordinary citizens-
imputed to Lebanese migrants a number of attributes to 'explain' 
the purported causal link between Lebanese culture and crime -
the kind of attributes we canvassed in earlier chapters. In the midst 
of the' gang crisis' , in late 1998, and again during the' ethnic rape' 
panic in 2001-2002, many Lebanese leaders rejected the claim 
that ethnicity was a causal factor in the apparent rise in ethnic 
crime. However, some ethnic community leaders (whether they 
represent Arabic, Lebanese or Muslim groups) participated in an 
ideological process which we could call 'self-criminalisation'. 
Further, the creation of a sense of community blame shifts much of 
the responsibility for these crimes and their prevention onto com-
munity leaders themselves. 
'The good name of Lebanese Australians is ... under threat' 
Influential 'numbers man' in the NSW Labor Party and Minister 
for Fisheries in the Carr government, Edward Obeid, vociferously 
defended Bob Carr's identification of the young offenders by their 
ethnicity by arguing that even though most of the criminals were 
born and raised in Australia, they identified themselves as 'Leba-
nese' (SBS Radio Arabic programme 1998). This assumption of 
an unquestioned link between the crime and their ethnicity is 
significant because Obeid is also a prominent Lebanese community 
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leader whose family own El-Telegraph, the largest Arabic news-
paper in Australia. In this instance, his loyalties to the rightwing 
leadership ofthe NSW Labor Party and his motivation to defend it 
against an 'ethnic backlash' following Carr's comments about 
'Lebanese crime' take priority over his role as an 'ethnic leader', 
to represent the interests of Lebanese communities in the political 
arena. His ability to 'deliver' for the communities concerned depends 
precisely on his leverage in the Labor Party, and much of his sway 
in the Labor Party right wing derives from securing the particular 
'ethnic vote' and from crucially targeted recruitment of Lebanese 
communities into specific party branches. 
Similarly, speaking at the Australian Lebanese Association's 
annual youth awards. in 200 I, Marie Bashir, the NSW Governor 
and someone also of Lebanese Christian descent, did not hesitate 
from referring to these young criminals as 'Lebanese Australians'. 
She added that 'the good name of Lebanese Australians is itself 
under threat' because of the' disappointing antisocial trend' among 
sections ofthe Lebanese community. On this very public occasion, 
the Governor did not question the legitimacy of perceiving the young 
offenders as 'Lebanese', but simply echoed the link that white 
Australians were making between the young offenders, their crimes 
and the Lebanese migrant community at large. Moreover, she ac-
cepted the implication that the solving of these problems was the 
responsibility of the Lebanese community: she called upon them to 
'work out what exactly was driving some young Lebanese Aust-
ralians to violence' (Morris 9/7/01 :7). In making these statements, 
another prominent figure of Lebanese background in NSW 
reinforced the trend initiated by the leader of the Labor government 
and mainstream media whereby the criminal activities of young 
people were identified as being primarily the acts of 'Lebanese 
gangs' , and, by inference, were caused by their Lebanese ethnicity. 
Other prominent people of Lebanese ancestry also seemed to 
accept the foregrounding of the link between ethnicity and crime: 
Farouk Hadid, the president of the Lebanese Muslim Association 
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(LMA), the largest and most influential Muslim organisation in 
NSW, had no problem in naming the gang by its ethnicity (English 
& Walsh 3/11198:5). Another (unnamed) leader admitted that 'We 
are all embarrassed by what's happening here' (Sofios 22/8/01 :4) 
- and embarrassment implies culpability. 
These leaders did not question here the validity of identifying 
'gangs' by their ethnic background. Nor did they show any critical 
awareness of the racist impact this identification was having on 
the Lebanese migrant community. Bashir's attempt to separate 
'good' Lebanese from 'bad' Lebanese only served to reinforce 
the link between the offenders' ethnicity and their crime. Their 
unquestioning identification of the offenders as 'Lebanese' contrib-
uted to the criminalisation of Lebanese ethnicity by facilitating the 
process of making a causal link between crime and the identifiable 
culture of the offenders. 
This 'self-criminalisation' implies not the acceptance of 
personal blame, but the acceptance of some degree of community 
blame because of the assumed link between ethnicity and offence, 
and hence some degree ofleadership responsibility for dealing with 
this 'ethnic problem'. When Sheikh Al Hilaly decided, after months 
of criticising the media and the Carr government for their rhetoric 
of Lebanese gangs and Muslim rapists, to visit the homes of the 
rapists' families, the Sun-Herald (1417/02: 1) reported that Al Hilaly 
was facing up to the 'reality' of ethnic gang rape and admitting to 
'our shame'. This 'self-criminalisation', then, is an act of accepting 
one's interpellation by the political and media discourse of the 
dominant culture. But this acceptance is not simply an ideological 
process; it also entails practical incorporation into a political system. 
Ethnic crimes: taking responsibility 
As we have seen, the Labor government and the Liberal opposition 
have engaged since the mid-1990s in a series of law and order 
auctions, each offering stricter policing, stronger laws and harsher 
sentences as the most effective way of fighting crime in NSW 
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(Lipari 24/6/02:3; Walker 26/8/0 1: 10). This 'tough' approach to crime 
was partly responsible for a sweeping victory for the Labor Party 
in the 1999 state election, and it was again in the 2003 state election 
campaign in NSW, with ongoing announcements about boosting 
the police presence in 'dangerous' parts of Sydney and promises 
to spend more money on fighting crime (Rehn 28/9/02:4; Horan 
13/10/02:2). The implicit message to the wider community behind 
the law and order auction is that this approach is mostly needed to 
curb crime within ethnic communities because they are the main 
cause of youth crime in NSW. By joining in the auction, Lebanese 
community leaders have, in tum, reinforced the same message. 
Indeed, many leaders demanded even tougher approaches to crime. 
In the wake of the shooting incident in Lakemba, Lebanese 
community leaders expressed their total opposition to the lenient 
character ofthe criminal law in Australia. Consequently, they called 
for tougher laws arguing that this 'Australian' leniency would 
encourage Lebanese-Australian youngsters to engage in anti-social 
and criminal activities. The Mufti of Muslims in Australia and 
religious Sheikh at Lakemba mosque, and Michael Hawatt, a 
Muslim-Lebanese Canterbury Councillor (English & Walsh 3/11/ 
98:5) were both critical of the law in Australia for not supporting 
the exercise oftough parental authority over kids. In an interview 
conducted by one of the authors in 2002 with Khalil Harajli, a 
community leader with the Lebanese Community Council (LCC) 
and St George Lebanese Joint Committee (LJC), and a multicultural 
health worker in southern Sydney, similar views were expressed in 
the following terms: 
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... there is a lot of freedom to kids in Australia, [parents feel] 
they couldn't discipline them in a way [because ofthat freedom]. 
And so the law [plays] a big role in bringing up the kids. Espec-
ially when the kid is aware that he can report his parents to the 
police if they're classified as abused. It doesn't mean that 
[parents] want to abuse him; they want to straighten him up 
(interview with Khalil Harajli 13/1 0/02). 
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Despite the emphasis given to the Australian criminal system, Harajli 
asserted that weak parental authority over kids was the 'number 
one' problem that the Lebanese community is facing when dealing 
with its youth. For him, as much as for the previous two community 
leaders, Lebanese youth would be less likely to tum into a criminal 
if the Australian legal system gave greater authority to parents to 
discipline their children. The drive for tougher measures within the 
Lebanese migrant community led Barbara Coorey, an independent 
Canterbury Councillor to call 'for a curfew across Canterbury in 
the wake of the Lakemba shoot-up' and for tighter security around 
the police stations in the area (Field 13/11/98:6). 
In response to public outcry over the supposed leniency of the 
initial gang rape sentences in 2001, Lebanese community leaders 
expressed their support for the government's proposal to introduce 
maximum life sentences, and prided themselves that the punishment 
for rape in their country is even harsher than the proposed sentencing 
laws. Charlie Moussa, President of the United Australian Lebanese 
Assembly (UALA), condemned the 'soft' sentences, saying that 
'the law should be changed'. He declared that punishments for 
such crimes should be harsh enough to deter others (Kent 24/8/ 
01:5; Connolly & Kennedy 24/8/01 :3). 
Ethnic leaders' support for and participation in a political system 
which was targeting their community extended even to forms of 
self-policing. In the context of the moral panic over male Muslim 
youths, a group of young men from Lakemba mosque was formed 
under the supervision of Sheikh Al Hilaly, with the their aim of 
going out on the street and bringing young Muslims 'back' to the 
mosque. On the question of sentencing, one of them declared: 
In Islamic law the penalty for rape is execution, but Australian 
law gave these gangsters just 6 years ... Instead, these girls' 
parents will be paying taxes for years to feed and clothe these 
criminals injail. Whose law is wrong? 
A second member of the same group was not only critical of the 
'soft' punishment, he also blamed the Australian schools for abetting 
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laxity: 'Kids should be taught ethics and proper behaviour at school. 
Instead, they are told they have rights and told to tell their teachers 
if their parents discipline them' (Walker 26/8/01: 11). Around the 
same time, LMA President Farouk Hadid, echoed similar views: 
[Lebanese kids] have no respect for their parents, elders and 
teachers because the law and the schools tell them to run to 
[authorities] if their parents show them some discipline, no 
matter how hard. They don't obey their parents, they don't 
listen to their parents and they don't know anything about 
their religion. Here we can't touch them - just to hurt them a 
little to punish them and teach them (Sofios 22/8/01:4). 
On the question of the rape crime, he added: '[The rapists] have 
social problems, they need help and we don't want to protect them. 
They should be caught and punished harshly'. Hadid is not simply 
distancing himself from 'bad' Lebanese; he is refusing the principle 
of protection and representation at the heart of community politics. 
In adopting this position, along with other community leaders, Hadid 
reinforces the view of the government and other representatives 
of white dominant society that youth crime is a Lebanese problem, 
and that harsh sentencing is the most effective measure to deter 
them from committing these crimes (Sofios 22/8/01 :4). Al Hilaly 
expressed similar views (Morris 21/8/01 :5). 
One year later, when the Department of Public Prosecutions 
successfully appealed against the so-called 'soft sentences' received 
by three members of the 'rapist gang', Lebanese community leaders 
joined the government in welcoming the new sentences meted out 
to the offenders. Keysar Trad, the spokesman for the Lebanese 
Muslim Association, said: 'I hope that [the sentence] sends a 
message to anyone else that may be thinking of committing a violent 
sexual crime that they will be put away for a long time' (Totaro 16/ 
8/02:2). The Daily Telegraph quoted Dr Jamal Rifi, a commissioner 
representing the Lebanese community with the Community 
Relations Commission for a Multicultural NSW, as saying: 'We 
have no problem with this sentence whatsoever. Our community 
has repeatedly called for the toughening of sentences ... anything, 
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as long as it sends a tough message'. Philip Rizk, President of the 
Australian Lebanese Association, made similar remarks: 
We are very happy that the perpetrator of such an awful crime 
has received the full treatment ofthe law. If you commit a crime 
beyond imaginable human behaviour, you should be put away 
and thrown away. This [ sentence] is not excessive (Clifton 16/ 
8/02:4-5). 
Even Hilal Dannaoui, a rising cricket star of Lebanese descent, 
who has voiced strong opinions about his own experiences of vili-
fication, stated that the young men who received long jail sentences 
for their part in the rapes 'deserved what they got' (Sygall 6110/ 
02:93). 
The message conveyed by the above statements is clear; 
Lebanese community leaders strongly support the state policy of 
getting tough on youth crime. Leniency in punishment will certainly 
lead to more youth crime. The unintended (or intended) 
consequence ofthis message, however, makes the position of these 
leaders even more interesting. In the context where dominant white 
society links youth crime with Lebanese ethnicity, calling for a tough 
punishment policy on youth crime would effectively mean getting 
tough on Lebanese background youth because they are perceived 
to be the main cause of youth crime in Sydney. While adamant that 
the young criminals are not representative of their community and 
that the whole community should not be tainted by their crimes, 
they are positioned to endorse a raft of' law and order' crackdowns, 
part of which is the ethnic targeting of 'zero tolerance'. When 
Lebanese community leaders welcome this' get tough' policy, they 
are indirectly welcoming its application on Lebanese youth who 
are accused by broader society of being the main perpetrators of 
cnme. 
Incorporation into this system goes beyond support for tougher 
sentencing and involves practical involvement in the machinery of 
decision-making and policing. After the incidents in 1998, the 
Premier called Lebanese community leaders to a meeting to tell 
them that their community had a serious problem with gang crime 
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and they should cooperate with the government to overcome this 
problem. He warned them that they should break the 'wall of silence' 
that had been erected to protect the young criminals in their 
community from law enforcement agencies (Humphries 4111/98:5; 
Crosweiler 4/11/98: 1-2). On another occasion, when the Premier 
announced a government plan to stop what he called 'the spiralling 
gang violence that was going to engulf Lebanese youth' , he declared 
that it was important not to shy away from identifying ethnic-based 
crime problems: 
We've got to be candid and say there is a concentration of this 
type of crime in Bankstown and Lakemba, we've got serious 
problems and the problems are spilling over on to the streets 
and on to public transport and we want to tackle them. 
Two important community figures of Lebanese background, Bull-
dogs Rugby League hero Hazem Al Masri and Aussie Home Loans 
chief John Symond, were standing by the Premier when he was 
making these remarks (Morris, R 11/7/01:2). 
In an interview with El-Telegraph, Premier Carr, commenting 
on the pack rape incidents, argued that: 
the community had to accept the ugly fact that the perpetrators 
of the crimes had made race a factor, not the media or the 
government. One rape involved 14 men and during the rape, 
the men said racist things. Moreover, some of the men were 
involved in successive rapes. You had a gang (quoted in Horan 
1118/02:2). 
The community should not only acknowledge that the rapists were 
members of a Lebanese (Muslim) gang, but that they were racist 
as well. The entire Lebanese community was expected to share 
responsibility for the crimes, as the misogyny and the purported 
anti-'Aussie' racism of the sexual assaults were ascribed to the 
culture from which the offending youths came. 
The government strategy to make the Lebanese Australian 
community take responsibility for gang crimes in Sydney has been 
shared by mainstream media. As noted in previous chapters, 
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prominent journalists, such as Miranda Devine (Sydney Morning 
Herald and Sun-Herald), Cindy Wockner and Piers Akerman 
(Daily Telegraph) and Janet Albrechtsen (Australian) have written 
many articles suggesting that youth crime is the product of Lebanese 
ethnicity and Muslim culture (see in particular, Albrechtsen 4/9/ 
02:13). The editorial of the Daily Telegraph addressed ethnic 
leaders directly: 
Leaders of [ethnic] communities have a responsibility to 
encourage members to observe the laws of this country and 
assist the assimilation of their former countrymen in their 
adopted home ... cooperation is expected when the law has 
been broken ... The central topic for discussion should be how 
leaders can co-operate with the police and other agencies to 
prevent this criminal behaviour. 
As leaders, it is time to live up to their titles (Daily Telegraph 
22/8/01:30). 
In criticising those members of the Lebanese and Muslim com-
munities who rejected the association of ethnicity with crime, the 
Daily Telegraph argued explicitly that the legitimacy of 'ethnic 
leadership' hinged upon their cooperation with the state authority 
to force members of ethnic community to respect the law and help 
law enforcement agencies to catch the Lebanese offenders (Kent 
24/8/01:5). 
One year later, when the rapists were brought to court for a 
re-trial, the same newspaper stated in its editorial: 
While the sins of the 14 young men who have been found 
guilty of these crimes should not be held against the Lebanese 
Muslim community, it is important that their true nature be 
understood. 
In this manner, the community and families can work together 
to prevent a recurrence of such appalling offences. All must 
come to understand there is no tolerance of such behaviour-
or the attitude that nurtured it - in our society (Daily Telegraph 
17/7/02:28). I 
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While it seems to say at first that the community should not be 
blamed, it suggests that the community should take responsibility. 
Lebanese leaders participated in two events that openly contrib-
uted to the incrimination of their own community. The first one 
relates to the 'Partnership Plan to Prevent Violence and Crime 
Among Arabic Speaking Young People'. The project was designed 
to prevent crime among 'young people of Arabic speaking 
background'. When the Premier announced the plan on July 10, 
2001, he stated that Lebanese community leaders suggested to 
him the partnership plan in two meetings that he previously held 
with them. The Fisheries Minister, Edward Obeid, was appointed 
to supervise the implementation of the plan, and the group looking 
after its implementation included three leaders of Lebanese 
background: Randa Kattan, Executive Director of the Australian 
Arabic Communities Council, John Choueifate, Chief of Staff at 
Channel 9 and Jamal Rifi who is a Community Relations Commis-
sioner. To propose the idea of a plan designed to prevent crime 
among 'young people of Arabic speaking background' is in itself a 
serious acknowledgment that there is a 'Lebanese crime problem'. 
To act as a partner in the implementation of this plan showed that 
Lebanese leaders are prepared to take responsibility for tackling 
the problem (Carr 10/7/01). 
The Mufti of Australian Muslims, Sheikh Al Hilaly, initiated 
another project that conceded the tendency towards criminal 
behaviour amongst Lebanese Muslim youths. As mentioned earlier, 
this project involved the formation of a group of young Muslims 
whose task was 'to come down hard on Lebanese gangs hanging 
around after dark'. In the words of Imam Al Hilaly, the Muslim 
community 'will mobilise people to walk the streets at night to reclaim 
the streets. We will go to areas where young people congregate. 
We want them off the streets' (Walker 26/7/01: 11). When the 
tabloid press interviewed some members of this squad, they declared 
they were furious about what they called 'the bad name' the gang 
members were giving their religion. To them, their mission was to 
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bring lost young Muslims back to the mosque. They further stated 
that they were working with the police without necessarily taking 
the law into their own hands. 'Bring them to us. We'll sort them 
out'. These were the words used by one member of this group 
addressing' gang members who targeted non-Muslim girls' (Walker 
26/7/01: 11). Clearly, this group not only accepted responsibility on 
behalf of their community for the' gang crimes' , they also conceded 
that the rapists were targeting' Australian' girls. They took further 
responsibility for policing their own community. Central to this 
acceptance of community and leadership responsibility are two 
things: first, the acceptance ofthe idea of being a community, which 
we have shown elsewhere to be central to the formation of ethnic 
politics in Australian multiculturalism (Collins et al. 2000). Second, 
a sense of honour - and its converse, a sense of shame - which 
is fundamental to the formation of community identity generally, 
but is crucial to Arab and Muslim cultures, is exploited in the proces-
ses of interpellation at work here. 
A Councillor of Lebanese background in southern Sydney 
critically described the entire approach taken by Lebanese 
community leaders as follows: 
... they walk into the traps, the media traps, the political traps, 
walk in. They, as I said, have good intentions, good intentions 
to resolve some of the problems, but they walk into traps, and 
the media manipulates it so well 
... the community recognises there's a problem, the Government 
says there's a problem, the community has recognised it as a 
problem, and people should see it, yes the Lebanese community 
do have a problem. So it creates this vicious circle that the 
Lebanese community, the Australian Lebanese community 
can't get out of the argument. You've told us, you're co-
operating with us, you've told us your youth is a problem, and 
we're not saying it, you're telling us. So it's a fantastic policy, 
and you'll see it as a policy of targeting particular communities, 
and playing on the prejudices of the wider community 
(Interview with Councillor Shawkat Muslimani 13/10/02). 
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Sharing with state authorities the responsibility for policing Muslim 
communities has re-emerged in the aftermath of the Bali bombings. 
Vasser Soliman, the head of the Islamic Council of Victoria, said: 
We've been accused of not standing up so many times against 
violence and terrorism and this and that ... Australian Muslims 
were eager to prevent terrorist activities and as likely as others 
to report suspicious behaviour to authorities as had happened 
in Preston when the community reported a Saudi national and 
suspected al-Qaeda member. 
Mr Soliman added that 'there were other instances where Muslims 
alerted authorities to 'suspicious characters' (Schwartz 2/11102). 
The Board ofImams, Victoria, and the Islamic Councils of Victoria 
issued a press release in which they also declared that 'Victorian 
Muslims support and cooperate with security forces in their bid to 
rid the nation of terrorism' (n.d.). 
Explaining ethnic gang crime 
Self-criminalisation is most clearly expressed by some ethnic leaders 
who ventured into offering an explanation of youth crime. In this 
case, the ownership of the gang problem is already implicit in the 
explanatory remarks they made in public. Amjad Mehboob, Chief 
Executive Officer for the Federation of Islamic Councils, was 
quoted approvingly by Miranda Devine as talking to ABC Radio 
of: 'Muslims accepting responsibility that they may have failed to 
do things that would have prevented these things [the gang rapes] 
from happening' (Devine 14/7/02:15). Mehboob's acceptance of 
the Muslim community's responsibility rests on the acceptance that 
the Muslim community and its leadership failed to carry out its 
duty. Had the community done these 'things', they would have not 
produced Muslim criminals. The Muslim community is perceived 
to be the key to both the problem of gang crime and its solution. 
Perhaps the undefined things that the community failed to do 
are what other community leaders have mentioned on different 
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occasions. Sheikh Khalil Chami, Imam of Penshurst Mosque, 
categorically blamed community leadership for the crimes of the 
Muslim youth: 
There are a lot of younger people who don't want to be part of 
the wider community. It's because of the leadership. The 
leadership teaches them to hate the other and this is not the 
right way. 
Sheikh Chami insisted that Muslim culture is 'insular' and it needs 
to be reformed (English 4110/02: 17). Leadership for Sheikh Chami 
includes Lebanese parents who: 
were refusing to teach their children about harmony and the 
need to love their neighbours, regardless of religion, creed or 
colour. Only when Muslim parents realise that this [teaching of 
harmony and love] is essential will our youngsters integrate, 
learn to accept and, in tum, be accepted (Duff 1417/02:4). 
UALA President Charlie Moussa made the point that the pres-
ence of young criminals in the community was the result of parents 
failing their families (Morris 23/8/01 :7). The Governor ofNSW, 
Marie Bashir, made a similar point by saying that parents should 
not spoil their boys and should teach them love and respect and 
offer them good education (Stephens 7-8/9/02:47). Furthermore, 
Sheikh Chami's eldest daughter Moufredi accused Lebanese Mus-
lim families of nurturing in men a unique sense of superiority over 
others, which, when taken 'to an extreme', will breed rapists (Cock 
& Fynes-Clynton 15/7/02:6). 
Ironically, unlike the tabloid journalists who believe that the 
problem is that Muslims haven't assimilated, these leaders see the 
problem being caused by these boys not being Muslim enough: a 
contradiction we explored in Chapter Three. But the perceived 
elements of the problem are shared - the insularity of Lebanese 
and Muslim culture, the lack of proper upbringing, the absence of 
love and respect. The claim here is that 'Lebanese rapists' exist in 
Sydney because Lebanese parents teach their children not to 
integrate in the broader community and to hate white Australians. 
They inculcate in them a sense of superiority over the Australian 
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culture and of the inferiority of 'white' women, which could lead 
them in the future to commit rape against white female Australians. 
By accepting community blame for the crimes of a few offenders 
Lebanese community leaders increase the susceptibility to bein~ 
criminalised by the dominant white society. 
The 'other' within the Other 
Some Lebanese Christian leaders accepted the terms of interpellation 
by the dominant white community on condition that these terms 
are exclusively attributed to Muslim and not Christian Lebanese 
migrants. By taking this position, they rely on the beliefthat because 
they are Christian and white Australianness is defined as Christian 
this will enable them to disown the Muslims from their Lebanes~ 
Australian community and count themselves as an integral part of 
the white Australian community. This echoes Dunn's (2001:303) 
analysis of conflicts around mosque development in Sydney over 
the last twenty years, which showed that Muslim groups with 
European heritage would frequently differentiate themselves from 
'Arabs', effectively reinforcing the negative construction of the 
Arab Muslim. In other words, they are trying to prise themselves 
out of the Arab Other while leaving the structure intact. They can 
attempt to do this because this Other is already fractured by lines 
of difference and division, and because they see themselves as 
sharing some characteristics with a fantasised Australian identity. 
As Rage (1998) argues, national belonging is constituted by a 
complex array of elements of 'Australian characteristics' which 
he casts as forms of cultural capital. Accumulation and rec~gnition 
of this capital allows citizens to attain symbolic power, as belonging 
to the nation. Migrants with more 'national capital' are perceived 
to be more Australian than those who possess less. This difference 
in the possession of national capital creates a hierarchy of 'others' 
in the nationalist imaginary of Australian society. Accordingly, 
Christian Lebanese migrants can feel more Australian than their 
Muslim counterparts because they share with white Australians a 
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perceived nationalist characteristic of being Christian. Muslim 
Lebanese migrants, on the other hand, are not only 'Arab' with 
'Middle Eastern appearances', they were also a 'Muslim Other' 
against whom the Christian identity of Australia is defined. 
It was this distinguishing characteristic which enabled Christian 
Lebanese leaders to dissociate themselves from their Muslim 
counterparts and take part in the criminalisation of Islam. This is 
made possible by the relatively privileged position that Christian 
Lebanese leaders feel that they occupy in the hierarchy of others 
imposed by the dominant white community. 
The criminalisation of Lebanese Muslims by Christian com-
munity leaders also relied on a deeply entrenched ideological tenet 
held by the Christian section ofthe Lebanese Australian community; 
the belief that since the inception of the state of Lebanon in 1920, 
Christians were the only section of the Lebanese population who 
identified with Lebanese national identity. In contrast, Muslims 
residing in Lebanon were always suspected of lacking a sense of 
belonging to Lebanon. They were accused of having allegiance to 
pan-Arab nationalism and to the broader community ofIslam (Zamir 
1985; 'Atiyah 1973). Against this background, Christian community 
leaders were able to disown gang members in Sydney because 
they supposedly had Muslim backgrounds. In their opinion, these 
gangs were not descendants of 'true' Lebanese citizens or the 
inheritors of Lebanese culture. The true Lebanese have always 
been the Christians in Lebanon and their descendants. The killers 
of Edward Lee, therefore, were not 'Lebanese gangs' as the 
Premier described them, but rather' Muslim gangs' . 
Some Christian Lebanese leaders implicitly used the same 
strategy to dissociate themselves publicly from any responsibility 
for the serious sexual assaults that occurred in south-west Sydney. 
This time, however, the incrimination of Muslims and their religion 
took a more naked and public form. On talk back radio, Joe Baini 
(n.d.), the ex-President of the Australian Lebanese Association 
claimed that Islam entices its followers to degrade women and t~ 
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rape Anglo women because of their 'footloose' behaviour and their 
belonging to an inferior culture. In addition, it was rumoured that 
during several meetings involving Lebanese leaders discussing their 
response, Philip Rizk insisted that Lebanese community leaders 
should acknowledge that the pack rapes were motivated by a racist 
hate that the Muslim rapists had towards their Anglo Christian 
victims. (It is worth noting that during the same meeting a Christian 
religious leader suggested that Lebanese community leaders should 
pay a sum of money to the rape victims by way of redemption. 
Another leader proposed that they also pay a visit to the families of 
the victims and apologise on behalf of the Lebanese community 
for what happened to their daughters). This leadership position on 
the radical distinction between the Christian and Muslim Lebanese 
communities is reflected in the words of a letter addressed to the 
Sydney Morning Herald by a writer who defines himself as 'a 
proud Australian of Lebanese background': 
I would like to make it clear that there are Australians of Leba-
nese Catholic background who form a completely separate 
Lebanese community and are the victims of generalisations. 
I believe that everyone who lives in this country should inte-
grate into the Australian family. 
Multiculturalism has not proved successful in history, yet multi-
ethnicity under one cultural umbrella, on the contrary, is very 
productive (Reston 24-25/8/02:21). 
In an interview with the Coordinator of the LMA, the Christian/ 
Muslim divide over the rape issue featured very clearly: 
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... both the Christian and Muslim community have a division, 
because everybody wants to have their name, or the community 
name as being clean. Maybe some ofthe Christians are saying 
'look, these were Lebanese Muslims', so they can feel better 
about themselves and their community. I actually heard that on 
talkback radio, where they say' look, these were Muslim kids'. 
They are Lebanese, but they're Muslim, they're not reflective 
ofthe Lebanese (Fawaz Derbas 24/9/02). 
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The response of the Howard Government to the 'boat peo-
pie' crisis that occurred between the second half of 1999 and 2001, 
encouraged even more Christian community leaders to dissociate 
themselves from Muslim Lebanese migrants in Sydney. Following 
the arrivals of illegal immigrants from the Middle East in recent 
years, the Australian federal government forsook humanitarianism 
for deterrence, as outlined earlier. Consequently, the atmosphere 
was highly charged with feeling of hostility towards the so-called 
'queue jumpers' who happened to be mainly of Muslim background. 
The hostility towards Muslim migrants further escalated after the 
events on September 11, 2001. In this context, Christian commu-
nity leaders found further reason to distance themselves from 
Muslim Lebanese migrants and to encourage the association of 
Muslims with youth crime and terrorism. 
In these responses Christian Lebanese leaders were attempting 
to shift blame away from themselves and their community. They 
acted as though they were being interpellated as 'ordinary' (white) 
Australians, and as though the construction of the Arab Other was 
directed exclusively towards Lebanese Muslims, hoping that by 
following this strategy they could protect Christian Lebanese mig-
rants from being criminalised. They were, however, still accepting 
the terms of interpellation by the dominant white community. 
'Muslim leader blames Australia' 
Despite the fact that Lebanese community leaders ended up taking 
responsibility for the problem of 'Lebanese gangs', on some 
occasions, Muslim leaders responded to the racialisation of crime 
by disowning the young offenders and arguing that they were the 
product of Australian culture. When the 'gang' crisis broke out in 
1998, for instance, Muslim community leaders were keen to prove 
to the white Australian community that the perpetrators of gang 
crimes were not representative of the Lebanese migrant community. 
They first described the criminals as being non-Lebanese and/or 
non-Muslim. Leaders such as Al Hilaly and Trad, repeatedly 
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claimed the young criminals were not really Lebanese or Muslim, 
and that their crimes showed that they had no knowledge ofIslam. 
'Those responsible were born in Australia and educated and-raised 
here', said Al Hilaly to the Daily Telegraph. About this, he was 
quite correct. He continued, however: 'They have probably never 
been to Lebanon. All this [the actions of the rapists] is not part of 
our culture. They do not know our culture because they were raised 
here' (Staff reporters 21/8/01:5). Trad echoed these words: '[The 
young criminals] have no association with the culture and no ' 
association with the religious teachings' (Chulov & Payton 13-14/ 
7/02: 19). The following day he was quoted as saying: 'Because of 
the vile, heinous crimes they have committed, these men have 
disowned their religion and their race' (O'Boume 1417/02:4). 
Even when community leaders opposed the criminalisation of 
Lebanese and Muslim groups by reversing the blame and making 
the claim that these 'criminals' were Australian rather than Leba-
nese Muslim, they fell into the trap of ascribing criminality to cultural 
attributes and thus sustained the problematic link between culture 
and crime through. which their communities could pe criminalised. . 
In the wake of the Bali bombings on October 12,2002, major 
Islamic councils in Australia issued a joint media release in which 
'extremists of the world' were condemned and 'terrorism' was 
described as being against the teachings of Islam. The signatories 
of the media release began their statement by saying that' ... never 
in our name or in the name of any religion or God, can you ever be 
aggressive, unjust or hurt innocent people'. Then they added that 
aggression and violence 'are against every religious teaching in 
spite of what [extremists] may believe' (Islamic CounCil of Victoria 
[ICV] 6/11102). Not surprisingly, the Islamic Egyptian Society (IES) 
ofNSW had also intervened in expressing its position on the Bali 
event because the culprit was Muslim and the Islamic religion was 
subjected to numerous attacks. The secretary of this organisation 
declared that: 
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innocent people; the killings of innocent people are acts that 
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contravene all the Islamic religion's values and human civi-
lised concepts. Those who carried out this criminal act have 
nothing to do with Islam (Helal16/11/02: 16). 
Randa Abdel-Fattah, a writer from Melbourne, proclaimed that, 
'As a Muslim, it appals me to witness people who dare to profess 
allegiance to Islam while committing heinous acts of murder and 
destruction' . At another point, she added, 'The point is that these 
people are aliens to the Islamic faith, and the cumulative effects of 
connecting such people to our faith and community has only ever 
served to create suspicion, fear and resentment of Australian 
Muslims'. Even the possibility of considering the perpetrators of 
the Bali bombings as representing 'an unsavoury deviation from 
the wider Islamic community' was rejected. Abdel-Fattah argued 
that 'this offers the people who committed such abhorrent crimes 
a legitimacy they don't deserve, for the black sheep still belongs, 
the thorn is still attached' (2111 0/02). Many letter writers joined in 
this campaign, trying to depict the Muslim community as being 
essentially against violence and fanaticism, 'The people about whom 
you are fulminating are fanatics, not fundamentalists' , declared one 
of these writers (Lewis Usman 17/11/02). This defence falls into 
the ideological trap of seeing the debate about what a religion or 
culture is or isn't, and who is an authentic representative of that 
religion or culture, or not. It. stays within a racist problematic which 
seemingly accepts the terms of the debate: that crime and terrorism 
are to be explained by cultural characteristics, not the dynamics of 
economic inequality, globalisation, social change or international 
politics. 
It is clear from these statements and many more (press 
releases by various Muslim organisations on the Bali events are 
available on the ICV website) that this racist problematic was 
reinforced when Muslim leaders, including those from the Lebanese 
community, attempted to save the reputation of the Muslim 
community by using the strategy of denying that the perpetrators 
of the Bali bombings in October 2002 were 'real' Muslims. 
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Accordingly, Muslims in Australia and abroad are depicted as a 
one homogeneous group that is inherently anti-violent. This strategy 
of essentialising the community as an entity is the same as that 
utilised by anti-Muslim racists to make exactly the opposite claim; 
that all Muslims as an undifferentiated mass of people are essentially 
violent and aggressive. In both situations the logic is the same despite 
the defensive character of the 'racist' position taken by Muslim 
leaders. The social, economic and cultural diversity ofthe Muslim 
community is negated for the purpose of ascribing to it essentialised 
positive or negative characteristics. The uncritical adoption ofthis 
problematic by Muslim leaders would also help indirectly in the 
propagation of the same ideological framework that is used by the 
white racists in the criminalisation of the Lebanese and Muslim 
migrants. 
Self-criminalisation: the product of state patronage 
institutionalised by multiculturalism 
As we have seen, the various positions taken by community leaders 
reinforce implicitly or explicitly the process of criminalising their 
own community, partly by accepting the cultural explanation of crime 
and violence and by participating in the political processes of 
ascribing problems and solutions. These responses derive largely 
from the patron-client relationship between the state and Lebanese 
community leaders in Australian multiculturalism, and from the 
emphasis on community politics built into this relationship. 
To begin with, it is important to realise that an important 
outcome of adopting the policy of multiculturalism in Australia was 
the creation of an institutional setting for the state recognition of 
ethnic leadership as an intermediary force between the state and 
migrant communities (Jakubowicz et al. 1984). Special State organs 
were created to deal with the leaders of ethnic organisations, 
including the Multicultural Affairs and Settlement Branch in what 
is now the Department ofImmigration, Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs (DIMIA) and, at the state level, the Ethnic Affairs Commis-
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sion, now called the Community Relations Commission (CRC) for 
a Multicultural New South Wales. Essentially, these State organs 
have the function of assisting migrant communities in the process 
of their settlement in Australia and addressing the specific needs 
that are generated by this process. In principle, ethnic organisations 
are funded to provide settlement services to their communities, 
and ethnic leaders are consulted in matters concerning the needs 
and problems of their respective communities. In reality, however, 
this practice, whose origin could be traced back to 1978 when the 
recommendations of Galbally report on migrant services were 
adopted by the federal government, has resulted in the creation of 
a hierarchical system of patronage between representatives of the 
state and ethnic leaders. According to this system, those ethnic 
leaders whose politics would fall outside the ambit of the state 
policy on community relations, are denied the high status attached 
to the state recognition of their leadership, and are financially 
penalised by receiving insufficient or no state funding at all. 
At the present time, Lebanese community organisations which 
receive Community Settlement Services Scheme (CSSS) grants 
from DIMIA include: the Lebanese Community Council (LCC, 
$219,725 for 2002-2004), the Australian Arabic Communities 
Council (AACC, $116,218 for 2002-2004), the St George Lebanese 
Joint Committee (SGLJC, $56,000 for 2002-2003), the Australian 
Lebanese Welfare Group (ALWG, $204,800 for 2001-2003), the 
Lebanese Muslim Association (LMA, $100,400 for 2001-2003), 
the AI-Zahra Muslim Association (ZMA, $168,324 for 2002-2005) 
(DIMIA, 2002; see CRC 2002 for its funding measures). Social 
capital- the endowment of high status and prestige - is conferred 
upon compliant ethnic leaders through their selection for consultation 
on 'community relations' and their appointment in consultation 
committees sponsored by the federal and state governments. Jamal 
Rifi, a medical doctor of Lebanese background, for instance, was 
appointed by the NSW Labor government as a part-time commis-
sioner with the CRC. He is well known in defending Carr's policies 
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on Lebanese gangs and youth crime. Similarly, Dr Moustafa 
Alemeddine, who is an ex-president of the LCC, was accom-
modating in his relationship with the federal government. He was 
subsequently appointed by the Liberal federal government as a 
member of the Council for Multicultural Australia. 
In order to retain the privileged treatment they receive from 
state officials, Lebanese community leaders were very cautious 
not to take a position that would effectively challenge the racialisation 
of youth crime by representatives of the state government. This 
was manifested in dropping their campaign to take legal action for 
racial vilification against NSW Premier, Bob Carr, for identifying 
offenders by their ethnicity in 1998 (Collins et al. 2000:210-212) 
and, a few years later, by implicitly or explicitly participating in the 
criminalisation of Lebanese ethnicity in the wake of the gang rapes. 
When Premier Carr insisted on the official use of 'ethnic des-
criptors' in identifying suspected criminals, despite the initial demand 
by some leaders to abandon these descriptors in NSW as in most 
other states, they never succeeded in forming a united position on 
the matter, nor did they take real action to press on with the demand 
to withdraw 'ethnic descriptors' from public circulation. 
Similarly, the emerging focus on cultural identity in Australian 
multiculturalism (Hage 2002: 11 0) not only has a class aesthetic 
which diminishes an initial emphasis on social justice, access and 
equity, it frames community politics with a cultural fetish that sees 
all customs and relationships as emanating from an essentialised 
cultural origin. The rationale of the leadership of ethnic communities 
derives then from an assumption that all behaviours are rooted in 
culture. Here the political appeal to responsibility and the cultural 
appeal to honour merge. 
Shame, grief and yearning for belonging 
The continuous fear of being held guilty of condoning the gang 
rapes has led many Lebanese community leaders to use every 
opportunity to express publicly their 'shame' over the incidents 
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and voice their sympathy towards the victims. Sheikh Khalil Chami 
believed that the rapists 'have heaped shame on Islam'. Trad 
considered that the rapists have brought' disgrace' to his community 
(Devine 14/7/02:4). Embodying a sense of collective guilt, leaders 
of the Australian Federation of Islamic Council (APlC) made a 
statement in which they expressed their sympathy for the victims: 
... [We] feel strongly for the victims who have suffered immen-
sely. We offer our condolences and warm words of support for 
the great courage that they have shown in standing against 
these sadistic and misguided youth (Tsavdaridi 18/7/02:2). 
The fact that they felt obliged to issue a statement at all indicates 
the extent to which they are implicated in acceding to the 
criminalisation of their own community, and the racialisation of 
certain crimes. 
Similar views were expressed in the aftermath of Bali bombings. 
A series of statements and press releases were issued by Muslim 
community organisations which expressed sorrow and sympathy 
towards the victims of the bombing. Two days after the tragic event, 
the president of Australian Federation ofIslamic Councils (APlC) 
publicly stated: 'Australians don't deserve this and without reserv-
ation we condemn this attack. We extend our heartfelt sympathies 
to the families of the victims' (Mehboob 14111102). The Australian 
Arabic Council (AAC) reiterated similar views in a statement 
released on the same day. The IES of NSW wrote that their 
members convey their' sorrow and grief for the innocent lives that 
have been lost during the barbaric and brutal bomb attack in Bali. 
We extend our sincere condolences to the families of the victims 
and those who are grieving' (HelaI16/11102: 16). On the national 
day of mourning for the victims of Bali bombings (20111102), a 
special prayer service was held by the LMA at Lakemba mosque. 
Two days earlier, Mufti Al Hilaly stated: 'We share the pain and 
grief, our sincere prayers go to the victims, we ask God to grant 
comfort to the grieving families and to all Australians to help get 
through these difficult times'. The spokesperson of the LMA, 
Keysar Trad added: 'Our heart-felt condolences to the families 
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who lost loved ones' (LMA 18/11102). Hassan Moussa (23110/ 
02:34), the chairperson of AACC, claimed in a letter to the Daily 
Telegraph that: 
Australia's National Day of Mourning (Domain Sydney) was a 
true reflection of a society united at a time of grief and sorrow. 
The emotional atmosphere was deeply moving and I felt pride 
in being part of this great nation and honourable society. 
The Bali tragedy was a horrific experience for every Australian 
and will leave deep feelings of pain and anger for a long time to 
come. It is beyond belief that the barbaric senseless killing of 
innocents would happen so close to our own backyard. 
On November 15, 2002, the Prime Minister, John Howard, and the 
Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, Gary Hardgrave, 
thanked AFIC for donating $22,000 to the Bali Appeal (2002). 
The fact that they felt the need repeatedly to express 'grief 
and sorrow', while other community organisations did not felt the 
need to do this, reflected the acceptance of community blame by 
Muslim Lebanese and non-Lebanese leaders; an acceptance which 
buttresses the criminalisation ofIslam, predicated on the entrenched 
belief that they were guilty of complicity with the terrorists because 
they share a religion. Muslims in Australia are required to denounce 
publicly and condemn the acts of 'terrorism' to demonstrate their 
innocence. It is precisely because their cultural ancestries are 
criminalised that Lebanese and Muslim leaders are expected to 
pronounce their innocence every time a person of similar cultural 
or religious background commits a crime (the 'ethnic gang' crimes 
in 1998, the pack rapes, September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings 
in October 2002). When Lebanese and Muslim leaders publicly 
condemn' gang' and 'terrorist' activities, they are at the same time 
reinforcing the criminalising of their own community precisely 
because their condemnation is motivated by accepting a measure 
of the guilt. 
The subordinate position occupied by ethnic community leaders 
in the patronage system of multiculturalism makes them also 
continuously worried about their acceptance as 'good' and 
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integrated members of the host society. During a function at 
Canterbury Leagues Club celebrating the initial implementation of 
the government-funded Youth Partnership Project mentioned 
previously, HazemAI Masri, one of Australia's highest-profile Mus-
lim athletes of Lebanese background, made a direct plea to Premier 
Carr - who was present and who also addressed the meeting: 
to help put an end to the isolation our community is suffering. 
. .. We do not condone rape ... this is how we are being 
portrayed. Today the Muslim community is the most hated 
community in the nation. 
He also revealed to Carr that he hated to use the label 'Lebanese 
community' when speaking about his community. 'I would prefer 
to be thought of as Australian ... so that we all feel part of one 
family' (Morris 8/8/02:7). Al Masri's comments reflect the sense 
of exclusion of the Muslim community from the 'mainstream' of 
Australian society. They also reflect a recognition of the devalorising 
effect that the criminalisation of Lebanese ethnicity was having on 
the status of his community and its leadership. The social capital of 
leadership is predicated on the recognised and honourable reputation 
that the community and its leaders can attain. To be responsible in 
relation to these incidents is to disown the criminals (as bad 
Muslims), but this response sustains the link between ethnicity, 
religion and crime, rather than disavowing the link in the first place. 
Further, it is predicated on recognition from the political and cultural 
authority which identified the community as prone to crime and 
violence in the first place. 
On another occasion, when Al Masri was awarded the Ken 
Stephen Medal for his 'outstanding work' for the community, his 
concern with the respectability of his community in the eyes of the 
dominant white society featured very prominently: 'There are a lot 
of good people in our [Lebanese] community and a lot of good 
developments happening and I want to let people know about this' . 
This award gave Keysar Trad the opportunity to emphasise 'the 
appreciation and acceptance of the broader community' (Haig 8/ 
10/02:1). Not only did Lebanese leaders appear anxious to secure 
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the good name of their community, they effusively expressed their 
gratitude at any opportunity afforded to them by the dominant 
society. 
If the 'gang' crimes made white Australian society consider 
the Lebanese community as being against the' Australian way of 
life', the Bali incident, on the other hand, made Muslims in Australia 
feel as if they were the enemy of the Australian nation. For this 
reason, the obsession with belonging to mainstream Australian 
society became much more acute among Muslim leaders immed-
iately after the Bali bombings. The fear of being excluded lurks 
behind a number of statements made by Muslim Lebanese and 
non- Lebanese leaders. On November 3, 2002, Sheikh Al Hilaly 
with the spokesperson for LMA, Mr Trad, issued a press release 
indicating that 'tens' of Muslims will go down to St Vincent Church 
in Redfern to 'celebrate' their respect for diversity in Australia. In 
this press release, Al Hilaly stated: 
The greatest attribute of Australian society is the respect for 
diversity and the ethos of 'fair go'. In support of this great 
ethos, we share in this great Sunday meeting ... We are Aus-
tralians promoting and protecting Australia and we here to 
work together to make Australia the greatest country on earth ... 
In the same statement, Trad declared his community's belief in 
'God' and their 'commitment to the values of peace, love, compa-
ssion and the security of our great country, Australia'. He then 
added that the Muslim community 'reject the present atmosphere 
of fear and apprehension', and they 'stand united as one society 
under God with expressions oflove and peace for all' (AI Hilaly & 
Trad 2002). In his comments on the national day of mourning, Sheikh 
Fehmi Naji EI-Imam from Melbourne said: 'We are Australians, 
we belong to this country and we are doing exactly what is expect-
ed,just like anybody else' (Williams 21/10/02). More recently, Al 
Hilaly, in a Telegraph piece entitled 'Visiting Muslims 'a threat' 
(31/7/03:4), is reported as admitting that a large number of 'foreign 
extremists' are 'targeting' young Muslims in Australia, preaching 
'social disharmony and intolerance'. The division between Christ-
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ians and Muslims, noted above, is replicated in the division between 
moderate and 'extremist' Muslims, such as those associated with 
the Islamic Youth Movement (Morris 21-22/6/03:36). Once again, 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese Muslim leaders express their yearning 
to belong to Australia precisely because they fear being expunged 
from the Australian nation, which is derived from accepting the 
guilt of complicity imposed on them by the racism within 
'mainstream' Australian culture. Paradoxically, these statements 
would reproduce the exact opposite of their intended message. 
They make the relationship of Muslims in Australia with mainstream 
society increasingly tenuous. 
After the outbreak of the 'gang' panic in 1998, the 'ethnic 
rape' crisis of 2001-2 and the Bali bombings in October 2002, 
Lebanese and Muslim ethnic leaders undertook a number of steps 
designed to protect the good name of their communities and oppose 
their marginalisation by white Australian society. Their overall 
objective was to retain the recognition of the state and all the 
symbolic benefits (social capital of prestige and respectability) and 
material benefits (state and federal funding) that come with it. 
However, as we have seen, the response of these leaders intent-
ionally or unintentionally contributed to the criminalisation oftheir 
communities and reinforced their marginal status in relation to 'White 
Australia' . 
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'Paranoia in the lucky country': 
the fear of everything, everywhere 
Fear finds its voice 
A 5-year-old says to his mother after listening to the latest 
report about bushfires in Sydney in December, 2002: 'Mum! ... 
Something funny! There was an attack and then a fire last year, 
and there was an attack and a fire this year. They must have 
been done by the same person!' 
A Telegraph reader asks why we are sending troops overseas 
when we need them 'to combat terrorism in our own back yard': 
the terrorism referred to here is the 'mindless acts of terrorism 
perpetrated by arsonists' (Oloman 9/12/02:20). 
It was not just Sydney where this association took hold: in the 
bushfires in Canberra just a few weeks later one victim said 'I feel 
like I've survived a terrorist attack', and referred to the threat 
from Iraq or North Korea (Wynhausen 20/1/02); another compared 
it to a bomb blast in Beirut (Channel 9 20/1/03). Prime Minister 
John Howard commented that what we had seen was 'the national 
capital under attack from the summer terror' (Channel 9 20/1/03); 
and 'Summer Terror' was the Australian's header for covering 
the fires not just in the Australian Capital Territory, Sydney and 
rural NSW, but in Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia 
as well (Australian 22/1/02:4--6). In a reversal of the metaphor, 
Piers Akerman (26/1/03: 111) opined that we need to get the' global 
firebugs' of terrorism: 
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Images of Canberra's smoking suburbs, and the fires that are 
ravaging bushland across the nation provide a strong argument 
for those who suggest the case for bringing an end to Saddam 
Hussein's monstrous regime in Iraq. 
For Saddam Hussein is a proven arsonist on a global scale. 
'Paranoia in the lucky country' 
There is nothing logical in the association between the bushfires in 
the summer of 2002-3 and the threat of crime and terrorism, but 
logic is hardly the issue here. They are experienced as cognate, 
constituting the same environment of fear. In the same fortnight 
that the comments about Canberra's fires are made, there is further 
panic about armed robbery and rising violent crime, (ethnic) gangs 
and guns (Kamper 8/1/03: 1), and one about the failure of the legal 
system to impose bail appropriately, allowing offenders to continue 
to commit crimes (Lipari 6/1/03:1). At the same time, detention 
centres are set alight by asylum seekers, and Sheikh Al Hilaly 
arrested on various charges supposedly based on surveillance 
'intelligence', in circumstances which raise the threat of racial 
violence (Morris & English 7/1/03: 1). The tangible threat of fire is 
thrown into the mix of crime, violence, gangs, refugees and terror-
ists. The summer of 2002-3 brought to a head those fears arising 
from the events we have described in this book. These fears ignite 
in all directions; they feed upon small scrub fires of anxiety, and 
burst into flame in tinder-dry Australia. It was not just the fires that 
gave these fears materiality: journalist Paul Sheehan describes the 
'water crisis' as 'the greatest threat to Australia, an unfolding 
collapse that makes the incursions of al-Qaeda, the bombings in 
Bali and the prospect of war in Iraq all look trivial' (7-8/12/02:4-
5). 
It has become almost a truism amongst commentators that 
we are living in a time of great fear and anxiety. Media com-
mentators and politicians, and not just academics, glibly talk about 
the pervasive 'fear of crime' (Cameron 7-8112/02:3), 'Fears of 
cultural rift' (Millett 18/3/02: 1), the 'politics of fear , (Newman 18/ 
12/02:36), 'worry about war' and terrorism (Robins 21-22/12/02:4). 
There is talk of anxiety, insecurity, safety, uncertainty, and even 
paranoia (Mackay 26-2711 0/02:30). Surveys demonstrate that this 
is not just media hyperbole: one survey showed that the threat of 
terrorism is the number one issue of concern in Australia, with 
62% of respondents seeing Australia as a target (Shepherd 17112/ 
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02:12). The Sun-Herald, screaming 'TERROR THREAT GRIPS 
A NATION' (29/12/02: 1 ,4), reported that 60% of Australians 
believed their 'relaxed way oflife' had been changed forever, while 
more than a quarter suffered 'general paranoia' in the 'lucky 
country' (West & Walker 29/12/02:4). Australians responded by 
assuaging their paranoia in various ways: they attended church in 
record numbers (Moses 27/12/02:5), as they had done at Anzac 
Day earlier in the year, looking for spiritual and national community; 
they stayed at home and away from public New Year celebrations 
but attended sporting and cultural events in record numbers 
searching for the 'feel good factor' (Signy 9/1/03: 1); they swapped 
rumours of pending terrorist attacks (Cornford 30/12/02: 1) and rang 
the federal government's terrorist hotline reporting 'suspicious 
behaviour' (Allard 7/1/03:2), while stocking up on gas masks and 
other survival equipment (Morris & Murray 10/1/03: 1). This climate 
of paranoia also licensed and gave credence to behaviour that is 
normally policed carefully, or ignored. The Government's 'terrorist 
hotline', for example, received numerous calls from 'bigots and 
hoax callers', and ASIO director-general Dennis Richardson 
revealed that many of its 'tip-offs' came from the mentally ill: 'Some 
of it is able to be put to one side fairly clearly as coming from a 
nutter', he admitted (Daily Telegraph 31/12/02:4). Sometimes these 
'nutters' aren't so harmless, however, and engage in campaigns of 
race hate against Muslims (Morris 30/5/03:21). 
A Herald article from November 2002 discusses how Sydney 
has become suspicious of strangers, producing rising intolerance 
as we 'learn to live with fear' (Allard, Cameron, Stevenson & 
Wainwright 23-24/11/02:27). The title of this article - 'The party's 
over' - implies that the euphoria and international bonhomie 
associated with the Sydney Olympics in 2000 is but a dim memory. 
It documents a number of incidents where sightings of suspicious 
containers and people have led to police responses. It likened this 
current mood with the Cold War and warned that psychiatrists 
have predicted an increasing incidence of anxiety and depression. 
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Other commentators have rehearsed the idea of the 'politics of 
fear' - the manipulation of human fears for electoral gain which 
we discussed in Chapter Five - especially as it has been used 
domestically by the Liberal Party (MacCallum 2002), while others 
have linked it to the international economics of oil and commodity 
trading (Newman 18/12/02:36). 
This 'politics of fear', while not an inaccurate rendering of 
conservative campaigns and international politics in recent years, 
is nonetheless an inadequate tool for making sense of the current 
waves of panic experienced in Australia, and especially Sydney. It 
too easily collapses complex social phenomena into the cynical 
manipulation of those phenomena, and it too easily conflates the 
specific fears related to international terrorism with more pervasive 
and less well-defined social anxieties. Most media discussions of 
these fears fail to analyse in any sustained way what it is we actually 
fear. Nor do they consider the conditions of possibility of these 
fears - how it is possible for them to arise and be harnessed to 
specific political agendas. You cannot have a politics of fear unless 
you have a culture of paranoia; a paranoia built into a nation's 
anxieties around its racial and ethnic dimensions but deriving from 
a range of wider social, economic and political factors. The article 
by Allard et aI., to give them their due, contains the recognition that 
this fear and anxiety are not just the result of specific terrorist acts 
per se. In claiming that 'fear found its voice ... on September 11', 
and got stronger with each incident, the article implies that fear 
was already present. It quotes one psychiatrist who suggests that 
it was an accumulation of events over the last few years that was 
the fundamental factor, each event 'priming and re-priming our 
anxiety'. It also hints at what the object of those fears might involve: 
it mentions one psychiatrist who argued that government warnings 
have shrunk the distance between Australia and world-scale trag-
edy, narrowing our 'comfort zones' and eroding our belief that 
Australia is a 'safe haven' in this globalised world (Allard et aI. 
23-24/11/02:27). 
213 
Bin Laden in the suburbs 
As we have already argued, moral panics are never just about 
single issues but are layered, complex phenomena, suturing a series 
of events, over time and operating at various levels of social reality, 
and giving them a focus. They articulate these events to broader 
social experience and structures of power. What makes the current 
situation so powerful in demonising the Arab Other was that events 
occasioning panic fed upon each other, and became inseparable, 
so that even minor incidents can become part of the larger ideo-
logical landscape via dog-whistling. We also suggested that what 
was at stake was not simply a specific concern - regarding crime, 
for instance - but a complex of issues and anxieties. The crimino-
logical literature has consistently shown that fear of crime involves 
the blurring of private and public concerns, personal experience 
and social problems (Hollway & Jefferson 2000:32), although this 
has rarely been extended to explore the links with larger questions 
of ethnicity and national belonging. In this chapter we want to 
unpack the fears and anxieties that have emerged in recent years 
and explore them in their complexity, to suggest that we are 
increasingly living in a broader culture of 'paranoid nationalism' 
(Hage 2002), in which the relations between national and ethnic 
identity are structured by international and domestic concerns around 
security and safety. 
'The fear outside everyone's door' 
In 2001, we conducted a survey of825 people (380 adults and 445 
youth) in Sydney that focused on social perceptions and fears 
regarding crime (Collins, Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2002). The 
research was undertaken before September 11, the refugee crisis 
and the widespread reports of the gang rapes, so it gives us some 
sense of the social mood as a result of the ethnic crime concerns. 
The survey was not a random sample representative of Australia's 
demographic make-up overall; instead it was designed to give a 
voice to Sydney's ethnic communities on the issues of crime and 
policing, and was stratified to target the most populous ethnic groups 
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in seven Local Government Areas. Over 80% of those surveyed 
were from a non-English speaking background and lived in south-
western Sydney. This is important, since more than half of those 
who live in Sydney today are first-or second-generation immigrants, 
with an increasing number from a non-English speaking background 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). Most of the adults were 
surveyed in their first language, and this was mostly a language 
other than English. Such voices are often ignored in the English-
language based telephone polling of 'public opinion' that dominates 
contemporary Australian politics. 
The research confirmed a high degree of fear of crime in 
Sydney, particularly among adults, in the wake of the ethnic crime 
panic. Paradoxically, however, the research revealed that most 
people we surveyed felt safe where they live, particularly those 
people living in the suburbs that have been characterised in media 
reports over the past four years as being the hot spots of 'ethnic 
crime'. The survey also suggests that ethnic minority youth are 
much more likely to experience crime as its victims than as its 
perpetrators and that reports of the level of concern over so-called 
ethnic youth gangs in Sydney are exaggerated - at least among 
the populations we surveyed. 
Almost two out of three of the adults surveyed were very 
concerned about crime, with another 25% concerned. Only 12% 
of those adults surveyed were mildly concerned or not concerned 
at all about crime. In contrast, only one in five youth (21 %) reported 
that they were very concerned about crime, though another 41 % 
were concerned. Overall, females (45%) were more likely to be 
very concerned about crime than males (34%). 
This fear of crime is linked to the firm impression that crime is 
on the increase in Sydney, a view held by nearly three quarters of 
adults surveyed and two thirds of youth. This seems to echo the 
findings of Don Weatherburn (2002), Director of the NSW Bureau 
of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), that Australia has a 
serious and growing problem with both property and violent crime; 
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but Weatherburn argues that, given that some crimes appear to be 
in decline, this does not constitute a 'crime wave' . 
The research also probed the sorts of crime that were of most 
concern to the people we surveyed. It revealed that crimes related 
to drugs were perceived as the biggest problem by adults (41 %), 
followed by violent assault (15%), while young people identified 
burglary (34%), violent assault (23%) and street theft (17%). Fear 
of sexual assault was, not surprisingly, four times greater among 
females surveyed than among males. Concern about crime has 
some roots in people's experiences: nearly one in two adults (44%) 
surveyed reported that they had at some time been victims of 
burglary, 32% had their car stolen, 12% had been victims of street 
theft and 10% had been victims of violent assault. One in three 
youth reported that they had ever been victims of burglary, one in 
five victims of car theft, 14% victims of street theft. Moreover, 
17% of youth surveyed reported that they had been victims of 
violent assault and 14% (mainly girls) victims of sexual assault. 
The survey suggests, in contrast to media coverage and political 
point scoring, that Sydney's NESB inhabitants, like their ESB 
neighbours, are more likely to be victims of crime than offenders, 
although they typically appear as criminals in the media and in political 
debate. 
Community safety is the other side of the coin to fear of crime. 
The research reported here reveals an important paradox in regard 
to community safety in Sydney. The same people who revealed 
the extent oftheir concern about crime also thought that their local 
area was a safe place to live in. This finding is all the more startling 
since most ofthose surveyed lived in Sydney's south-western local 
government areas (LGAs), the very suburbs that are regularly 
reported as being at the heart of crime-ridden Sydney. Overall, 
71 % reported that they felt safe in their own area, a finding roughly 
comparable with recent research (Tulloch et al. 1998b: 18-19). The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics national crime survey also found 
that 80% of people felt safe inside their homes during the day, but 
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this dropped to 69% at night (cited in Wainwright 23-24/8/03a:3). 
In our study, feelings of safety were highest in the Hurstville LGA 
(80%), and lowest in the Fairfield and Bankstown LGAs, the areas 
most frequently represented as dangerous in the media, where 
around 55% of those surveyed felt safe there. Males felt safer in 
their suburbs (78%) than did females (65%), with youth generally 
feeling safer in their local area than adults 
South-western Sydney's 'unsafe' places are mostly public 
transport nodes at night: the railway station, the car park and the 
bus stop. Only three out of every ten surveyed felt safe using 
Sydney's public transport at any time, with youth feeling safer on 
public transport than adults. In contrast, an earlier NSW Police 
survey found that 72% felt safe on public transport during the day 
(although this drops to 20% when asked about night-time travel 
(cited in Tulloch 1998a:26). Parks and recreation areas were also 
felt to be dangerous at night. The local shopping centre can also be 
a place where adults in particular can feel unsafe: 30% of adults 
surveyed felt unsafe in the local shopping centre (about the same 
as the NSW Police survey), compared to 12% of youth surveyed. 
There was tension, however, between youth and adults with 
respect to use of these public spaces. In respect of this tension, the 
youth ranked conflict with police highest, followed by conflict with 
adult residents, security guards and shopkeepers. This highlights a 
critical issue about community safety in Sydney. Other studies have 
also found that when young people do hang out in groups in Sydney's 
public spaces such as shopping malls, many are made unwelcome, 
especially when they are seen to lack a legitimate purpose, such as 
spending (White 1998; YAPA 1997). 
Youth gangs have captured many a media headline in Sydney 
over the past four years. It is not surprising then that 64% of adults 
surveyed agreed that there was a problem with youth gangs. Youth 
seem more ambivalent on this issue, with 55% agreeing that there 
is a problem with youth gangs in the Sydney area. Given the 
coverage of 'ethnic crime' in recent years, we investigated the 
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perceived link between ethnicity and youth gangs in the minds of 
the multicultural public in south-western Sydney. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the majority (albeit a slight majority only) did not link youth 
gangs with particular cultural backgrounds. Those that did so were 
more likely to living in the Canterbury, Rockdale and Hurstville 
LGAs than in the Fairfield, Auburn, Liverpool and Bankstown 
LGAs. Those who did link criminal and youth gangs to particular 
cultural groups most commonly volunteered the categories 
'Lebanese', 'Middle Eastern' and 'Arabic' or 'Asian', 'Chinese' 
and 'Vietnamese'. What emerges strongly here is that crime and 
criminal gangs have been ideologically reconstituted as an 'ethnic 
problem', that is, as a non-Anglo-Celtic phenomenon in Sydney, 
despite crime statistics and histories to the contrary. 
The survey found that community attitudes to policing were 
clearly polarised. About six out often adults thought that the police 
were handling organised crime and youth gangs in Sydney 'very 
well' or 'well'. Two out of three adults ranked police handling of 
young people - as distinct from gangs - as 'very good' or 'good' . 
On the other hand, six out of every ten youth surveyed rated police 
handling of organised crime and youth gangs in their area as 'poor' 
or 'very poor', and over half(55%) rated police handling of youth 
in general as 'poor' or 'very poor'. Almost two in every three 
youth surveyed (62.8%) thought that police picked on young people 
because of their cultural background: those from Asia, the Middle 
East and Lebanon were mentioned most often. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, 
many of those surveyed shared in perception of a 'crime wave' 
encouraged by some media and politicians, and expressed levels of 
concern which reflected that perception. Second, many shared the 
racialised association of ethnicity and crime that was part of media 
coverage and political debate - a link that also seemed to be 
accepted by many community leaders discussed earlier. Third, 
however, there is also a creeping distrust of the police, as rep-
resentatives of law and order in Sydney, which accords with the 
second of the two frames that we analysed in Chapter Two. 
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Most importantly, the discrepancy between the perception of 
crime as a major social problem and the feelings of safety in these 
supposedly crime-ridden areas suggests that NESB people, like 
Australians generally, share in the pervasive social mood exhibiting 
significant fear of crime, but that this fear is still a relatively abstract 
concern, not related directly and simply to everyday experience. 
The often hysterical coverage of crime in south-western Sydney 
suburbs, not the personal experience of it, has buttressed an 
exaggerated concern for crime in the minds of many Sydney-siders. 
This distinction between abstract fears and concrete dangers is a 
fundamental one to the risk society literature (Furedi 1997: 105), 
and fear of crime studies consistently demonstrate the discrepancy 
between the 'objective' likelihood offalling victim to crime and the 
'subjective' perception of that risk (Tulloch 1998a:8). It suggests 
that there is more at issue here than a rational assessment of the 
real threats people face in their daily lives. 
It is difficult to compare the findings from this project with 
those ofthe (very few) fear of crime studies undertaken in Australia; 
not just because the sample here is not representative of the nation 
as a whole, but also because of the variations in the instruments 
and methodologies used in those few studies, and the subjective 
nature of the issues at stake. Nevertheless, it is worth repeating 
here several findings from elsewhere. The first point is that a regular 
NSW survey of people's perceptions of the problems of crime in 
their localities shows that while the proportion of people answering 
that there was a problem has increased over the decade across 
NSW, there has not been an increase in Sydney itself (although 
there have been annual fluctuations). In 2001,55.4% of residents 
ofNSW felt that crime was a problem in their neighbourhood, while 
the figure in Sydney was 58% (Wainwright 23-24/8/03a:3). 
The second point is that these studies echo the oft-repeated 
finding that fear of crime varies according to gender and age 
(Tulloch 1998a: 16). The conclusions that fear of crime is higher 
amongst the poor, less educated and ethnic minorities are, however, 
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less clear-cut (Tulloch 1998a: 17). These findings on social class 
and ethnicity contrast with a survey conducted by BOCSAR in 
1999, which found that people living on Sydney's north shore (with 
a higher concentration of residents from wealthier backgrounds) 
recorded a higher level of fear of crime than those in the outer 
west. Moreover, they were more likely to be worried about youth 
gangs and louts, while residents of Fairfield and Liverpool were 
concerned about drug-related crimes and burglary (Daily Telegraph 
30/6/99:3). Don Weatherbum concluded that this showed people 
were more concerned about issues that directly affected them, but 
while it does confirm a distinction between abstract and concrete 
fears, it also suggests that there is a class and racial dimension to 
fear of crime when youth gangs are involved. The fear of such 
gangs is highest where there is a higher concentration of Anglo 
Australians of high socio-economic status, and where such gang 
activity is less likely to occur. 
If we conducted our survey today, when September 11, the 
Bali bombings, asylum seekers, the 'race rape' cases and the law 
and order election campaign are fresh in the minds of Sydney-
siders, it might well reveal different results: and, most notably, 
perhaps a diminution of perceived community safety in Sydney. 
Certainly, analysis of media coverage, including letters to the editor, 
indicates a heightening of social fears and a narrowing of the gap 
between abstract fears and concrete dangers. 
The discrepancy between objective likelihood of falling victim 
to crime and the subjective perception of risk has its corollary in 
media and political commentary on the terrorist threat to Australia. 
We have been told for several years now, and we are still being 
told, that Australia has become a prime target for terrorist attacks. 
The Herald headed a report of comments by Clive Williams, director 
of Terrorism Studies at the Australian National University, as 
'Australia near top of terrorist list' (Goodsir 22-23/2/03:14). The 
same journalist wrote a story emphasising the 'traitors within 
(Goodsir 14/7/03:1). The Australian paraphrased remarks by 
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Attorney-General Daryl Williams as 'We're in reach of Mid-East 
Terrorists' (Kerin & Stewart 28/5/03: 1). The Prime Minister warned 
that a terrorist attack was a 'grim possibility', even though he had 
had no reports of such a threat (Allard & Snow 9-10/8/03:16). 
Against these claims, a much less widely reported assessment of 
Australia's vulnerability to terrorist attack by a risk assessment 
analysts listed Australia as 38 out of 168 countries, and lagging 
well behind the US and Britain (Harris 28/8/03:5). Yet this seems 
somewhat incidental to rising panic around the possibility of attack: 
indeed, the threat seems very near. In the current international 
climate, fear oflocal crime and distant terrorist threat have merged 
to become 'the fear outside everyone's door' (Murphy 27-28/4/ 
02:25). 
Fear of everything 
Fear of crime is not simply a reasonable calculation offalling victim 
to crime: as we have already seen throughout this book, the social 
perception of crime is interwoven with a range of ideological frames 
and assumptions, and is folded in with an array of social events and 
concerns, which makes the fear of crime more than just a fear of 
crime. The burgeoning literature on the rise of 'risk society' rightly 
demonstrates that social anxieties are rarely straightforward 
manifestations of real threats. We fear some dangers more than 
others, Furedi (1997 :27) points out, not because of the real threat 
they pose - we are of course much more likely to be injured in a 
car or a bath than attacked by a gang or killed by a terrorist - but 
because they embody deeper anxieties about social cohesion, trust, 
human control, a meaningful life. When moral panics around crime 
are interlinked with concerns around 'boat people' and terrorists, 
and articulated with insecurities about sundry minor changes of 
daily life in Australia, then we have a layered social phenomenon 
built on a complex of anxieties which 'find their voice' at particular 
moments in specific objects of concern. The pervasiveness of these 
anxieties and the chains of association we have mapped in this 
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book result in the rendering of a range of culturally different 
behaviours as 'deviant', a process of criminalisation which conflates 
illegality with transgression of the social conventions of the dominant 
culture. As we suggested in Chapter One, this complex involves 
anxieties around social and cultural cohesion, economic change 
and the failure of political order - indeed, it exudes a fear of 
everything, but is given a racial hue. 
This complex of racialised fears was evident in the recent 
furore over the proposed building of a prayer centre for Muslims 
(particularly those ofIndian origin) in the semi-rural Sydney suburb 
of Annangrove, in the strongly middle class, Anglo-Celtic Hills 
district, which is heavily sprinkled with Christian fundamentalists. 
Baulkham Hills Council rejected the plan after massive, negative 
community response (with around 5000 objections), claiming it was 
not compatible with the area and 'not in accordance with the shared 
beliefs of the community'. One local feared that people would come 
from 'outside' the area - from 'as far away as Granville and 
Earlwood', to worship at the centre. The mayor, emphasising that 
the centre did not fit in with the values and aspirations of the 
community, said there was a fear of 'what could happen' as a 
result of the presence of Muslims , (Morris 19112/02:21). 
Yet this claim is spurious. While Baulkham Hills LGA, in which 
Annangrove is located, is one of the areas least affected by waves 
of recent migration, it is hardly free of a migrant presence: 37% of 
males are overseas-born (Millett 5-6/7 /03b:30). The oft-stated claim 
about the area being a distinct and somewhat secluded entity with 
a strong sense of community is also something of a myth: it is on 
the edge of the second-fastest growing region in the state and has 
the highest level of car ownership in Sydney (Richards & Saleh 11 
8/03:25). 
Nevertheless, there is a real sense of a 'quiet community' 
under threat. While locals in the Annangrove stressed that they 
were not being racist, just simply asking to retain their community 
feel, it is the ethnic nature of this community and what is perceived 
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to threaten it that are explicitly at issue. With what can only be an 
allusion to the 'ethnic gang rape' incidents, the mayor argued that 
he was 'concerned about the girls and ladies in the community' 
(Morris 28111102:7). After the Land and Environment Court over-
ruled the Council's decision, other locals were more abrupt, claiming 
that Muslims were 'coming in from the outside', and that they should 
'stay in Muslim Areas', 'like Punchbowl'. The site proposed for 
the prayer centre was vandalised with racist graffiti, saying 
'Mosques out' (Saleh & Morris 31/7/03: 11). While this belongs to 
a longer history of (largely Anglo-Australian) resistance to the 
development of mosques in local government areas based on racist 
stereotypes ofIslamic fanaticism, patriarchy and intolerance (Dunn 
2001), the current contexts of 'ethnic rape' and international 
terrorism have given these responses greater resonance. It is not 
surprising, then, that a One Nation (2003) election pamphlet should 
begin by asking 'Is There a Mosque Coming Near You?', and 
answering that mosques attract 'hordes of men with too much time 
on their hands' . 
Abbas Aly, the man who is proposing to build the Annangrove 
centre, commented: 'They use the word "fear" - I want them to 
define what that fear is, then solve it'. The President of the Supreme 
Islamic Council ofNSW, Gabriel Elgafi, responded to objections 
that the prayer centre, or 'mehfil', would 'be contrary to the shared 
beliefs, customs and values of the close-knit community' (O'Rourke 
13/5/03:3) with the questions, 'what is the belief ofthe community? 
What are they? Are we not part of that community?' (Morris 19/ 
12/02:21). It is exactly that vague sense of fear and the equally 
vague but exclusive sense of what the 'community' is and believes 
which are at stake here. As Aly suggests, we need to unpack what 
exactly constitutes this complex of fears. 
The first and most obvious theme built into this complex is the 
fear of the Other. As we illustrated in Chapters One and Two, the 
construction of an 'Arab Other', which ideologically weaves 
together groups of disparate people, exhibits a deep-seated anxiety 
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towards the presence of 'exotic strangers' in or near Australia. 
This 'invasion anxiety' has been a recurring feature of Australian 
society since the arrival of Europeans - especially fears about 
Indigenous people and about the 'Yellow Peril' or the' Asian hordes' 
(Burke 2001). In many ways the Arab Other has simply assumed 
the role of the primary threat, both as the 'unpredictable stranger' 
central to fear of crime (Lupton 1999a) and as the external threat 
central to our invasion anxiety. But the Other is always a necessary 
fiction in the construction of modes of national belonging and identity 
which says more about those modes of belonging and identity than 
the putative object itself. In identifying and excluding the Other, we 
project onto this object problems that emanate from within the social 
formation. An invasion anxiety is fundamentally an anxiety about 
vulnerability to invasion rather than a fear of the invader. Never-
theless, blaming the Other - the Aborigine, the immigrant, the 
refugee - is a pervasive operation in contemporary Western soc-
ieties (Back, Schuster & Solomos 6/5/02: 13). 
This same move has occurred in Australia, where immigration 
and the social policies of multiculturalism are ideologically rep-
resented as a primary cause of a raft of economic and social 
problems. This came through very clearly in each of the events 
discussed in this book. But the issue is not immigrants themselves, 
rather what they do in and to Australia that causes problems. Many 
letters to the editor and opinion pieces stress this - that the authors 
have no problems with people coming to Australia (indeed, many 
of their best friends are probably foreigners!), it is their failure to 
assimilate (or integrate) with an Australian way of life and its 
attendant values and beliefs that is being criticised. We have already 
cited a number of correspondents and commentators bemoaning 
the failure of immigrants to assimilate in Chapter One: others repeat 
this desire for the assimilated migrant in different ways. One letter-
writer to the Telegraph, attempting to 'defend' people from other 
cultures and religions in the wake ofthe furore over the banning of 
Santa Claus in a Christian school, gave examples from a Hindu 
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gathering of children with a 'broadminded view that makes them 
tolerant and inclusive': 'Surely these are the sort of new Australians 
we need. Those who appreciate our traditions and are able to 
integrate easily into the community with no fuss' (BeckIe 131121 
02:31). Here we have not a right-wing diatribe against migrant 
intolerance and inassimilability, but liberal applause for the migrant 
who integrates: either way, however, the assumptions about the 
value of assimilation, and the cohesiveness of the culture migrants 
are integrating with, are the same. As we saw in the 'lost between 
two cultures' discourse, the debate turns on shared values that 
themselves may need interrogation. 
But what is the problem here? NESB Australians are still very 
much in the minority in this country -long-time Australians and 
ESB migrants (who are usually presumed to share this culture) still 
dominate numerically and in terms of positions of economic and 
political power. Can anyone force long-time Australians to adopt 
foreigners' ways and values? Apparently there is a perception, as 
we saw earlier, that 'Australians' (that is, white, Anglo-Celtic 
Australians) are being forced to abandon their own culture and 
adapt to others' ways. There are two or three interleaving elements 
here, then: anxiety around cultural dissolution and its consequences 
for social cohesion, and hence anxiety around social change; and 
anxiety around the compulsion to change, around political authorities 
and economic forces intervening in people's lives. 
The fear that Australia has become a place of cultural division, 
not just cultural difference, is a pervasive one. In March 2002, a 
front-page Herald article announced, 'Fears of cultural rift as 
Sydney's migrant magnet works overtime'. The influx of mainly 
Asian and Middle Eastern migrants was producing 'two Australias', 
riven by a 'cultural divide' (Millett 18/3/02: 1). This was really about 
a division between Sydney and Melbourne on one hand, and the 
rest of the country on the other, partly but not entirely resulting 
from patterns of migration, yet was presented primarily as an ethnic 
division. Two months later, the Australian ran a series of items 
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over several days under the same title of 'The Cultural Divide'. 
Though these articles were overwhelmingly positive about migration, 
cultural diversity and multiculturalism (see, for example, Australian 
8/5/02: 12-13), the title under which they ran sets the tone for the 
overall debate, repeating the kinds of assumptions about cultures 
that we saw in Chapter Three. The theme of fragmentation has 
been an increasingly pervasive one in Australia over the last decade. 
In the wake of the Federal election in 2001, Mike Seccombe 
described Australia as a 'fractured nation' (17/2/02:25,30-31). 
Sydney in particular is seen to exemplify this fragmentation: 
'Fractured Sydney' is seen to be riven equally by 'race and wealth' 
(Millett 5-6/7/2003b:23,30). Based on claims by academic 
researchers that there were now 'two Sydneys', the media 
accentuated the divisions around property and wealth and cast them 
in terms of the 'ethnic map' of the city, or 'The twofaces of Sydney' 
(Sydney Morning Herald 5-6/7/03:32, our emphasis). This fear 
of a divided 'home' - be it city or nation - is, of course, what 
gave purchase to the slogan, 'One Nation'. 
Of course, much of the concern that cultural conflict is 
inevitable with groups such as Muslims, Afghans and Lebanese is 
ill-founded: the history of Afghan traders and Lebanese hawkers 
in Australia, and Australian soldiers in the Middle East in World 
War One spring to mind as examples of amicable relations and 
demonstrate that there is no essential 'cultural clash'. A similarly 
problematic assumption is that Australia is being swamped by 
migrants from exotic cultures and religions. Australia's 'racial make-
up' is still predominantly European (Megalogenis 9/5/02: 13). A 
different belief that Sydney is home to a series of' ethnic ghettoes' 
is similarly inaccurate (Megalogenis 13-14/7/02: 19,22) - but still 
holds popular sway. Many white Australians feel they are being 
swamped, excluded, forgotten - as the denizens of Annangrove 
attest. A One Nation (2003) pamphlet for East Hills asked (of an 
implicitly Anglo-Australian voter) during the 2003 NSW election: 
, Are you sick of multiculturalism - feeling like a stranger in your 
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own country?' As a result, the cause of social division and the 
dissolution of community is seen to be the presence of cultural 
difference, as the criticisms of unassimilated migrants suggest. It 
is only by untangling this web of anxieties that we can begin to see 
how, for example, a number of rapes by a small number ofNESB 
men come to be seen as evidence of fundamental social fracturing, 
and of the failure of multicultural social policies. The 'failure' of 
multiculturalism is an overriding theme in the opinion pieces of the 
Telegraph and elsewhere. One Telegraph article explained, amidst 
the gang rape trials, 'Why the melting pot is ready to boil over' -
a metaphor earlier resorted to by the Australian (Chulov 18-19/8/ 
01: 1,4) - citing a survey that claimed that Parramatta, the heartland 
of multicultural Australia, was 'bubbling with barely concealed 
racism' (Morris & Hu! 12/7/02:6). In all these articles and letters 
the point is made repeatedly that 'they' (ungrateful migrants and 
intolerant workers) killed social and multicultural harmony, that it is 
a problem of someone else's doing. 
In the weeks leading up to Christmas, 2002, one bizarre furore 
captured the fever pitch of Australia's anxieties regarding cultural 
difference and change. The headmaster of a fundamentalist 
Christian school sent parents a newsletter explaining their policy of 
disabusing students of the fantasy of Santa Claus, arguing that it 
was not part of Christian tradition. (This was a fundamentalist 
Christian school, incidentally -a fact lost on many complainants 
railing about 'fundamentalist' Muslim immigrants!) This unleashed 
a whirlwind of invective, led by the Telegraph, directed at the 
excesses of multiculturalism. This in itself was bizarre, because 
the school's policy was based on a strict Christian focus on the 
birth of Jesus as the central feature of Christmas. Nevertheless, it 
automatically became a debate about multiculturalism, and in 
particular the intolerance of Muslims towards Christian traditions 
(Connolly & Cazzulino 30111102: 1-2), and the problem of 
'divisiveness' arising from 'Australians' having to 'defer to other 
cultures in fear of causing offence' (Daily Telegraph 30111102:24). 
The Telegraph ran a 'save Santa' campaign, including posters 
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declaring, 'Santa, We Believe', as though this was a central tenet 
of white, Western, Christian culture. Anxieties around cultural 
division were woven into anxieties about cultural change and the 
end of childhood innocence; unsurprisingly, the Prime Minister 
stepped in to 'defend' Santa (Connolly & Cazzulino 30111/02:1-2). 
But it is not simply differences in cultural values that are at 
stake: given the evaluative judgements implicit in the language of 
barbarism and civility, and perceptions of Christian and non-Christian 
values, the problem is seen to be that migrants from different 
cultures have a lesser morality than the dominant Anglo-Celtic one. 
In this, the criticisms of Islamic terrorism, Lebanese crime and 
Sharia law, as in the sentence to stoning of a woman in Nigeria for 
adultery, and the 'attack on Santa', are at one. Explaining danger 
or threat typically relies on a moral frame, because it allows for the 
easy attribution to someone, often an outsider, of fault, and hence 
calls for vengeance. Blame also serves the social function of 
solidarity (Douglas 1992:5-6). Rejecting the argument that poverty 
and inequality are the fundamental causes of crime, Telegraph 
columnist Piers Akerman argues that the Great Depression did not 
produce the same crime waves in Australia: 'Purely and simply, a 
stricter code of community morality existed'. While Akerman does 
not make an explicit link to migration, as a well-known critic of 
multiculturalism and someone who has frequently commented on 
the problems of 'ethnic crime', his allusion to the different 
'communities involved in criminal activities' in Sydney and New 
York in this article plainly refers to the impact of migration on this 
dissolution of a clearly defined community morality (Akerman 23/ 
5/02:28). 
Part of Australia's problem is that 'we' are so damned decent: 
'We are becoming so tolerant and accepting of other cultures that 
we are losing our cultural identity' (Mulhall 3112/02:26). In a series 
of letters compiled under the heading 'Lesson ofa society apart', 
correspondents to the Telegraph (20/8/02: 19) make it clear that 
Western and Middle Eastern cultures are incompatible, linking this 
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to the crimes of the 'Lebanese' rapists, the separatism of women-
only gyms, and the inability of Lebanese and Muslim migrants to 
integrate, to 'accept the Australian way oflife'. Similarly, it is 'they' 
who discriminate, such as was perceived in the case of the Muslim 
women-only gym. 
It is not simply cultural difference that is at issue here, or even 
different moral systems: immigration is increasingly seen as the 
cause of an array of social problems, especially in a place like 
Sydney: demographic and urban change, and environmental 
destruction, as well as crime. The 'cultural rift' discourse referred 
to above, talked about how the influx of migrants into Sydney was 
'skewing the city's demographics'. The resulting 'cultural schism' 
was 'increasing the economic, political and social pressures on 
Sydney as it faces people movements unrivalled elsewhere in the 
country' (Millett 18/3/02:6). The division here was more than 
between Sydney and Melbourne on one hand, and the rest of 
Australia on the other. Given Sydney's constant preoccupation with 
real estate, it was inevitable that the recent events would fuel another 
call to reduce immigration levels on grounds of urban sprawl. This 
time, Bob Carr called [again] for reduced intakes, arguing [again] 
that over-population was adding to Sydney's urban woes, increasing 
residents' concerns regarding over-development and the erosion 
oflifestyle, and linked to the environmental impact of high migration 
(Totaro & Nicholls 30111/02:25). The 'great Australian dream' of 
a house with a backyard is becoming an object of nostalgia, as 
Sydney becomes an 'international-type city' with greater demands 
for apartments or home units (Connolly 27111/02:9). Also, of course, 
immigration has often been seen as a cause of unemployment (Duffy 
17/8/02:16); now it is seen as the cause of Sydney's 'splitting' 
(Millett 5-6/7 /03a: 1). It is perhaps no coincidence that a furore 
over a prayer centre should occur in Annangrove, not because it is 
the centre of Anglo-Australia, but because it is on the fringe of 
rapid and extensive urban development, suffering from an absence 
of infrastructure. Concerns about social change and the loss of a 
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sense of local community, therefore, have much deeper roots than 
the threat posed by a small Indian Muslim prayer centre, but in a 
context of terrorism and 'ethnic crime', these are projected onto 
the very visible difference ofIslam. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
in the name of environmental and urban care, Bob Carr has emerged 
as one of the most outspoken critics of Australian immigration since 
Pauline Hanson. 
Rather than simply see these as bad explanations of social 
phenomena (which they certainly are), we also need to see these 
moments as expressing real anxieties around economic change. 
The articles discussing cultural division mentioned above inevitably 
refer to the economic dimensions of social division, even if this is 
initially seen in terms of ethnicity. An article on Hurstville in Sydney's 
south after several violent crimes occurred there linked the escal-
ation of crime in the area to immigration, but also to high density 
housing policy and to changes in the local economy of the suburb 
(Murphy 27-28/4/02:25). Amidst fears of economic downturn in 
Australia, and in the midst of drought and its economic 
consequences for farmers and Australia's agricultural exports, it is 
no wonder that the description of refugee detention centres as 'Five 
star asylums' (Penberthy 17112/02: 1) renewed the bile which the 
Telegraph's letter-writers directed at asylum seekers and the costs 
of supporting them. It is not always easy to tease out these 
dimensions of the anxieties directed towards migrants, refugees 
and NESB Australians, but they bubble away underneath, com-
pounding an earlier association. Well before these events, Pauline 
Hanson tapped into the insecurities resulting from globalisation, 
economic restructuring, rising unemployment, the casualisation of 
work and the decline of rural Australia. Her trump card was to link 
this insecurity to ethnic and Indigenous minorities. As suggested in 
Chapter Two, the links between social phenomena are often implicit 
because of the accumulation of cultural representations. Sometimes 
it is more explicit: Michael Duffy's article on the 'racial reality' of 
multiculturalism pointed out that many Lebanese migrants were 
230 
'Paranoia in the lucky country' 
unemployed and drew on welfare, producing ethnic ghettoes. He 
also argued however that the presence of these migrants caused 
greatest suffering to working class white Australians, because 
migrants constituted 'competition for working class jobs' (Duffy 
17/8/02: 16). 
The current fears of globalisation are, however, more implicit 
than in the rhetoric of One Nation, perhaps partly because the 
current climate involves vitriolic attacks on left-wing anti-
globalisation protesters. Nevertheless, concerns regarding the 
consequences of globalisation abound in odd ways. Most obviously, 
the recognition of the global nature of terrorism articulates one set 
of anxieties about living in a globalised world. The image of Osama 
bin Laden as an octopus with tentacles around the globe reaching 
to Australia, apart from echoing the infamous nineteenth-century 
Bulletin cartoon of a 'Chinaman' as an octopus and its white 
Australian fears of Asian hordes, captures this sense of penetration 
from the outside (Warren 28/10/02:14) (see Figure 4). The idea of 
bin Laden as an octopus was a common throughout the west (Bruce 
18/9/02). The Telegraph headlined 'GLOBAL TERROR' when 
Chechen rebels occupied a Moscow theatre (Wilson & Harvey 
2911 0/02: 1), linking it to Al Qaeda, and articles on the new global 
nature of terror included world maps showing this degree of 
penetration, and the end of Australia's isolation from it (Time 28/ 
10/02:44-45; Dickins 30/10/10-11). Reference to Australia's 
innocence was paralleled by talk of Australia no longer being a 
'safe haven'; as the Telegraph put it, in this 'world fed on hate', 
'Terrorism is no longer on our doorstep, it is here' (20111/02:30). In 
the midst of this emerged claims that mosques in Australia were 
being financed by Middle Eastern money (Cameron 25111/02: 1,4). 
The anxieties expressed in these examples also convey a sense 
of the failure of State institutions. In Chapter Two we demonstrated 
how the war metaphor was also turned against police and political 
leaders, who were seen to be as much of a problem as violent 
'ethnics'. After several years in which the NSW Police Service 
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had become highly politicised and prone to scathing attacks, largely 
by right-wing media commentators, the undermining and subsequent 
departure of Commissioner Peter Ryan did little to restore public 
faith in the leadership of policing in NSW. As analysts at the time 
argued, the appointment of Michael Costa as the new NSW Police 
Minister continued to demonstrate that political and media 
intervention in policing were powerful factors in the management 
of the force (Wilkinson 7/2/02:4; Poynting 2002:239). 
This resulted in what Miranda Devine referred to as 'jaded 
citizens' (Devine 7112/02:12). A series of events after Ryan's 
replacement by Ken Moroney - further restructuring of the force, 
fears of a handgun epidemic, internet trade in firearms, a series of 
murders, including the murder of a policemen, and savage fights 
amongst armed youth, including several based around schools, as 
well as the release of statistics showing increases in violent crime 
- did little to diminish the sense of failure. At the same time, 
various initiatives - increased use of surveillance technologies, 
the allowing of police to work in their spare time as security officers, 
random knife searches and the greater use of dogs in searches, the 
presence of police in schools - raised concerns about increased 
police powers. While the majority of commentators and letter-writers 
approved of these new powers and dismissed the spectre of a 
'police state' (Daily Telegraph 23/4/02: 14), others were less 
sanguine about the 'invasion of our civil liberties ' (Clark 24/5/02:25). 
This wasn't just a NSW issue: Australian police, for example, have 
been shown to use phone-tapping at 20 times the rate of their US 
counterparts (Banham 24/9/02: 16). 
As well as the NSW police, the state government was held 
accountable for many of these problems, and much venom was 
also directed, as it was during the rape trials, at a legal system 
which supposedly failed to punish criminals appropriately, or even 
at all. Miranda Devine (7/4/02:15) condemned the NSW 
government, its public service and the courts for 'Turning a blind 
eye to blood on the streets'. But it was not just police and state 
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political leaders that have been the object of criticisms, and it was 
not just in relation to gangs and crime - a range of authorities 
came under fire during many of the media stories we have described 
here. The Anti-Discrimination Board, and bureaucracy generally, 
was roundly condemned for 'political correctness' and 'multi-
culturalism gone mad' during the 'Muslim gym' affair (Daily 
Telegraph 15/8/02:30). David Penberthy, in a particularly crude 
example of populist demagoguery, lined up 'small-s society' (us), 
'a vast and disorganised mass of humanity which judges issues on 
their merits', against 'Big-S Society' (them), groups which operate 
on the basis of self-interest or ideology - The Law Society, the 
Council for Civil Liberties, leftish judges, academics and other 
organisations (20/9/02:28). A One Nation (2003) state election 
pamphlet makes comparable elisions by simply listing its gripes as 
multiculturalism, the health system, criminal justice and policing. 
Both the refugee and the terrorist crises have occasioned 
criticism of wider political authority. Particularly but not only in the 
wake of the' children overboard affair' , distrust of political leaders 
has been high, with trenchant criticism from the liberal left. The 
popular response to the federal government's handling of the asylum 
seekers has been, on the surface, largely supportive. However, we 
suspect that in the long run this will only confirm Australians' political 
cynicism. One regular survey of levels of 'well-being' found that 
satisfaction with government fell 5 points to 52.2% during 2002 
(Kerin & Balogh 10/7/02:3). Other evidence suggests that cynicism 
is growing. In the midst of the federal government's calls for us to 
be alert, it was revealed that the 'war on terror' would be cramped 
by 'cost bungling': 'Australia's defence forces face cuts to vital 
weapons programs as they prepare for the dangerous new world 
of terrorism and increased regional instability , (Allard 16/12/02: 1). 
This followed the bizarre standoff between the major parties 
regarding the anti-terrorism laws, resulting in the failure to pass 
any legislation for several months. This 'political brinkmanship over 
Australia's security' which showed the major leaders 'at war' 
(Banham 14-15/12/02:1) was seen as a case of party politics 
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compromising issues of national security by members ofthe letter-
writing public. While the Telegraph Vote-line was probably divided 
on party lines - 46% of readers felt the government should not be 
blamed for not allowing enough time for debate, while 54% 
disagreed with this (Daily Telegraph 16/12/02:21), presumably 
many blaming the Opposition and the Greens for not passing the 
legislation - this division itself expresses a failure of national unity 
at a time when political leaders stress that this is what is needed. 
As Joan Kelly of Miranda put it, under the heading 'An act of 
irresponsibility' : 
I am absolutely appalled that our politicians have not agreed 
on new anti-terrorism laws and have opted instead to go on 
holidays ... Our politicians were elected to manage and protect 
our country. In the interests of the nation, they should return 
immediately and remain there until an agreement has been 
reached and legislated (16/12/02: 18). 
At the same time, there is concern that new anti-terrorist legislation 
of whatever ilk could usher in the kind of police state that seemed 
hysterical six months previously. A generally positive front-page 
article by the Telegraph nevertheless alerts 'TERROR POWERS: 
Police can search first and ask questions later' - feeding upon 
this anxiety towards increased political intervention (English 19/11/ 
02: 1). On the other hand, letter-writers condemn Australian leaders 
and the various authorities for being unprepared for terrorist attacks, 
making Australia an 'Open House for terrorists' (Daily Telegraph 
5/11/02: 18). Similarly, the heavy-handed ASIO raids, while generally 
supported by 'right-thinking' Australians, combined with other 
examples of the ineptitude of intelligence organisations, confmns a 
lack of faith in political authority as a whole. 
Taking all these things together, there is clearly an extensive 
complex of fears - the loss of social cohesion, the unsettling 
presence of cultural difference, moral decay, the failure of political 
leadership and institutional authority, globalisation and economic 
change -lying underneath the very public reactions to the events 
discussed in this book. Australia is a very scared place. 
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Fear of everything, everywhere 
These fears congeal around particular events and objects, but they 
are always about a range of anxieties that are pervasive and ongoing, 
and not reducible to the presence of exotic migrants per se. What 
is important is that the anxieties are given materiality - a face ('of 
evil', whether it be Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, the gang 
rapists, or an identikit of a young man of Middle Eastern appear-
ance), a place (Gangland, Iraq, Bankstown, Afghanistan), a name 
(Lebanese, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Punchbowl Boys, Islam), and a 
'crime ' (rape, discrimination, terror, inassimilability) - a materiality 
which allows us to identify and at least symbolically control that 
anxiety. This tangible thing is something to aim for, to avoid, to 
blame, to capture, to fight, to punish, to imprison, to exclude: it 
gives us something on which we can act. For, when we are thrown 
up against events over which we have no control, we tum back 
onto those things we do (or think we do) - we recuperate a sense 
of agency and power lost in the immensity of threat, and 
exacerbated by the self-representation of innocent victimhood 
resulting from the desire to foreground the moral dimension of crime. 
Yet at the same time, the global nature of these fears combines 
with our increasingly intimate relation to the objects of those fears 
to undermine the attempts we make to distance ourselves, morally, 
culturally and physically, from the underlying sources of anxiety, 
and hence undermines our attempts to recuperate power. The 
attempts to locate the object of fear somewhere removed from us 
fail, because, as with our sense of escalating crime, it is 'the fear 
outside everyone's door'; and, with global terrorism, it is 'no longer 
on our doorstep'. Not only is the problem here, then; it is 
everywhere. As Dave Madden, the NSW Deputy Commissioner 
of Police, said, 'I'm asked "Are shopping centres targets?", "Are 
night clubs targets?"; anything can be a target' (Channel 7 News 
20/11/02). Indeed, as the articles kept reminding us, 'TERROR 
HITS HOME' (Karvelas 30/10102:8). 
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This increasing awareness that we are no longer removed 
from terror is some recognition, however muted, that the problem 
is not out there, nor someone else, but is part of Australian society. 
There are hints at this throughout the articles cited above -
particularly in regard to economic and political anxieties. But even 
in relation to concerns regarding cultural dissolution and social 
cohesion, there are moments that register that immigration is not 
the only, nor even the major, cause of our anxieties. 
Attempts to construct a unified Australian-ness in the wake 
of Bali in particular - headlines that announce we are 'AUST-
RALIANS TOGETHER' (Daily Telegraph 18/10/02:72-73), '19 
MILLION MATES' (Daily Telegraph 19/10/02:1), and so on, 
come across as somewhat anxious attempts to reassure ourselves 
that there is no disunity, or that we can recover the unity that was 
once ours. This is predicated on the mythic belief in a once cohesive 
Australian community, but Australian society has always had social 
and cultural divisions - Indigenous and Irish Catholic inhabitants 
would happily testify to this - as well as significant economic 
inequalities of class, and political antagonisms. 
The 'family' theme of national belonging is interesting here. 
Piers Akerman criticised the 'Muslim rugby league player' Hazem 
Al Masri after he had publicly called on Premier Carr to recognise 
Muslims as Australian to help them 'feel part of one family'. 
Akerman responded by saying 'Australians' had always been 
accommodating and happily invite migrants into the national 'family', 
but, quoting a local, radical Islamic magazine, argued that it was 
Muslim migrants who 'removed' themselves from this 'family' 
(Akerman 13/8/02: 14). A few months after this, NSW Police 
Commissioner Ken Moroney admitted that the police could not fix 
all of Sydney's problems - that parents needed to take more 
responsibility, and instil respect in their children. The article implicitly 
compares Moroney's 'strong family' with a Tongan family whose 
boys were 'running wild' - implicitly associating poor parenting 
with ethnicity (Cameron 7-8/12/02:3). 
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On top of criticism of the history of the policy of the removal 
ofIndigenous children from their parents, of the problems with the 
operations of departments of community and family services in 
Australia, ofthe federal government's treatment of refugee children 
in both the 'children overboard affair' and the detention centres, it 
seems disingenuous to criticise, as Howard did during the asylum 
seekers crisis, the bad parenting ofNESB migrants. Again, it seems 
that deeply embedded anxieties regarding our own social fabric 
are played out through the fragile construction of a fictional bad 
Other onto whom we can project our own self-doubts. 
Despite our attempts to contain our fears through the creation 
of objects of aggression and immorality, they always overflow that 
containment; they always exceed the rational. This is evidenced in 
some of the bizarre associations made in recent years, like that 
between fire and terrorism. What we can conclude from these 
associations is that not only do we fear everything, but that the 
things we fear are everywhere. As one 'expert' was quoted as 
saying, 'Watch out for danger everywhere' (Morris 22/11/02:4). 
The management of fear 
The problem for the State and for media organisations is how to 
handle these fears: the promotion offear helps sell papers as much 
as governments, but only if the media, like government, can offer 
some apparent resolution to these fears, to tame them, to restore 
some sense of equilibrium. As the 2001 federal election showed, 
the successful deployment of public concerns around refugees and 
terror can be coupled with increasing levels of apathy and cynicism: 
these issues were considered important but overall there were low 
levels of public engagement (Bean & McAllister 2002:272). In any 
moment of uncertainty, there are always tendencies to both fun-
damentalism and cynicism: neither is beneficial to social cohesion 
or social justice (Hoggett 1989:32); but they are politically useful if 
they can be managed. 
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Moral panics, especially when they constitute a broader climate 
of fear, are not simply cultural affairs, negotiations over rep-
resentation; they are tied to institutional power and state actions 
(Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994:31), as Chapter Five has demonstrated. 
As we suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the 'politics of 
fear' is not quite complex enough to capture how governments 
and media have participated in the escalation of this panic culture. 
Certainly they have engaged in the cynical manipulation of fears, 
but they have not produced them in any simple and direct sense; 
moreover, these fears have to be handled carefully, not just inflamed, 
because their value lies in balancing fear and reassurance. As 
Douglas argues, fear tends to strengthen the lines of division in a 
society, not reduce them (1992:34); but in a society increasingly 
preoccupied with risks of all sorts, the strategies employed for 
taming our anxieties may also paradoxically exacerbate them 
(Lupton 1999b:13). It is perhaps better to say that we have seen 
processes exemplifying the management of fear, both for the 
handling of crime and offenders, and also as the handling of the 
wider population, at federal, state and local levels. The dilemmas 
of justice and identity, Burke argues, are reduced in Howard's vision 
to a managerialist task offacing change but providing reassurance. 
Yet the cause of the resentment may be government policy and the 
effects of globalisation, rather than imported terror itself (Burke 
2001:186-7). 
There is a lot of emphasis on reassuring Australians at the 
moment - at the expense of some serious effective social policy. 
There is a shift in government strategy at all levels to the cynical 
management of public mood. NSW Premier Bob Carr, turning his 
attention from domestic crime to the international crime of terrorism, 
admitted that 'we are trying to send a message of reassurance to 
the people ofNSW' (ABC News 18112/02); his government needed 
to show, he claimed, that the 'authorities' were responding to 
terrorism: 'people need that reassurance' (Channel 9 News 171 
12/02). Similarly, Police Commissioner Moroney has made it clear 
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that his task is as much about solving 'fear of crime' as it is solving 
the reality of crime (Cameron 7-8/12/02:3). In August 2003, 
Moroney, whose work performance was proposed to be judged on 
social 'perceptions' of crime as well as crime rates, called for the 
first comprehensive survey of fear of crime, echoing the Premier's 
comments of eight months earlier: 'People want reassurance'. He 
added that 'the fear of crime can be as debilitating as the crime 
itself'. In a telling admission, however, he claimed that: 'I need to 
know that the strategies and policies we are implementing are 
working. The best approach would be to survey community attitudes 
on the fear of crime' (Wainwright 23-24/8/03a:3). As both 
Akerman (23/5/02:28) and Wainwright (23-24/8/03b:29) suggest, 
our 'sense of security' regarding crime and policing has been 
'shattered' because of the focus on local crimes, national issues 
such as illegal immigration and international political crises. 
To reassure us, however, we need to be anxious. We live in a 
world where campaigns for public safety (such as 'stranger danger') 
require the promotion of the fear in the first instance: we promote 
safety by promoting fear (Furedi 1997:25). The Howard Govern-
ment's management of fear is well shown in its anti-terrorist 
campaign. Full-page advertisements in the major papers entitled, 
'Protecting the Australian way oflife from a possible terrorist threat' 
- were aimed to reassure us that all will be OK if we stay alert, 
but they fan the fears they seek to put out by reminding us that we 
need to be alert, that there is reason to feel threatened (Common-
wealth Government 29112/02: 12). 
To see how the Federal Government's anti-terrorism campaign 
is part of a larger genre of fear promotion, it is worth comparing 
the 'Let's look out for Australia' kit (Commonwealth Government 
2003) to 'A kit for protecting your home from intruders', distributed 
by the Attorney-General's Department (2001) as part of the Com-
monwealth Government's National Crime Prevention Programme. 
The anti-terrorism kit is subtitled, 'Protecting our way oflife from 
a possible terrorist threat'. The Intruders kit carries the same 
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discourse of security and threat, safety and protection, with an 
implicit acknowledgment of a threat from 'outside'. Moreover, the 
Intruders' kit, while emphasising a discourse of the 'family' as 
being under threat, also locates this within a frame of national 
belonging; the anti-terrorism kit, while emphasising the issues around 
national security, links this to personal security and the need to 
protect Australian families. The latter begins with 'An important 
message from the Prime Minister', the former with 'A message 
from the Minister' , Chris Ellison, giving it the imprimatur of national 
community. Against this overwhelming threat, both kits offer a sense 
of agency, a chance to do something in the face of near insur-
mountable fears - the Intruders kit talks about 'taking an active 
role, the anti-terrorism kit talks of 'playing a part'. The anti-terrorism 
kit offers a handy checklist of 'Possible signs of terrorism' and 
'suspicious activity' (such as cars with low suspension or people 
videotaping important sites). The Intruders kit similarly provides a 
checklist 'to reduce the risk' and a practical guide to a 'safety 
audit'. The anti-terrorism kit offers a fridge magnet with emergency 
numbers; so does the Intruders kit. The point here is to draw attention 
to the shared generic features - of content, language and style -
to emphasise how this economy of terror has become commonplace 
over the last decade and is not simply the result of recent inter-
national events. Our fears have been managed for some time now; 
the anti-terrorism campaign feeds upon these anxieties. 
Similarly, Premier Carr was foremost in promoting a language 
of ethnic crime and Lebanese gangs (Collins et al. 2000), and yet 
also steps in at times to 'defend' the Muslim community and to 
promote racial harmony (Wainwright 18/10/02:3), and initiate 
cultural and leadership programs for Arabic youth (Kerr 1117/01:4). 
The ASIa raids on the homes of Muslims with vague connections 
to Indonesian Muslim radicals was clearly a public relations exercise 
with the (majority Anglo-Celtic) electorate in mind - it was designed 
to be seen to be doing something, like zero tolerance and community 
policing, as much as, if not more than, achieving real intelligence, 
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especially as one of those raided had previously invited ASIa to 
discuss his supposed contacts with Jemaah Islamiah (Morris 4/111 
02: 1). Carr also used this to his advantage, calling for defence force 
staff to guard Sydney targets, and introducing his own Terrorism 
Bill as his federal colleagues undermined the plan put forward by 
Howard (Allard et al. 23-24/11102:27,34). Carr also used the theme 
of 'security' in his election campaign in March 2003. Placed just 
after the Telegraph's regular coverage of the war in Iraq, which 
spans several pages, and most significantly following the sub-section 
on the 'War in Iraq: Home Front', the Labor Party placed a full-
page advertisement headed 'A Secure Future' featuring a large 
photo of Carr in front of the national flag (Australian Labor Party 
2113/03: 10). Carr is clearly drawing on allusions to the threat of 
international terrorism although this is not a state issue. 
Late capitalist society is marked by what Zedner calls 'the 
pursuit of security', a preoccupation not just in crime control, but 
which extends through various levels of State and commercial 
activity, private and public life. The boom in private security services 
and technologies exemplify this 'security industry' as much as the 
growth in intelligence activities, and these both parallel the 
emergence of vigilantism and community-based crime prevention 
initiatives (2000:200, 207). 
The consequence of this is, however, that in promoting fear to 
promote safety, governments and media always run the risk of 
being unable to contain the fears and anxieties they seek to assuage. 
As Allard et al. (23-24/11/02:27,34) register: 'Making people secure 
has in some ways enhanced anxiety'. Alongside the anxieties of 
the dominant culture, of course, are the very real fears of people of 
Muslim or Middle Eastern ancestry, who are increasingly becoming 
the target for social exclusion, racial vilification, state surveillance, 
intensive policing and race-hate campaigns (English & Cazzulino 
2/10/02: 11); there is a sense that they are 'Under siege and bracing 
for a war' (English & McDougall 111 0/02: 10). Muslims in particular 
were increasingly 'in fear of growing paranoia' across Australia 
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(Karvelas 30/10/02:6). Barrie Unsworth, the NSW chairman of 
the Australia Day Council, has recently suggested that the anti-
terrorist ads have contributed to a climate of 'fear and suspicion' , 
and have especially undermined the confidence of the Islamic 
community (Taylor 23/1/02:28). As the levels offear and paranoia 
grow, surveys have shown that Australians' sense of well-being 
has diminished markedly in the last few years (Horin 9/9/02:4; Morris 
23/12/02:4). 
Panic culture: the national paranoia 
In the late 1980s, in what seemed at the time an example of 
postmodern hyperbole, Kroker, Kroker and Cook proposed the idea 
that the West, and especially the United States, embodied a 'panic 
culture', because panic had become 'the key psychological mood 
of postmodern culture'. They claimed that panic had become a 
free-floating reality, that ecstasy and anxiety were entwined, 
attaching themselves to all events and institutions: we had panic 
politics, panic sex, panic capitalism, and so on. Panic culture was 
marked by the disappearance of external standards of conduct , 
such that the social becomes the transparent field of cynical power, 
and by the dissolution of internal foundations of identity, such that 
selfhood becomes attached to the spectacles of a mediatised culture 
(1989: 13-16). Social changes intersected with inner anxiety, produc-
ing depressive and persecutory anxieties - despair on the one 
hand and scapegoating on the other. They also resulted in a deep 
distrust of political leadership, and a retreat into fantasy, exemplified 
by the rise ofthe gated community (122-4,209). Hyperbole aside, 
and with some shifts of emphasis, Kroker et al. were not that far 
off the mark: we would say, however, that in the uncertainty, flux 
and fragmentation oflate capitalism, we experience constant low-
level fear, like a 'background radiation saturating existence' 
(Massumi 1993 :24; Lupton 1999b: 11), but which spikes in moments 
such as those we call moral panics. 
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This book has demonstrated that there is clear evidence in 
Australia of the pervasiveness of panic and its attachment to diverse 
ph~n~mena ~x~cerbated by media reportage, and of scapegoating, 
pohtlcal cymclsm and distrust, and that these articulate with the 
fantasy of a protective national community. The result is that we 
live in the state of what Hage calls 'paranoid nationalism': a national-
ism that rests on an institutionalised culture of worrying which 'is 
the product of an insecure attachment to a nation that is no longer 
capable of nurturing its citizen'; instead of being a reality that needs 
to be protected, the nation becomes 'a fantasy that needs to be 
protected from reality'. This protection takes the form of an 
obsessive preoccupation with the threat of disorder (2002:3-4), 
and hence we must find constant objects of hostility. 
Political paranoia, as described by Robins and Post (1997), 
typically involves delusions of persecution, and the projection of 
conflict and distrust onto malevolent others to provide an alternative 
to an unbearable reality. At issue in the complex of fears around 
terrorism, however, is more than just 'psychic disarray' caused by 
some vague western malaise of psychological 'emptiness' (Carroll 
2002) - such a view neatly sidesteps the material foundations of 
these anxieties. Anxiety, as Wilkinson (2001) shows, is not just a 
psychological phenomenon, but a reaction to larger social changes 
that are experienced in subjective terms. The complex of fears we 
have described is more than just an arbitrary linkage of diverse 
anxieties. We are no longer talking about concrete fears in our 
immediate environments, but abstractions that are felt as present 
and immediate. Anthony Burke has detailed Australia's obsession 
with security throughout its history, an imperative shaped by our 
perilous existence as an outpost of European colonialism in the 
Asia-Pacific region. He cites an earlier 'refugee crisis' of 1999, 
which Philip Ruddock called a 'national emergency' and a threat 
to the nation's integrity, arguing that governmental responses of 
recent years have been out of all proportion given Australia's long 
tradition of dealing with illegal migration, and given the relatively 
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minor problem Australia faced compared to other countries. 
Australia exhibits a desire to be secure from cultural strangeness, 
asserting a sense of national integrity that reveals more about its 
vulnerability, and produces a particular perception of security that 
rests on the exclusion and suffering of others (200 I :xxii-xxv). 
Burke's analysis suggests that there is more at stake here than just 
policy, but a profound need for an ontological guarantee of existence 
and of a future, a search for historical, strategic, economic and 
ontological certitude (xxxvi, 184). The power of the idea of security 
is its promise to secure and enable being, but it is a being that we 
need to question. It rests on a hegemonic masculinity that perceives 
politics as disordered, needing force for security, and it rests on the 
insecurity of others (265). Yet ultimately, Burke suggests, this form 
of security reproduces the very fear it is meant to contain, revealing 
the vulnerability of an impoverished sovereignty, Australian 
democracy and freedom of expression (325,328). There is, as he 
argues, a profound anxiety underlying the vision of John Howard 
about the lack of fixity to the Australian identity (187). 
The mobilisation of fear amongst populations - and especially 
fear of the Other, but also fear of the unknown and fear of change 
- has always been a crucial implement for the maintenance of 
power. However, the development of organised capitalism and its 
attendant state complex saw this mobilisation become a more 
systematic mechanism. In the twentieth century, an increasing 
number of nation-states marshalled an array of resources in which 
the promulgation of a popular fear was an increasingly pervasive 
element. The 'populate or perish' dimension of the White Australia 
Policy is one such local example. Alongside state-based mechanisms, 
the twentieth century also saw the mass commodification of fear 
- popular cinema, for example, especially in the science fiction, 
war and horror genres, serviced this popular fear. News media -
and especially the tabloid press and talkback radio - also operate 
on the ground of popular fears. The reasons for this need have 
been well covered elsewhere - the increasingly abstract social 
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relations of organised capitalism, the resulting experiences of 
alienation and loss of community, globalisation and the increasing 
intensity of international conflict, technological change, increasing 
transnational flows, and so on. But it is of significance that we live 
in a world that is far safer than at any time in history (except for 
the potential threat arising from the nuclear arms race), and yet we 
are preoccupied more than ever with risk, danger and insecurity 
(Furedi 1997:54). 
Fundamental to this paradox is the prevailing mood of existential 
insecurity: the world of late modernity is one in which we are no 
longer sure who we can trust, whether our identities and com-
munities are meaningful any more, whether we have any agency 
in a hi-tech, corporate world. In an increasingly individuated world, 
the social character ofhuman action is lost and we become accom-
modated to powerlessness (Furedi 1997: 171). 
As Giddens (1991:38) has argued, we strive for 'ontological 
security' - the sense of trust we have in the surrounding world. 
We need a basic confidence in the things and people around us to 
make it possible to act in the world. In a world of change, of complex 
social relations, we need constantly to secure our identities and 
relations to make our lives viable. The similarity between the anti-
terrorism and home security kits is not coincidental: the home is the 
place where we most typically ground that ontological security 
(Dupuis & Thoms 1998) and the home is the site where the 
connections between private life and national belonging are forged 
(Noble 2002). It is no wonder, then, that the suburban home and 
ordinary mums and dads figure in our deepest anxieties about social 
conflict, as we saw in Chapter Two, or that Bali - as our 'backyard' 
- should have such great resonance for Australians and their 
perception of international terrorism as a direct threat. What 
seemed so shocking to some Australians about the incidents of 
group sexual assault, perhaps, was that it was 'RAPE IN THE 
SUBURBS', right next door (Wockner 12/7/02:1). In September, 
2003, a number of incidents led to concerns that there was a spate 
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of 'gangland-style' hits in Sydney's suburbs: one article charac-
terised these as 'attacks on homes' and, although brief, managed 
to refer to 'homes' nine times (although the police raids in response 
were noticeably conducted only on 'properties '), and managed to 
make reference to the families of four of the victims (Kennedy 3/ 
9/03). It is clear that these events are seen to strike to the very 
heart of Australian family life and suburban community. 
Bauman (1999: 14,5) suggests that in contemporary society 
we desperately we seek a 'community without fears', but in vain, 
and that this is really an issue about three things - in/security, un/ 
safety and un/certainty - which overlap. Looking back over the 
coverage of these various incidents in this book we can see these 
concerns of security, safety and certainty interweaving through 
preoccupations with borders, violence and values. 'Safety', for 
example - safe sex, personal and public safety, help lines, home 
security - became a fundamental value in the 1990s as we 
developed a greater consciousness of risk and a greater fear of 
crime (Furedi 1997: 1). Now 'security' has become as significant a 
value, as Burke shows. Certainty (versus relativism) has been a 
central problem in the debates around multiculturalism and a core 
Australian culture: the Sydney Morning Herald included a feature 
on 'Keeping the faith in a world less certain' to mark Australia 
Day in 2003 (Morgan & Stephens 25-26/1/03:A2). These different 
dimensions of fear feed upon each other. 
Bauman argues that we only deal with these in one of two 
ways. First, we fashion a sense of unity founded on 'killing an 
enemy' (15): the Arab Other functions as this enemy in con-
temporary Australia, and its murder is both symbolic and increasingly 
literal. Second, by turning our existential fears into something smaller 
to worry about, some 'practical task' to perform, we find an object 
for human action - harsher laws and sentences, tightening border 
security and the detention of asylum seekers. But what we really 
seek, Bauman suggests, is a more lasting sense of community, 
agency and vision (44). Yet these short-term 'solutions' only 
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exacerbate the impossibility of addressing the real needs. Hage 
(2002:9) argues that 'hope' is in increasingly short supply in 
Australia; we cannot show compassion to marginalised people 
because 'to be able to give hope one has to have it'. US President 
George W Bush recently argued that 'government can write 
cheques - but it cannot put hope in people's hearts or a sense of 
purpose in people's lives' (Zackman 22/1/03:40). Howard's 
eschewal of 'the vision thing' of the previous Labor Government, 
and Carr's pragmatism, amount to much the same philosophy of 
political leadership. Yet, as we have shown, while the State increas-
ingly disavows the task of providing hope, it does so at the same 
time it increasingly engages in the promotion of fear. 
While we have stressed, in line with contemporary media theory, 
that 'fear of crime' and associated anxieties can't be reduced to or 
blamed on sensational media reporting (Tulloch 1999:34), the media 
have fundamental roles in voicing and shaping (often contradictory) 
perceptions about crime and related social problems: roles that help 
explain the disparity between escalating fear of crime out of 
proportion to the personal experience of crime. The media may be 
the only place we experience some threats, such as terrorism, and 
it provides a daily catalogue of such hazards (Wilkinson 2001: 118). 
Crucially, the media encode crime, disorder and social hazards as 
fragmentation made coherent (Tulloch 1999:42). In doing this, they 
tum social anxieties into narratives of crisis and its containment 
that are consumable: contemporary media reshape violence and 
crime as a popular entertainment (Presdee 2000). Alongside the 
proliferation of police TV dramas and the current affairs reporting 
of crime and terror is the proliferation of documentaries and dramas 
around events such as September 11. While it is too simplistic to 
say that the media produce our anxieties, by offering endless, 
competing representations of social problems and crisis, especially 
in the forms of crime and terror, they produce uncertainties and 
conflicting interpretations that help create the grounds for wider 
anxieties (Wilkinson 2001 :9,129). 
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The alignment of state policy and commodification of popular 
fears means that western nations in particular have a peculiar 
'economy of terror': the promotion of fear and its appeasement. 
Governments, like popular media, help produce the anxieties they 
then seek to ameliorate - in the post-September 11 world, and in 
Australia after Bali, for example, governments and media 'talk up' 
the prospect of terrorist attacks, biological warfare, and the threat 
of nations such as Iraq - in order to reassure us that these threats 
can and will be dealt with. The same kind of economy of terror 
operates in the realm of law and order - the threat of ethnic 
gangs/drugs/rape etc are talked up in order to reassure us they will 
be overcome. However, this manipulation of fears and anxieties 
has dire consequences for the trust central to our 'ontological 
security' . 
This economy of terror constantly throws up challenges to 
our ontological security in order to reassure us: the long-term effect 
of this is that our ontological security is ultimately undermined-
and social anxieties become much more profound and destructive 
and less amenable to amelioration. The economy ofterror described 
above operates largely as a fear of the Other, of difference, but in 
constantly throwing up threats it undermines the stability and coher-
ence of our daily lives, revealing the fact that these threats emanate 
from us, from here, not from them or there. If national belonging is 
framed in terms of victim hood and persecution, there must ensue a 
crisis of social responsibility in which agency is given up (Young 
1996:53,58). Australian identity and community has increasingly 
been framed not just in terms of fragmentation, but in terms of a 
nation endangered. The nation is aligned with 'white victimisation' 
that involves the construction of internal threats from Indigenous 
and ethnic minority groups (Mackey 1999: 109-111). 
We have demonstrated that alongside the attempts to depict 
the threats of crime and social decay as coming from Others, the 
depiction of threats within our social institutions - the police, courts, 
government, media - makes this process of blaming the Other 
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unstable. Two brief examples will suffice: in July, 2003, a rising 
rugby league player Kane Mason was killed in an example of what 
the Telegraph admitted was 'a vicious hate crime', in a front-page 
article which screamed 'HATE KILLING', because the alleged 
murderer had intended to 'kill some niggers' (Goldner 29/7/03: I). 
The ethnicity of the alleged offender, Michael Clifford, was not 
given (nor was the Indigenous background of Mason explicitly 
stated) - in stark contrast to the 'race rape' coverage - yet it is 
implicit that this racist crime could not be sheeted home to non-
English speaking background migrants. This followed (limited) 
coverage of Anglo-Australian racism towards Muslims in the wake 
of September 11 - both from extremist groups such as White 
Pride who conducted a 'race hate' campaign in Sydney's west 
(Morris 30/5/03 :21) and from' ordinary' Australians who give voice 
to the 'MINDLESS HATE IN THE SUBURBS' (Jopson 20-211 
1 % 1: 18). At the same time, the threat of the Arab Other has 
become somewhat less exotic: two men linked to Al Qaeda in 
September, 2003, were unhesitatingly, and repeatedly, identified as 
'Australian men' (Daily Telegraph 4/9/03: 17). The Herald was 
more abrupt and wider in its implications: 'Terror contact: finger 
points at Australians' (Goodsir et al. 4/9/03: 1). Suddenly, the Other 
is not so Other. 
The responses to these deep anxieties - the defence of 
ordinariness, the recuperation of national agency - can only be 
temporary, they cannot be sustained, and ultimately 'we' may be 
recognised as the source of our own fears. These tensions, however, 
fuel the increasingly 'paranoid nationalism' that constitutes Aus-
tralia's national belonging and which keeps searching for objects 
of hostility onto which we can project our anxieties. What we have 
demonstrated throughout is that these anxieties are not simply 
remote concerns about some abstract notion of national belonging: 
this paranoia touches the very suburban heart of Australian national 
life. Themes of home, suburbia, ordinariness, family and local 
community resonate throughout the media reports and political 
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rhetoric we have analysed in this book. There are close relationships 
between localised fear of crime and the feeling of safety in your 
neighbourhood and the perceptions of the threat of international 
terrorism. Moreover, the sense of threat destabilises the certainty 
and security we desire from the local and the familiar. 
At the same time, it becomes harder to sustain the idea of the 
radical difference of Others. Rage (2002: 141-2) argues that in the 
post-September 11 world it is not xenophobia that is the problem 
(fear of the Other), but a fear of the same. What really terrifies 
'us' in the acts of suicide bombing, for example, is not the radical 
difference of the perpetrators, but their common humanity - the 
fact that they could be just like 'us'. Certainly, amidst the claims 
and images discussed here, we can see underneath a concern with 
the fate of humanity - not just at the hands of others, but in our 
own as well. Our world has a diminished sense of humanity and its 
potential, not only of others, as Rage suggests, but also of our own: 
we have an increasing sense of our passivity and fragility (Furedi 
1997:10). The Daily Telegraph spoke of 'broken humanity' in the 
aftermath of the Bali bombings (Lalor 15/10102:4-5). The shifting 
of agency onto a violent but mythic Other, in the face of the futility 
of our institutional responses, only exacerbates this. Our 'paranoid 
nationalism' rests on a narcissistic culture of worrying, rather than 
an ethic of care: a worrying that evinces a fragile national belonging 
premised on an obsessive concern with borders and their trans-
gression (2002:3-4). In this environment, our collective and personal 
ontological security is massively eroded, exacerbating a sense of 
alienation and fostering a climate in which short-term and desperate 
responses - like the scapegoating of ethnic groups - becomes 
increasingly aggressive. What we really need, at this moment, is a 
different way of thinking community, agency and vision. 
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Against racist penal populism 
This book has shifted a long way from its initial concern with the 
perceived link between crime and people of Middle Eastern 
ancestry in a context of increasing international concern regarding 
terrorism. In asking, 'Row does a crime committed by an individual 
or group of individuals come to be seen as the fault of an entire 
ethnic group?', we demonstrated that this link involves not just some 
kind of racist mistake, but complex social perceptions which have 
at their heart larger issues to do with national belonging, multi-
culturalism and international and domestic politics. They also, of 
course, centrally involve matters of economic disadvantage (Collins 
et al. 2000). We have shown how there have been in Australia and 
particularly in Sydney over the last few years, waves of moral 
panic around 'ethnic crime', youth gangs, 'race rape', asylum 
seekers and terrorism: a moral panic that sutures together, over 
time, a number of discrete events around a figure we have called 
the Arab Other which impacts at various levels of political and 
social life. 
We have argued that the social imagining of the criminal in 
contemporary Australia increasingly involves the evocation of the 
Arab Other as a primary folk devil of our times: a figure which 
conflates Arabs, Muslims and Australians of Middle Eastern 
ancestry, and is grounded in an Orientalist pathology of crime, 
violence, barbarism and sexual rapaciousness. This racialised frame 
rests on the equation, in media reportage and political rhetoric, of 
the rowdy youth with the gang member, the rapist, the refugee and 
the terrorist, and their condensation into an aggressive Other. It 
also entails the criminalisation of cultural difference, set offby the 
merest examples of' dog-whistling', as deviance from cultural and 
not just legal codes becomes the threatening transgression of social 
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and moral order. This mythic figure informs not just the conservative 
perspectives on crime gangs, rape and terrorism, but also the 
responses of ethnic community leaders and more progressive 
attempts to understand' cultural clash' , yet it bears little relation to 
the lived experiences of (especially young) people of Arab and 
Muslim backgrounds. It provides, therefore, an ideologically charged 
'explanation' of complex problems of crime, terror and cultural 
difference. 
As we have outlined, the fear of crime has less to do with the 
calculation of real dangers than with a complex of fears that reveal 
deep and abiding anxieties embedded within contemporary 
Australian society and with the processes of economic, political 
and social division which increasingly structure cultural difference. 
These anxieties reach deep into the heart of Australian national 
belonging and suburban life. Rather than being ameliorated by social 
policy and debate, our fears around crime and terror are exploited 
by the media and by various levels of government. They have 
helped produce a climate where fear of crime is not just on the 
increase, but merges with perceptions of terrorist threats to foster 
a paranoid nationalism. This is not simply a symbolic process, but 
has substantial effects, as we have seen in various chapters, on 
policing and intelligence services, the judicial system, legal change, 
government, immigration and welfare policy. 
The 'pursuit of security', and the increasing mobilisation of 
the rhetoric of security in these areas of social and political life, 
have culminated in what some commentators, here and overseas, 
have suggested is tantamount to a burgeoning 'police state' or 'state 
terrorism' (Ramsey 21-22/6/03:43; Klein 8/9/03:11; McCulloch 
2002:54). While this is sometimes exaggerated, western and other 
countries have certainly seen the expansion of various law 
enforcement and intelligence powers in the wake of September 11 
- in Australia, these include the extensions of powers to detain 
without charge, including those as young as sixteen, the extension 
of interrogation powers, the increase in jail terms for failing to 
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cooperate, and so on (Walker 18/6/03:2). This is paralleled by 
increasing use of surveillance technologies and communications 
interception in Australia, at various levels oflaw enforcement (Lowe 
12/9/03:10). These changes come on top of changes to policing 
and the criminal justice system - increasing numbers of police, 
anti-gang laws, zero tolerance tactics, new powers of search, 
standard minimum sentences, greater 'accountability' for judges, 
and so on - and the expansion of the private security industry. A 
central element across these changes is the associated rhetoric, 
supposedly responding to community demand, of 'getting tough' 
on crime and terror. Premier Bob Carr's NSW election campaign 
of2003 was centred around this rhetoric (as had been Tony Blair's 
election in England). This was illustrated by a leaflet used to 
advertise the Labor government's 'tough decisions' (Australian 
Labor Party 2003): it featured the word 'TOUGH' spelt out with 
handcuffs. 
A recent study has examined the international rise ofthis 'penal 
populism' and its recognition of the electoral benefits in heightening 
fear of crime. It argues that the law and order auction in state and 
federal politics is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging most 
strongly during the 1990s, and relates directly to 'scaring up the 
votes' (Roberts et al. 2003; Totaro 27/1103:). Despite research which 
shows that harsher punishments have no effect on crime rates, 
various governments and their oppositions have engaged in this 
'penal populism', promising to increase penalties and the length of 
sentences, build more prisons, and to let murderous criminals, as 
Bob Carr promised, 'die injail' (Peterson 5/9/02:5). Sparks (2000) 
argues that penal populism is linked to wider problems of state 
legitimacy in a neo-liberal environment of 'crisis management' 
which too easily uses punishment as a political device in the context 
of the dismantling of welfare programs and policies. As Roberts et 
al. (2003) argue, this populism, driven by (often spurious) 'public 
opinion', has short-term benefits for the parties involved, and sells 
newspapers, but it has no benefits for a humane and effective system 
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of policing, law and imprisonment; it simply drives the fear of crime 
which underlies this opinion. The task of deterring crime, they 
suggest, needs more than bigger jails and longer sentences; and 
such reform would be aided by enlisting the insights drawn from 
research into crime, not simply bending to the whim of talkback 
radio and tabloidjournalism. 
The 'pursuit of security', realised in this penal populism, comes 
at some social cost. As Zedner (2000:211) and others have argued, 
the promise of community safety and solidarity is made at the 
expense of the social exclusion of marginalised groups, as particular 
ethnic minorities are identified as potential wrongdoers and sources 
of disorder. As we have suggested, rather than creating a sustainable 
sense of national belonging, this eats away at it, producing a paranoid 
nationalism. At stake, then, is not just the issue of better law 
enforcement and criminal justice policies, or even culturally sensitive 
policing (Chan 1997), as important as these are, but the wider issues 
of citizenship, community and cultural diversity. In this context of 
social exclusion, multiculturalism, as the set of policies that come 
to be seen as the source, rather than the response, to cultural 
difference, comes increasingly under attack. At the same time, 
effective responses to and insights into the complex causes of the 
fear of crime and its attendant perception of social disorder are 
lost in the rush of penal politics. 
The death of multiculturalism? 
Telegraph columnist Michael Duffy pronounced multiculturalism 
dead in August 2002 (17/8/02: 16). The thrust of Duffy's argument 
was that the Lebanese Muslim rapists, by making their assaults 
into racial attacks, asserted their cultural separateness from 
mainstream Australia. He then detailed the extent of 'their' failure 
to assimilate, referring to high levels of unemployment, reliance on 
welfare, ghettoisation and criminal activity, as manifestations of 
this cultural separateness. He lambasted 'elites' for protecting a 
failed system on ideological grounds, and on grounds of self-interest 
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(since they apparently benefited through cheap domestic servants) 
and hence doing a disservice to 'ordinary Australians'. Sundry 
opinion pieces and letters to the editor echoed the sentiment, as we 
have seen in the previous chapters. The same writers who are 
writing on gangs, rape and terrorism have also set their sights on 
wider issues such as multiculturalism, but at the same time they 
are attacking what they see as the left-wing elites whose interests 
it serves. 
It wasn't the first time multiculturalism has been pronounced 
dead, and it wasn't the last. Duffy argued much the same thing the 
previous year, in the wake of the Tampa incident. He added a 
swipe at the 'human rights industry' to his customary attack on 
'the multicultural industry' as the indulgence of 'elites' , which had 
been a favourite formula of One Nation. This concern was explicitly 
connected to crime: 
The elite gets all the benefits of refugees and poor immigrants 
and none of the drawbacks. 
To take an example: areas of western and southwestern Sydney 
for years have been suffering from criminal ethnic gangs. 
But the elite of Sydney lives far away, in predominantly Anglo-
Celtic enclaves, so they are rarely victims of the crime and 
social problems caused by their continuing advocacy of more 
poor immigrants from cultures very different to our own (Duffy 
8/9/01:23). 
This argument was repeated two months later (and two days before 
the federal election) by Miranda Devine in the same newspaper, 
railing against inner-city 'wankerati' who do not have to suffer the 
purported crime wave of western Sydney, which she mentioned 
alongside 'boat people' (Devine 8111101). This criticism of elites is 
at heart a criticism ofliberal and radical intellectuals who not only 
support the idea of multiculturalism but challenge the conservative 
line favoured by the government and tabloid and talkback com-
mentators - on crime, immigration, refugees, international politics 
and social policy - by pointing to more complex roots of these 
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problems than individual or 'ethnic' pathology, and to the complicit 
role of government policy in practices of social exclusion. The 
attempts at silencing the critical voice is tantamount to a fear of 
social explanation which Hage (2002: 140-141) believes lies at the 
heart of the need of the dominant culture to ignore the humanity of 
the Other. 
The failure of multiculturalism has been a constant theme 
amongst right-wing commentators since the inception of the broad 
array of social policies ushered in under this rubric in the 1970s. It 
has reached a crescendo in recent years, piggy-backing on the 
events we have described here, as evidenced in Chapter Four. In 
one infamous article, Janet Albrechtsen blamed 'multicultural 
zealots' for September 11, because 'in awe of Multicultural Man 
we tolerated the intolerant for too long' (4/9/02: 13). Multiculturalism: 
Albrechtsen claimed, allowed Muslims to remain culturally separate. 
Several months earlier, she had again argued for the need to chal-
lenge 'the cult of multiculturalism' , attacking the left for promoting 
community fears because of its support for 'unchecked immigration 
and unquestioned multiculturalism', and she managed to make the 
link between Islam and crime into the bargain (8/5/02: 11). Her 
criticisms ofIslam and her dislike for radical intellectuals are merged 
more symbolically in a piece in which she describes 'the Left' as 
'fanatics', 'fundamentalists' and 'militant mullahs' who are intolerant 
of alternative opinions (Albrecht sen 3017/03: 11). 
Tabloid columnist Mark Day had similarly declared in 2001 
that 'Tolerance needs a reality check'. Asserting that gang crime 
in Sydney was mainly 'an ethnic phenomenon', he argued that: 
'Tolerance does not extend to pack rape, home invasions, heroin 
pushing, extortion, fraud, smuggling, shoot-ups and standover gangs' 
(Day 8/8/01:27). A raft of replies arrived the very next day, and 
the heading of the Telegraph's letters column echoed the opinion 
piece: 'Tolerance wearing thin' . 
Piers Akerman's column, entitled 'Opening our doors to a wave 
of hatred' , was accompanied by a drawing of a woman in a chador 
with a brick wall instead of human eyes showing through the gap. 
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Akerman began by marshalling the September 11 events for an 
attack on Australian multiculturalism: 'The terrorist attack on the 
US should provide a wake-up call to Australia to re-examine its 
policy of multiculturalism'. He concluded: 
When we look within Australia we find a separatist clique unsure 
whether it follows religious or cultural practices. 
A beard, a scarf, a headdress or the length of a sleeve or dress 
are all important to some ofthese people and the supporters of 
multiculturalism tell other Australians that they are the ones 
who must exhibit tolerance when they are spat upon or cursed 
for wearing ordinary clothing in keeping with the dominant 
culture. 
It is the Muslims who must show tolerance to others here and 
in other Western nations otherwise they will always be separate 
(Akerman 18/9/01 :22). 
Across these articles, the same themes are drawn and redrawn , 
whether the issue be crime gangs, pack rape, terrorism, immigration 
or refugees. In a remarkable camera obscura, it is the Muslim! 
Lebanese/asylum seeker who exemplifies violence and dis-
crimination, while the' ordinary' (white) Australians are the victims 
of intolerance. At root is said to be a multiculturalism ideologically 
supported by 'elites'. The two prongs of the critique are the threat 
of the Other, which we explored in Chapter One; and the treason 
of the elites. Hage (1998) has deftly explored the shift in national 
identity and multiculturalism in terms of class-based forms of 
symbolic capital, and how the backlash of resentment represented 
by One Nation involves a conflict over national belonging and the 
rise of what he calls cosmo-multiculturalism. We need not repeat 
his powerful argument here, except to say that these journalists 
exemplified above have taken up the line developed by Pauline 
Hanson - rather, we want to suggest that the popular rejection of 
multiculturalism may be somewhat overstated. 
There is something of popular concern in the direction multi-
culturalism has taken in recent years, but the current truism that it 
is on the nose with the Australian people may be an ideological 
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claim not fully supported by the facts. A recent study commissioned 
by the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) focused on the lived 
experience of Australia's cultural diversity and reached very 
different conclusions. The report, based on a national sample of 
over 1400 Australians - including five non-English speaking 
samples of about 400 each (Filipino, Greek, Lebanese, Somali and 
Vietnamese), and 56 Indigenous people from six communities -
found a more complex, but overwhelmingly positive response to 
Australia's cultural diversity across all groups (Ang, Brand, Noble 
& Wilding 2002). The study found, for example, that two-thirds of 
the national sample (with a much higher figure amongst the NESB 
groups), believed that immigration had been a benefit to Australia, 
and 59% felt that cultural diversity was a strength of Australian 
society. While a smaller majority - 52% - supported multi-
culturalism, in the current climate this is a strong showing. The 
negative responses amounted to only about 10% of the population. 
Moreover, the study showed a strong civic and social engagement 
with cultural diversity: the majority of Australians 'lived and 
breathed' this diversity, fashioning hybrid lives and intercultural 
relations across their environments (in the way that we discussed 
in Chapter Three). This 'everyday cosmopolitanism' was in contrast 
to the assumptions about ethnic ghettoes which dominate tabloid 
debate. The most insular group was long-time Australians, largely 
of Anglo-Celtic ancestry, who lived in more culturally homogeneous 
worlds. The one finding which seemed to stand out as discrepant 
was that the vast majority of first generation migrants, and most of 
their children, did not identify as 'Australian', even though they 
saw Australia as home. It was this factor which was reported by 
the media. Even the Herald emphasised this seeming fragmentation, 
claiming that 'we're still strangers', even though the report as a 
whole did not reflect this (Banham 25/11102:4). The tabloid press 
and the radio shock jocks complained about migrants not assimilating 
(Clark 25111102), and once again shifted the blame for social disorder 
onto migrants. 
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What comes out ofthis report is that the vitriolic criticisms of 
multiculturalism in the name of the people distort the accommodating 
experience of intercultural relations in Australia. Maybe Australians 
are more comfortable with cultural diversity than they are credited 
with. Perhaps, as we found with the discrepancy between abstract 
fear of crime and the sense of safety people experienced in their 
own neighbourhoods, we fear multiculturalism when it is posed as 
an abstract system, but live with it happily in our daily lives. Either 
way, the hysteria associated with the attacks on multiculturalism 
represents the ideological agendas of conservative politicians and 
the commercial imperatives of tabloid journalism more than it does 
popular opinion. Having said that, as multicultural policies are slowly 
dismantled, along with social welfare policies generally, it may be 
time to rethink the nature and direction of multiculturalism and 
national belonging in Australia in the twenty-first century. 
Rebirthing multiculturalism 
Ironically, perhaps, some members of the left seem to agree with 
the right-wing ideologues we have discussed in thinking that it is 
time to abandon at least the word 'multiculturalism' (Bauman 
1999: 199; Turner 2002). Even some ethnic minority politicians share 
a discomfort towards the language of multiculturalism. In 2000, on 
the advice of its powerful Lebanese-Australian minister, Eddie 
Obeid, the Carr Government ofNSW assessed that even the word 
'ethnic' was an electoral liability and decided to rename the Ethnic 
Affairs Commission as the Community Relations Commission, argu-
ing that 'ethnic' was a 'divisive' term (Obeid 2000). This moment 
reflects the need to move towards a more inclusive multiculturalism; 
but we must not forget that these terms carry the acknowledgment 
of economic inequalities and the imperative for the ongoing work 
of social justice as well as the demand for cultural recognition. 
Moreover, the positive response found in the SBS study may suggest 
that the concept of 'multiculturalism' still has a useful role to play 
in the negotiation of intercultural relations in Australian society-
it has a currency that is not yet worthless. 
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Giddens writes about those significant crossroads when 
individuals are called on to take decisions that are particularly 
consequential for our lives, because the 'business as usual' attitude 
is broken by events. These 'fateful moments' are threatening to 
our ontological security and so we may feel the need to return to 
traditional authorities or fundamentalisms or tum to experts; but 
they are also opportunities to be embraced (1991: 112-114,142-3). 
We may characterise this as a 'fateful moment' in the life of 
Australian multiculturalism. Perhaps what we need to do is to use 
this opportunity to rethink the sense of community, agency and 
vision of multiculturalism and of national belonging. Both rest on 
the idea of connection and community (despite what the critics of 
multiculturalism say about its purported divisiveness; in any case, 
many Indigenous inhabitants see national community as divisive). 
The problem with 'community' has always been that it is a 
useful but flawed concept. It evokes nodes of collectivity and con-
nection - determined by geography, class, ethnicity, history, and 
so on - but such aggregations are always riven by other divisions 
or other nodes of collectivity. Further, community rests on a 
changeable relation between symbolic forms of identification and 
socio-structural forms of relationship. There is a tendency to 
emphasise connection over division, but this can often be ideological 
rather than simply utopian. When leaders attempt to fashion their 
subjects as a community, this is usually a function of some form of 
subordination. When a group fashions itself as a community, this is 
often done for some political purpose of representation and 
protection, or relates to some historical process of change. 
Therefore we can never take the claim to community for granted. 
The modern concern with 'community' emerges in the 
nineteenth century, alongside the emergence of the discipline of 
sociology, amidst rapidly shifting relations of class and gender, and 
mass migrations between country and city and across state borders, 
as all that had seemed solid melted into air in the face of the 
inexorably advancing commodity relation. 'Community' takes on 
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an important ideological and political function that works by exclud-
ing others. The effect of the ideological retrieval of community in 
the first half of the twentieth century can be seen most sharply in 
the attachment of the concept of community (Gemeinschaft) with 
the racially conceived 'people' (Volk) of a nation-state or empire 
in the Nazi ideology of Volkgemeinschaft. This ideology of 
community rested on the blaming of foreigners (or other 'races ') 
for economic woes, loss of national pride and identity, crime, 
immorality and the rest, in a way that simply set the benchmark for 
other projects of national and racial belonging, and is echoed in the 
political strategies we have outlined in this book. Race-based, 
ideological yearnings for community serve to provide imagined 
resolutions of real and potentially crisis-inducing contradictions. 
Ethnicities are not communities. Collective identities or 
'enclaves' designed to keep threatening others out are not com-
munities either. Perhaps, then, we need to think of new models of 
public connection, a new framework for articulating collective 
experience that addresses the real problems of social and economic 
division. Genuine community is a collective practice, a difficult and 
ongoing shared labour. As Bauman argues, the individuated, 
privatised worlds we live in increasingly make such labour 
impossible. We keep looking for occasions of communal motivation 
(1999:9-10), linking private experiences and public spectacles of 
solidarity, but the privatisation of public space makes it harder to 
find spaces for such spectacles. Moreover, the state can no longer 
guarantee collective safety in a globalised, corporatised world where 
power is increasingly removed from the political sphere, and where 
fears are increasingly the source of new forms of commodification 
(19,40). The only form of togetherness conceivable under these 
circumstances is community by exclusion, resting on the fears of 
many and the suffering of others; where we draw strength from 
providing outlets for pent -up anger from an array of origins, directed 
at specific targets and through practical tasks which seem to offer 
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a sense of agency (47-8). But, as Bauman argues, individuals cannot 
be free unless they are free to institute a society which promotes 
their freedom; that is, unless they institute collectively an agency 
capable of achieving this (107). He proposes a 'republic' or 
'multicommunitarian' model of debate and negotiation, in which 
critique, not conflict and allegiance, is at the heart of relationships 
(166-8,197). 
The problem with Australian multiculturalism, we might suggest, 
is twofold. First, it has devalued some of its original principles -
of social justice and equity - for a politics of cultural identity (Hage 
2002: 110). Multiculturalism as it was developed in Australia had as 
one of its aims a desire to fashion an equitable society in which 
true diversity was viable, economically and politically as well as 
culturally. In a world of increasing privatisation and globalisation, 
cultural difference increasingly comes to be experienced as social, 
economic and political inequality. There is little multiculturalism as 
social policy can do about this, but certainly a state with a rein-
vigorated sense of social justice can begin to restore the mechanisms 
of trust and protection that three decades of neo-liberalism have 
eroded. 
Second, a related flaw of Australian multiculturalism -
paternalism - was there from the start. What has been called 
Galbally multiculturalism, named after the key report that ushered 
in multicultural programs, was predicated on a top-down model of 
funding which privileged (ethnic) community leadership over the 
lived work of community, creating singular lines of accountability 
and internal patronage, and tying' leaders' into party political forms 
of allegiance (Jakubowicz, Morrissey & Palser 1984). The result 
was also a reification of ethnicity as identity, as a badge of 
membership (or passport control, see Hoffman-Axthelm 1992: 196) 
rather than a resource for living. We now live with essentialised 
notions of ethnicity which do not conform to the 'living diversity' of 
Australian society, but rather act as sources of tension and conflict 
amongst differently identified groups. This model of ethnicity easily 
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becomes a model of anatagonisms. This is not to side with the 
Albrechtsens and Akermans, but to realise that a more livable form 
of multiculturalism is one that bends with cultural diversity, rather 
than caging it. This book has, in some ways, outlined the kind of 
multiculturalism we have in Australia because of the social 
economic and political forces which have shaped it in recent years: 
This is not to reject multiculturalism as a project, but to critique the 
uses of racialised discourses embedded in Australian multi-
culturalism in order to envision a policy and practice more in step 
with cultural diversity. 
The renaming ofthe Ethnic Affairs Commission in NSW was 
one moment when such a shift was seemingly possible. When Bob 
Carr spoke at Government House on the occasion of its rebadging 
as the NSW Community Relations Commission, he argued that the 
term 'ethnic' has no salience today in NSW. Yet the day after, and 
in the many days since, he continued to use the word 'ethnic', but 
in one context only: in relation to crime. The reification of ethnicity 
produces the possibility of selective ethnicity; that it belongs only to 
some, and hence can become a source of social division and an 
explanatory pathology for social behaviours. 
This selective ethnicity is pervasive in Australia and reflects 
the 'invisibility' of whiteness, its tendency to see itself as normal 
and non-whiteness as different. Moreover, ethnicity becomes a 
prison from which one cannot escape: the journalists and shock 
jocks who bemoan the inability of migrants to assimilate are the 
same ones who insist on referring to 'Lebanese gangs' and 'Chinese 
triads'. Australian multiculturalism shares with Australia's racist 
history an emphasis on ethnicity over citizenship. When migrants 
arrive in Australia their former nationality becomes an ethnicity 
they can never shake off in the eyes of white Australia, yet they 
are criticised for declaring an attachment to this identity. It is no 
wonder NESB people didn't identify as 'Australian' in the SBS 
study - they are not allowed to be. Similarly, as Adele Horin points 
out in relation to the proposed prayer centre in Annangrove, ethnic 
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groups are damned if they stick together, and damned if they leave 
it and try to live in 'true-blue Christian Australian' communities 
(21-22/12/02:25). 
We must abandon an 'over-defined' or 'ethnic' nationalism 
for a fluid-state nationalism (Nairn 2002/3:6) which uses the 
commonalities and differences of social experience as the basis 
for a dialogic relation to national community: as a reason for 
welcoming difference rather than as a barricade for protecting us 
from it. Our notions of both national belonging and cultural identity 
must be inclusive not exclusive; they must be about possibilities of 
extension and intermingling, not borders designed to keep others 
out. They must be mechanisms for acting together, for shaping 
mechanisms of collective agency, which recognise our shared 
humanity first and foremost (Hage 2002: 139). As Bauman 
(1993: 183) has argued, responsibility is fundamental to the structure 
of subjectivity. In the claims about multiculturalism, crime, terrorism 
and cultural difference detailed here, it is always someone else's 
fault. In abrogating responsibility we lose a sense of social and 
collective agency. 
It is not rejection of multiculturalism being proposed here, and 
a return to nostalgic forms of national identity or fundamentalism 
which breed antagonism, and it is certainly not a romantic evocation 
of some fuzzy one-ness. We need to recreate a multiculturalism 
that is deeply critical but ethical. It should be critical in challenging 
the assumptions and essentialisms that pervade multicultural policy 
as it currently stands, undertaking a constant interrogation of its 
social, economic and moral bases, the rules of its possibility. What 
Hage calls the fear of social explanation undermines, for example, 
effective organisation of the criminal justice system because it 
silences those who may have greatest insight into these social 
problems and their relation to cultural diversity. Rather, a critical 
multiculturalism should embrace the task of seeing things in all their 
complexity and as articulated with wider economic and political 
structures. Similarly, sophisticated crime prevention policies and 
programs need to look more substantively at issues of community 
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regeneration and associative democracy with a stronger pluralist 
ethos (Hogg & Brown 1998: 181). 
Such an approach to both multiculturalism and criminal justice 
needs to be more 'ethical'. Multiculturalism has always been a 
moral project - it is, at some level, about forms of acceptable 
behaviour towards others - this is not the same as a moralistic 
injunction, which is the kind of criticism often levelled at the 'polit-
ically correct' multicultural industry. Ang (2001) asks similarly for 
an ethics of multiculturalism. She argues that Australian multi-
culturalism has always been deeply ambivalent - it has preached 
a message of harmony but practiced forms of division; it claimed 
to be anti-racist but has at its heart a repressed sense of race 
(143,96,104-5). She suggests we need a new national narrative 
that can account for change, rather than reify a nostalgic sense of 
Australian and ethnic pasts (107). An ethics of multiculturalism 
would acknowledge this ambivalence and ask us to consider again 
the problem of how to act towards each other in a culturally diverse 
nation (145-6). Unless we interrogate this ambivalence, we will 
maintain a multiculturalism that preserves a conservative element 
of racialisation (111). A positive conception of this ambivalence 
would provide the basis for a vision of what a multicultural society 
could be. Hogg and Brown argue similarly that in the hostile climate 
of law and order debate, we need a 'politics of civility' which 
challenges the unwritten social codes of incivility and moves towards 
greater recognition of shared responsibility (1998: 16, 177). 
This would also mean abandoning the macho posture which 
dominates contemporary politics - against that language of' getting 
tough' (on crime, on terrorists), and not being 'soft' or 'weak' or 
uncertain, we need an ethics of care, reciprocity and responsibility. 
Such an ethics would rest on the idea of responsibility, not as self-
serving and individuated, but rather responsibility for the Other 
(Levinas 1997). This would also allow for the possibility of a 
multiculturalism which refused to see ethnicities as peripheral 
adjuncts to mainstream society, as things to be reified (Stratton 
1998: 16,208-9). 
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The task then is not just to continue to celebrate the differences 
we rightly value, nor just to attack the State whose actions serve 
to denigrate and discriminate against Arabic-speaking communities, 
but to problematise the not so easily seen part, the space in between. 
We need to refashion a national identity which questions the 
apparent neutrality at the heart of Australian identity, and to refashion 
a multiculturalism which does not just sit at the edges of the lives of 
'ordinary Australians' , or allow for the fabrication of 'bin Ladens' 
in every suburb, but questions what it means to be an 'ordinary 
Australian' . 
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